On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Evan Miller v. Alabama, USSC No. 10-9646 / Kuntrell Jackson v. Hobbs, No. 10-9647, 6/25/12,  reversing 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)

The two 14-year-old offenders in these cases were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In neither case did the sentencing authority have any discretion to impose a different punishment. State law mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics,

Question Presented

Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits an appellate court to correct a trial court’s “plain error” despite the lack of an objection in the trial court. In Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), this Court held that, when the governing law on an issue is settled against the defendant at the time of trial but then changes in the defendant’s favor by the time of appeal,

Sandy Williams v. Illinois, USSC No. 10-8505, 6/18/12, affirming People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 939 N.E. 268

A split Court (4-1-4) upholds against Confrontation objection, admissibility of expert testimony that a DNA profile, produced by a different lab, matched Williams’ profile. Because the rationale favoring admissibility doesn’t earn a clear majority of votes, the opinion should be approached with the following principle in mind, 

Question Presented:

Whether withdrawing from a conspiracy prior to the statute of limitations period negates an element of a conspiracy charge such that, once a defendant meets his burden of production that he did so withdraw, the burden of persuasion rests with the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member of the conspiracy during the relevant period — a fundamental due process question that is the subject of a well-developed circuit split.

Parker v. David Eugene Matthews, USSC No. 11-845, 6/11/12, reversing 651 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2011)

In this habeas case, the United States Court of Ap- peals for the Sixth Circuit set aside two 29-year-old murder convictions based on the flimsiest of rationales. The court’s decision is a textbook example of what the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) proscribes: “using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts.” Renico v.

Question Presented 

Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar retrial after the trial judge erroneously holds a particular fact to be an element of the offense and then grants a midtrial directed verdict of acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove that fact?

Docket

Lower court opinion (491 Mich 1, 810 NW2d 535 (2012))

Scotusblog page

The QP efficiently sets up the issue,

Question Presented (from cert petition):

Whether, pursuant to Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), police officers may detain an individual incident to the execution of a search warrant when the individual has left the immediate vicinity of the premises before the warrant is executed.

Docket

Lower court decision (652 F.3d 197 2nd Cir 2011)

Scotusblog page

Police getting ready to execute a search warrant saw Bailey leave the residence,

Coleman v. Lorenzo Johnson, USSC No. 11-1053, 5/29/12 (per curiam), reversing 446 Fed. Appx. 531 (3rd Cir. 2011)

We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference. First, on direct appeal, “it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.

Alex Blueford v. Arkansas, USSC No. 10-1320, 5/24/12, affirming 2011 Ark. 8

Double Jeopardy doesn’t bar retrial on greater offenses, despite jury foreperson’s report of unanimous votes against those charges, after ensuing deadlock resulted in mistrial.

Blueford’s primary submission is that he cannot be retried for capital and first-degree murder because the jury actually acquitted him of those offenses. See Green v.

Holder v. Carlos Martinez Gutierrez, USSC No. 10-1542, 5/21/12, reversing 411 Fed. Appx. 121 and 399 Fed. Appx. 313

The Attorney General has discretion under 8 U.S.C. §1229b(a) to allow otherwise-removable aliens to remain in the U.S., if the alien satisfies three criteria: minimum of five years as a lawful permanent resident; continuous residence in the U.S. for at least seven years after lawful admission,