On Point: B. Opinions

Kentucky v. Hollis Deshaun King, USSC No. 09-1272, 5/16/11, reversing, King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649 (2010)

The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement (here, imminent destruction of evidence) isn’t circumscribed by whether the exigency was “police-created.”

It is well established that “exigent circumstances,” including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant.

Bobby v. Harry Mitts, USSC No. 10-1000, 5/2/11 (per curiam)

The death penalty may not be imposed when the jury isn’t permitted to consider a verdict of guilt on a lesser included, non-capital offense supported by the evidence, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). As the Court now notes:

such a scheme intolerably enhances the irrelevant considerations into the factfinding process, diverting the jury’s attention from the central issue of whether the State has satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a capital crime.” Id.,

Cullen v. Scott Lynn Pinholster, USSC No. 09-1088, 4/4/11

We first consider the scope of the record for a §2254(d)(1) inquiry. The State argues that review is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Pinholster contends that evidence presented to the federal habeas court may also be considered. We agree with the State.

…

We now hold that review under §2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.

Felkner v. Steven Frank Jackson, USSC No. 10-797, 3/31/11

On habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the court of appeals failed to give sufficient deference to the state court determination that the prosecutor had race-neutral reasons for striking 2 of 3 black prospective jurors.

The prosecutor struck one juror because she had an MSW, and the prosecutor didn’t like having social workers on the jury;

Henry W. Skinner v. Switzer, USSC No. 09-9000, 3/7/11

A convicted state prisoner may utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to seek DNA testing of crime-scene evidence.

When may a state prisoner, complaining of unconstitutional state action, pursue a civil rights claim under §1983, and when is habeas corpus the prisoner’s sole remedy? …

We summarized the relevant case law most recently in Wilkinson v.

Wall v. Kahlil Kholi, USSC No. 09-868, 3/7/11

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim” tolls the 1-year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition. 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2). The question in this case is whether a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law tolls the limitation period,

Pepper v. U.S., USSC No. 09-6822, 3/2/11

In light of the federal sentencing framework described above, we think it clear that when a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal and his case remanded for resentencing, a district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s rehabilitation since his prior sentencing and that such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range.

The thrust of the opinion is statutory,

FCC v. AT&T, USSC No. 09-1279, 3/1/11

The “personal privacy” exemption in the federal Freedom of Information Act doesn’t apply to corporations, though they are considered “persons” under the Act.

… Adjectives typically reflect the meaning of corresponding nouns, but not always. Sometimes they acquire distinct meanings of their own. The noun “crab” refers variously to a crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective “crabbed” can refer to handwriting that is “difficult to read,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 527 (2002);

Michigan v. Bryant, USSC No. 09-150

At respondent Richard Bryant’s trial, the court admitted statements that the victim, Anthony Covington, made to police officers who discovered him mortally wounded in a gas station parking lot. … We hold that the circumstances of the interaction between Covington and the police objectively indicate that the “primary purpose of the interrogation” was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis,

Walker v. Charles W. Martin, USSC No. 09-996, 2/23/11

State court time limit for seeking postconviction relief needn’t be “fixed,” but instead may be discretionary in nature, for purposes of the habeas default rule.

In a recent decision, Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. ___ (2009), this Court clarified that a state procedural bar may count as an adequate and independent ground for denying a federal habeas petition even if the state court had discretion to reach the merits despite the default.