On Point: 44. SCOTUS

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen, USSC No. 20-843, 6/23/22 reversing N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Beach (2nd Cir. unpublished); Scotusblog page (including briefs and commentary)

You can read tons of analysis of, and commentary on, of this precedent-demolishing (and establishing) case at Scotusblog (and many, many other places). SCOTUS abandoned its previous balancing approach to assessing gun regulations under the Second Amendment in favor of a history-only approach (with that “history,” as so often in SCOTUS, very much in dispute). As to the specific question before it, the Court struck down state concealed-carry licensing regimes that invest authorities with discretion to decide whether to issue a permit to a given applicant (the so-called “may-issue” model).

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, No. 19-1392, 2022 WL 2276808, June 24, 2022, reversing 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019); Scotusblog coverage

As you all know, Dobbs overruled Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), which held that a woman has a constitutional right to an abortion under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Dobbs has implications for SPD clients. This post highlights a few.

Denezpi v. United States, No. 20-7622, 2022 WL 2111348, June 13, 2022, affirming U.S. v. Denezpi, 979 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 2020); Scotusblog page (including briefs and commentary)

Denezpi was prosecuted in the Court of Indian Offenses, a creature of the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs that provides a criminal court system for those (relatively few) tribes that haven’t set up their own. After serving a 140-day sentence in that prosecution, he was charged for and convicted of the same conduct in federal court—and ultimately given a 30-year sentence. The Supreme Court rejects his claim that the second prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Last week SCOTUS issued Kemp v. United States construing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). That rule allows a party to seek relief based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” within one year of the date on which a judgment becomes final. Wisconsin’s analog is §806.07.  The issue in Kemp was whether the term “mistake” means mistakes by parties or whether it includes mistakes by judges.

Shinn v. Ramirez, USSC No. 20-1009, 5/23/22, reversing Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2019); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

You can read at Scotusblog quite a bit of commentary on this most recent entry in the present Court’s war on habeas. At oral argument, the lawyer for the state told the court that “innocence isn’t enough” to merit relief for one of the death-row inmates in this case to gain relief. And the Court now agrees. The reason: the likely innocent inmate’s state-provided postconviction counsel didn’t make a good enough record that his trial counsel was ineffective.

Jones v. Hendrix, USSC No. 21-857; cert. granted 5/16/22; Scotusblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)

Question presented:

The question presented is whether federal inmates who did not—because established circuit precedent stood firmly against them—challenge their convictions on the ground that the statute of conviction did not criminalize their activity may apply for habeas relief under § 2241 after this Court later makes clear in a retroactively applicable decision that the circuit precedent was wrong and that they are legally innocent of the crime of conviction

State v. Jovan T. Mull, 2020AP1362, petition for review of a per curiam opinion granted, 5/18/22, case activity (including briefs)

Question Presented (from petition):

Under binding case law, in reviewing an ineffective assistance claim, the court must defer to a trial attorney’s strategic decisions. Here, the circuit court found Mull’s attorney used reasonable strategies in choosing a defense and handling cross-examination of a witness, and it deferred to the attorney’s strategy. But the court of appeals substituted its own decisions for those of Mull’s trial attorney. Did the court of appeals impermissibly fail to defer to Mull’s attorney’s strategic decisions?

Hemphill v. New York,  USSC No. 20-637, 142 S.Ct. 681, 1/20/22 reversing and remanding People v. Hemphill, 150 N.E.3d 356; Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

New York charged Hemphill with a homicide; a stray 9mm bullet fired after a fight in the street had killed a child. Hemphill’s defense was that another man, Morris, had fired the shot. Police had searched Morris’s room and found both 9mm and .357-magnum ammunition, and the state had, in fact, originally charged Morris with the murder. Hemphill was able to introduce evidence of Morris’s possession of the 9mm ammo by cross-examination of a state’s witness. In response the state sought to introduce portions of a transcript of Morris’s ultimate plea–in which he admitted to possessing a .357 revolver, rather than the 9mm pistol that had killed the child. Morris was out of the country and thus not available for cross-examination, but the New York courts ruled the transcripts were admissible under state law allowing such evidence where it is “reasonably necessary” to “correct” a “misleading impression.” The Supreme Court reverses, declaring in an 8-1 decision that “Hemphill did not forfeit his confrontation right merely by making the plea allocution arguably relevant to his theory of defense.” (Slip op. at 2).

Shoop v. Twyford, USSC No. 21-511, cert granted 1/14/22; SCOTUSblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)

Questions  presented:

1.  28 U.S.C. §2241(c) allows federal courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering the transportation of a state prisoner only when necessary to bring the inmate into court to testify or for trial. May federal courts evade this prohibition by using the All Writs Act to order the transportation of state prisoners for reasons not enumerated in §2241(c)?

2.  Before a court grants an order allowing a habeas petitioner to develop new evidence, must it determine whether the evidence could aid the petitioner in proving his entitlement to habeas relief and whether the evidence may permissibly be considered by a habeas court?

We have a new development to report.  Recall that in 2015, Federal Defender Shelley Fite wrote an excellent guest post about a 7th Circuit decision, Pidgeon v. Smith, 785 F.3d 1165 (2015).  The 7th Circuit held that Machner‘s requirement–that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must present his lawyer’s testimony at an evidentiary hearing–is just a Wisconsin rule. “[A]n ineffective assistance claim is a claim under the United States Constitution” and “[n]othing in Strickland or its progeny requires prisoners seeking to prove ineffective assistance to call the challenged counsel as a witness.”