On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Warger v. Shauers, USSC No. 13-517, 2014 WL 6885952 (December 9, 2014), affirming Warger v. Shauers, 721 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving an issue that had split some federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court unanimously holds that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one juror’s affidavit or testimony about what another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other juror was dishonest during voir dire.

Questions presented:

I.   Whether a state court that considers the evidence presented at a petitioner’s penalty phase proceeding as determinative of the petitioner’s claim of mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), has based its decision on an unreasonable determination of facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

II.   Whether a state court that denies funding to an indigent petitioner who has no other means of obtaining evidence of his mental retardation has denied petitioner his “opportunity to be heard,”

Questions presented:

1.  Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires law enforcement officers to provide accommodations to an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect into custody.

2.  Whether it was clearly established that, even where an exception to the warrant requirement applied, an entry into a residence could be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment by reason of the anticipated resistance of an armed and violent suspect within.

Glebe v. Frost, USSC No. 14-95, 11/17/14 (per curiam), reversing Frost v. Van Boening, 757 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); docket and Scotusblog page

Supreme Court precedent has not clearly established that improper restriction of a defendant’s closing argument is structural error, so the Ninth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief on that ground.

Jeremy Carroll v. Andrew Carman, et ux., USSC No. 14-212, 11/10/14 (per curiam), reversing and remanding Carman v. Carroll, 749 F.3d 192 (3rd Cir. 2014); docket

A police officer being sued under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Fourth Amendment doesn’t lose qualified immunity as a matter of law because he went to the back door of the plaintiff’s home instead than the front door, as it is not clearly established that an officer doing a “knock and talk” must go the front door.

Questions presented:

(1) Whether facial challenges to ordinances and statutes are permitted under the Fourth Amendment; and

(2) Whether a hotel has an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a hotel guest registry where the guest-supplied information is mandated by law and an ordinance authorizes the police to inspect the registry, and if so, whether the ordinance is facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment unless it expressly provides for pre-compliance judicial review before the police can inspect the registry.

Questions presented:

(1) Whether a state court’s rejection of a claim of federal constitutional error on the ground that any error, if one occurred, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is an “adjudicat[ion] on the merits” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), so that a federal court may set aside the resulting final state conviction only if the defendant can satisfy the restrictive standards imposed by that provision; and

(2) Whether the court of appeals properly applied the standard articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).

Question presented:

Does a felony conviction extinguish all of a defendant’s property interests in a firearm, such that he or she may not even arrange for the sale or other transfer of any surrendered or seized firearms to another person because doing so would constitute “constructive” possession and thus violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)’s ban on possession of a firearm?

Lopez v. Smith, USSC No. 13-946, 10/6/14 (per curiam), reversing Smith v. Lopez, 731 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2013); docket

When a state prisoner seeks federal habeas relief on the ground that a state court, in adjudicating a claim on the merits, misapplied federal law, a federal court may grant relief only if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We have emphasized, time and again, that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), … prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is “clearly established.” …. Because the Ninth Circuit failed to comply with this rule, we reverse its decision granting habeas relief to respondent Marvin Smith. (Slip op. at 1).

Questions presented:

1. Does an individual’s obligation to report suspected child abuse make that individual an agent of law enforcement for purposes of the Confrontation Clause?

2. Do a child’s out-of-court statements to a teacher in response to the teacher’s concerns about potential child abuse qualify as “testimonial” statements subject to the Confrontation Clause?