On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Question Presented (composed by Scotusblog): 

Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendment principles that this Court established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny, apply to the imposition of criminal fines.

Scotusblog page

Petitioner, a natural gas company, was found guilty by jury of one count of knowingly storing mercury without a permit, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). The jury wasn’t called upon to find such storage for more than one day,

Question Presented (composed by Scotusblog): 

Whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 applies in an initial sentencing proceeding that takes place on or after the statute’s effective date if the offense occurred before that date.

Hill: Scotusblog page; consolidated with Dorsey (lower court decision: United States v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2011))

The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,

Questions Presented (from Scotusblog): 

1) Did the Seventh Circuit violate this Court’s precedent on harmless error when it focused its harmless error analysis solely on the weight of the untainted evidence without considering the potential effect of the error (the erroneous admission of trial counsel’s statements that his client would lose the case and should plead guilty for their truth) on this jury at all?

2) Did the Seventh Circuit violate Mr.

Miller: SCOTUSblog page; consolidated with Jackson: SCOTUSblog page

Question Presented (from SCOTUSblog):

Whether imposing a sentence of life without possibility of parole on an offender who was fourteen at the time he committed capital murder constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Sound at least vaguely familiar? It should: our supreme court resolved that very question last Term,

Bobby v. Archie Dixon, USSC No. 10-1540, 11/7/11 (per curiam), reversing Dixon v. Houk, 627 F.3d 553 (6th Cir 2010)

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v.

Cavazos v. Shirley Ree Smith, USSC No. 10-1115, 10/31/11 (per curiam); prior history: Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated and remanded in light of Carey v. Musladin, 549 U. S. 70 (2006) by Patrick v. Smith, 550 U. S. 915, reinstated on remand, 508 F. 3d 1256 (2007); vacated and remanded in light of McDaniel v.

Docket

Decision below: Blueford v. State, 2011 Ark. 8

Question Presented (from cert. pet.):

Whether, if a jury deadlocks on a lesser-included offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars reprosecution of a greater offense after a jury announces that it has voted against guilt on the greater offense.

Cert. Petition

SCOTUSblog page

Blueford was tried for capital murder.

Docket

Decision below: Wood v. Milyard, 10th Cir, 11/26/10

Questions Presented (by the Court):

1) Does an appellate court have the authority to raise sua sponte a 28 U.S.C. §2244(d) statute of limitations defense?

2) Does the State’s declaration before the district court that it “will not challenge, but [is] not conceding, the timeliness of Wood’s habeas petition,” amount to a deliberate waiver of any statute of limitations defense the State may have had?

Docket

Decision below: People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125 (Ill. S. Ct. No. 107550)

Question Presented (by the Court):

Whether a state rule of evidence allowing an expert witness to testify about the results of DNA testing performed by non-testifying analysts, where the defendant has no opportunity to confront the actual analysts, violates the Confrontation Clause.

Hmm. Didn’t the Court just get done resolving this issue?

Docket

Decision below: United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g denied sub nom. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010)

Questions Presented:

1. [from Petition:] Whether the warrantless use of a tracking device on petitioner’s vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violated the Fourth Amendment.