On Point: B. Opinions

Swarthout v. Damon Cooke, USSC No. 10-333, 1/24/11

Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 of a state’s decision to deny parole is limited to whether the inmate was provided an opportunity to be heard and a statement of reasons why parole was denied. The federal court simply has no authority to scrutinize the merits of the denial.

… Because the only federal right at issue is procedural,

Harrington v. Richter, USSC No. 09-587, 1/19/11, reversing grant of habeas relief, in 578 F. 3d 944

The 9th Circuit failed to give sufficient deference to the state court’s determination that Richter received adequate representation, requiring reversal of it grant of AEDPA-2254 habeas relief. The principal thrust of the opinion relates to the standard of review, both as to AEDPA habeas generally and ineffective-assistance claims more particularly.

Premo v. Moore, USSC No. 09-659, 1/19/11, vacating grant of habeas relief, in 574 F.3d 1092

Moore, who admitted brutalizing the victim and shooting him in the temple, accepted a plea bargain on advice of counsel: he pleaded guilty to felony-murder, and received the minimum allowable sentence, thus avoiding a capital-offense charge. He raised a postconviction challenge to counsel’s failure to seek suppression of his statement to the police,

Wilson v. Corcoran, USSC No. 10-91, 11/8/10, vacating and remanding habeas grant in, Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 593 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2010)

Mere violation of state law doesn’t support habeas relief, violation of federal law being required.

But it is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, USSC No. 08-1521, 6/28/10

Two years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. ___ (2008), we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, and we struck down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. The city of Chicago (City) and the village of Oak Park,

Magwood v. Patterson, USSC No. 09-158, 6/24/10

After a defendant has been resentenced in state court pursuant to relief granted on a federal habeas petition, a second federal habeas petition challenging the new sentence will be treated as a first petition (vs. a “2nd or successive” petition), even if raising grounds that could have been raised in the original petition.

We have described the phrase “second or successive” as a “term of art.” Id.,

City of Ontario v. Quon, USSC No. 08-1392, 6/17/10

Assuming without deciding that police officer Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages of his department-issued pager, the Court concludes that the warrantless review of Quon’s pager transcript was reasonable because it was motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose and was not excessive in scope.

The 4th amendment came into play because Quon’s employer was a government agency,

Dolan v. United States, USSC No. 09-367, 6/14/10

This case concerns the remedy for missing a statutory deadline. The statute in question focuses upon mandatory restitution for victims of crimes. It provides that “the court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim’s losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.” 18 U. S. C. §3664(d)(5). We hold that a sentencing court that misses the 90-day deadline nonetheless retains the power to order restitution—at least where,

Holland v. Florida, USSC No. 09-5327, 6/14/10

Habeas – Filing Deadline – Equitable Tolling, Generally

The 1-year limitations period for filing an 18 U.S.C. §2254 habeas petition is subject to “equitable tolling”:

We have not decided whether AEDPA’s statutory limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons. … Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have considered the question, we hold that §2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.

Barber v. Thomas, USSC No. 09-5201, 6/7/10

Credit for good behavior for a federal prisoner is awarded after, rather than before, the fact under 18 U. S. C. §3624(b)(1).

Of course, computation of federal sentence credit will ordinarily be a matter of indifference to the state practitioner, but the Court’s discussion of the rule of lenity may hold interest:

Fourth, petitioners ask us to invoke the rule of lenity and construe §3624 (2006 ed.) in their favor,