On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Musacchio v. United States, USSC No. 14-1095, 2016 WL 280757 (January 25, 2016), affirming United States v. Musacchio, 590 Fed. Appx. 359 (5th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving a split among the federal circuits, a unanimous Supreme Court holds that when a jury instruction sets forth all the elements of the charged crime but incorrectly adds one more element, a sufficiency of evidence challenge is assessed against the elements of the charged crime, not against the erroneously heightened command in the jury instruction.

Kansas v. Carr, USSC Nos. 14-449, 14-450, 14-452, 2016 WL 228342 (January 20, 2016); reversing and remanding Kansas v. (Jonathan) Carr, 329 P.3d 1195 (Kan. 2014), Kansas v. (Reginald) Carr, 331 P.3d 544 (Kan. 2014), and Kansas v. Gleason, 329 P.3d 1102 (Kan. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The Eighth Amendment does not require courts to instruct the jury deciding whether to impose the death penalty that the defendant does not have to prove mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

Question presented:

Whether a predicate prior conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act must qualify as such under the elements of the offense simpliciter, without extending the modified categorical approach to separate statutory definitional provisions that merely establish the means by which referenced elements may be satisfied rather than stating alternative elements or versions of the offense.

Question presented:

Whether, after a judge has discharged a jury from service in a case and the jurors have left the judge’s presence, the judge may recall the jurors for further service in the same case.

Hurst v. Florida, USSC No. 14-7505, 2016 WL 112683 (January 12, 2016); reversing and remanding Hurst v. State, 147 So.3d 435 (Fla. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In Florida the jury makes a recommendation as to whether to impose the death penalty, but the judge then holds a separate sentencing hearing and decides whether there are sufficient aggravating circumstances to justify the death penalty. This sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.” (Slip op. at 1).

Bruce v. Samuels, USSC No. 14-844, 2016 WL 112684 (January 12, 2016), affirming Pinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) of the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis must pay 20% of his or her existing income toward the filing fee of a case he or she files until the fee is paid. The federal circuit courts were split when it came to applying this requirement to prisoners who owed fees for more than one case. Some treated the 20% as a cap, so that the 20% would be taken out and applied to one case at a time till each fee was paid. Others assessed 20% per case, so that an inmate with, for example, three filing fees to pay would have 60% of his or her income taken. The Supreme Court unanimously adopts the second approach.

White v. Wheeler, USSC No. 14-1372, 2015 WL 8546240, 12/14/15 (per curiam), reversing Wheeler v. Simpson, 779 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2015); docket

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals failed to give proper deference to the state courts’ rulings when it granted habeas relief on the ground that the state courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent regarding removal of a juror in a death penalty case.

Question presented:

Is there a common law “special circumstances” exception to the Prison Litigation Reform Act that relieves an inmate of his mandatory obligation to exhaust administrative remedies when the inmate erroneously believes that he satisfied exhaustion by participating in an internal investigation?

Question presented:

Whether the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause applies to the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution, protecting a criminal defendant from inordinate delay in final disposition of his case.

Question presented:

Whether 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) requires a sex offender who resides in a foreign country to update his registration in the jurisdiction where he formerly resided.