On Point: B. Opinions

Berghuis v. Thompkins, USSC No. 08-1470, 6/1/10

Thompkins’ acknowledgment that he prayed for God’s forgiveness for the shooting was admissible as valid waiver of Miranda rights, despite being preceded by nearly 3 hours of silence during custodial interrogation. Rights must be invoked unequivocally, or not at all:

The Court has not yet stated whether an invocation of the right to remain silent can be ambiguous or equivocal, but there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis.

Carr v. U.S., USSC No. 08-1301, 6/1/10

… the Act established a federal criminal offense covering, inter alia, any person who (1) “is required to register under [SORNA],” (2) “travels in interstate or foreign commerce,” and (3) “knowingly fails to register or update a registration.” 18 U. S. C. §2250(a). At issue in this case is whether §2250 applies to sex offenders whose interstate travel occurred prior to SORNA’s effective date and,

U.S. v. O’Brien, USSC No. 08-1569, 5/24/10

§ 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), which exposes a person convicted of possessing, using or carrying a machinegun during certain federal crimes to a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years is an offense element subject to proof beyond reasonable doubt at trial rather than a penalty enhancer provable by mere preponderance of the evidence at sentencing.

The border between offense element and sentence enhancer remains indistinct at crucial junctures.

U.S. v. Marcus, USSC No. 08-1341, 5/24/10

… (A)n appellate court may,in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an “error”; (2) the error is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) the error “affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means” it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings”; and (4) “the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,

U.S. v. Comstock, USSC No. 08-1224, 5/17/10

The federal scheme for detaining the equivalent of ch. 980 sexually violent persons beyond release date from federal prison, 18 U.S.C. § 1848, is a valid exercise of Congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper clause. In reaching this conclusion, the Court “assume(s), but we do not decide, that other provisions of the Constitution—such as the Due Process Clause—do not prohibit civil commitment in these circumstances.”

Graham v. Florida, USSC No. 08-7412, 5/17/10

In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. This determination; the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders; and the severity of life without parole sentences all lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration is cruel and unusual. This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.

Renico v. Lett, USSC No. 09-338, 5/3/10

The state court’s conclusion of manifest necessity for mistrial where the foreperson reported inability to reach unanimity wasn’t unreasonable, hence grant of habeas relief is vacated:

… (T)rial judges may declare a mistrial “whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity” for doing so. Id., at 580. The decision to declare a mistrial is left to the “sound discretion” of the judge,

Padilla v. Kentucky, USSC No. 08-651, 3/31/10

In sum, we have long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Hill , 474 U. S., at 57; see also Richardson , 397 U. S., at 770–771. The severity of deportation—“the equivalent of banishment or exile,” Delgadillo v.

Berghuis v. Smith, USSC No. 08-1402, 3/30/10

Defendants have Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury drawn from fair cross section of community. To establish prima facie violation of this “fair-cross-section,” requirement, a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as “distinctive” (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) “systematic exclusion” in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation. Various methods have been proposed to test underrepresentation,

Thaler v. Haynes, USSC No. 09–273, 2/22/10 (per curiam)

Nothing in Supreme Court caselaw clearly requires “that a demeanor-based explanation for a peremptory challenge must be rejected unless the judge personally observed and recalls the relevant aspect of the prospective juror’s demeanor.” In other words, there’s no requirement that the judge have been present during jury selection in order to evaluate a Batson claim defended by the prosecutor as based on the juror’s demeanor.