On Point: B. Opinions

Jennings v. Stephens, USSC No. 13-7211, 2015 WL 159277 (January 14, 2015), reversing Jennings v. Stephens, 537 Fed. Appx. 326 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

A federal district court granted Jennings’s habeas relief, ordering a new sentencing hearing based on two of the three theories of ineffective assistance of counsel that Jennings raised. The state appealed, and Jennings defended the district court judgment on all three theories. The Fifth Circuit held that Jennings’s claim on the third theory was procedurally barred because it was rejected by the district court and Jennings hadn’t cross-appealed or obtained a certificate of appealability. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia the Supreme Court reverses, holding that Jennings may defend the district court’s judgment based on the third theory.

Whitfield v. United States, USSC No. 13-9026, 2015 WL 144680 (January 13, 2015), affirming United States v. Whitfield, 695 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court unanimously holds that a bank robber forces a person to “accompany” him for purposes of the enhanced penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) when he forces that person to go somewhere with him, even if the movement occurs entirely within a single building or over a short distance.

Heien v. North Carolina, USSC No. 13-604, 2014 WL 7010684 (December 15, 2014), affirming State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Rejecting the position taken by Wisconsin and the clear majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, the Supreme Court holds that a reasonable mistake of law may give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory seizure under the Fourth Amendment. While a statement of the Court’s holding is simple, its decision doesn’t fully articulate how courts are to determine when a mistake of law is “reasonable,” leading the sole dissenting Justice (Sotomayor) to predict lower courts will have difficulty applying the Court’s decision.

Warger v. Shauers, USSC No. 13-517, 2014 WL 6885952 (December 9, 2014), affirming Warger v. Shauers, 721 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving an issue that had split some federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court unanimously holds that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one juror’s affidavit or testimony about what another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other juror was dishonest during voir dire.

Glebe v. Frost, USSC No. 14-95, 11/17/14 (per curiam), reversing Frost v. Van Boening, 757 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); docket and Scotusblog page

Supreme Court precedent has not clearly established that improper restriction of a defendant’s closing argument is structural error, so the Ninth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief on that ground.

Jeremy Carroll v. Andrew Carman, et ux., USSC No. 14-212, 11/10/14 (per curiam), reversing and remanding Carman v. Carroll, 749 F.3d 192 (3rd Cir. 2014); docket

A police officer being sued under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Fourth Amendment doesn’t lose qualified immunity as a matter of law because he went to the back door of the plaintiff’s home instead than the front door, as it is not clearly established that an officer doing a “knock and talk” must go the front door.

Lopez v. Smith, USSC No. 13-946, 10/6/14 (per curiam), reversing Smith v. Lopez, 731 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2013); docket

When a state prisoner seeks federal habeas relief on the ground that a state court, in adjudicating a claim on the merits, misapplied federal law, a federal court may grant relief only if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We have emphasized, time and again, that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), … prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is “clearly established.” …. Because the Ninth Circuit failed to comply with this rule, we reverse its decision granting habeas relief to respondent Marvin Smith. (Slip op. at 1).

McCullen v. Coakley, USSC No. 12-1168, 2014 WL 2882079 (June 26, 2014), reversing McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In this decision the Supreme Court strikes down a Massachusetts law making it a crime to stand on a public road or sidewalk within thirty-five feet of a reproductive health care facility. While all the justices agree the law violates the First Amendment, they do not agree on the reasons for reaching that result.

Riley v. California, USSC No. 13-132 (together with United States v. Wurie, USSC No. 13-212), 2014 WL 2864483 (June 25, 2014), reversing People v. Riley, No. D059840 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2013) (unpublished) (and affirming United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)); Scotusblog case page (which includes links to briefs and commentary) and symposium page (additional opinion commentary)

Kevin Loughrin v. United States, USSC No. 13-316, 2014 WL 2807180 (June 23, 2014), affirming United States v. Loughrin, 710 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving an issue that split the federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court holds that the section of the federal bank fraud statute that prohibits “knowingly execut[ing] a scheme … to obtain” property owned by, or under the custody of, a bank “by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,” 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), requires only that the defendant intend to obtain bank property and that this end is accomplished “by means of” a false statement. Nothing in the statute requires proof of intent to defraud or deceive a bank.