On Point: B. Opinions

FCC v. AT&T, USSC No. 09-1279, 3/1/11

The “personal privacy” exemption in the federal Freedom of Information Act doesn’t apply to corporations, though they are considered “persons” under the Act.

… Adjectives typically reflect the meaning of corresponding nouns, but not always. Sometimes they acquire distinct meanings of their own. The noun “crab” refers variously to a crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective “crabbed” can refer to handwriting that is “difficult to read,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 527 (2002);

Michigan v. Bryant, USSC No. 09-150

At respondent Richard Bryant’s trial, the court admitted statements that the victim, Anthony Covington, made to police officers who discovered him mortally wounded in a gas station parking lot. … We hold that the circumstances of the interaction between Covington and the police objectively indicate that the “primary purpose of the interrogation” was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis,

Walker v. Charles W. Martin, USSC No. 09-996, 2/23/11

State court time limit for seeking postconviction relief needn’t be “fixed,” but instead may be discretionary in nature, for purposes of the habeas default rule.

In a recent decision, Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. ___ (2009), this Court clarified that a state procedural bar may count as an adequate and independent ground for denying a federal habeas petition even if the state court had discretion to reach the merits despite the default.

Swarthout v. Damon Cooke, USSC No. 10-333, 1/24/11

Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 of a state’s decision to deny parole is limited to whether the inmate was provided an opportunity to be heard and a statement of reasons why parole was denied. The federal court simply has no authority to scrutinize the merits of the denial.

… Because the only federal right at issue is procedural,

Harrington v. Richter, USSC No. 09-587, 1/19/11, reversing grant of habeas relief, in 578 F. 3d 944

The 9th Circuit failed to give sufficient deference to the state court’s determination that Richter received adequate representation, requiring reversal of it grant of AEDPA-2254 habeas relief. The principal thrust of the opinion relates to the standard of review, both as to AEDPA habeas generally and ineffective-assistance claims more particularly.

Premo v. Moore, USSC No. 09-659, 1/19/11, vacating grant of habeas relief, in 574 F.3d 1092

Moore, who admitted brutalizing the victim and shooting him in the temple, accepted a plea bargain on advice of counsel: he pleaded guilty to felony-murder, and received the minimum allowable sentence, thus avoiding a capital-offense charge. He raised a postconviction challenge to counsel’s failure to seek suppression of his statement to the police,

Wilson v. Corcoran, USSC No. 10-91, 11/8/10, vacating and remanding habeas grant in, Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 593 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2010)

Mere violation of state law doesn’t support habeas relief, violation of federal law being required.

But it is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, USSC No. 08-1521, 6/28/10

Two years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. ___ (2008), we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, and we struck down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. The city of Chicago (City) and the village of Oak Park,

Magwood v. Patterson, USSC No. 09-158, 6/24/10

After a defendant has been resentenced in state court pursuant to relief granted on a federal habeas petition, a second federal habeas petition challenging the new sentence will be treated as a first petition (vs. a “2nd or successive” petition), even if raising grounds that could have been raised in the original petition.

We have described the phrase “second or successive” as a “term of art.” Id.,

City of Ontario v. Quon, USSC No. 08-1392, 6/17/10

Assuming without deciding that police officer Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages of his department-issued pager, the Court concludes that the warrantless review of Quon’s pager transcript was reasonable because it was motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose and was not excessive in scope.

The 4th amendment came into play because Quon’s employer was a government agency,