On Point blog, page 35 of 41
Juan Smith v. Louisiana, USSC No. 10-8145, cert granted 6/13/11
Decision below: State ex rel. Smith v. Cain, 992 So. 2d 928, 2008 La. LEXIS 1772 (La., 2008), writ denied State v. Smith, 2010 La. LEXIS 2202 (La., Sept. 24, 2010)
Questions Presented (from SCOTUS docket page):
In this Louisiana criminal case, the state trial court, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, and the Louisiana Supreme Court, without making any factual findings, or providing any reasons for their rulings,
Rafael Arriaza Gonzalez v. Thaler, USSC No. 10-895, cert granted 6/13/11
Decision below: 623 F. 3d 222 (5th Cir. 2010)
Questions Presented (from SCOTUS docket page):
1. WAS THERE JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY UNDER 28 U.S.C. §2253(C) AND TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER’S APPEAL?
2. WAS THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OUT OF TIME UNDER 28 U.S.C. §2244(D)(1) DUE TO “THE DATE ON WHICH THE JUDGMENT BECAME FINAL BY THE CONCLUSION OF DIRECT REVIEW OR THE EXPIRATION OF THE TIME FOR SEEKING SUCH REVIEW”?
Federal Sentence Enhancer, Armed Career Criminal Act – “Violent Felony”
Marcus Sykes v. U.S., USSC No. 09-11311, 6/9/11
It is a federal crime for a convicted felon to be in unlawful possession of a firearm. 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). The ordinary maximum sentence for that crime is 10 years of imprisonment. §924(a)(2). If, however, when the unlawful possession occurred, the felon had three previous convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense, the punishment is increased to a minimum term of 15 years.
Federal Sentencing Enhancement, Armed Career Criminal Act – Construction
McNeil v. U.S., USSC No. 10-5258, 6/6/11
Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a prior state drug-trafficking conviction is for a “serious drug offense” if “a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law” for the offense. 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The question in this case concerns how a federal court should determine the maximum sentence for a prior state drug offense for ACCA purposes.
Luis Mariano Martinez v. Ryan, USSC No. 10-1001, cert granted 6/6/11
Decision below: Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2010)
Whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but who has a state-law right to raise such a claim in a first postconviction proceeding, has a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of first post-conviction counsel specifically with respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.
Barion Perry v. New Hampshire, USSC No. 10-8974, cert granted 5/31/11
Decision below: New Hampshire Supreme Court, No. 2009-0590, 11/18/2010 (summary order); Perry’s brief below; New Hampshire’s brief below
When a witness in a criminal case identifies a suspect out-of-court, under suggestive circumstances which give rise to a substantial likelihood of later misidentification, due process requires the trial judge to determine whether the out-ofcourt identification and any subsequent in-court identification are reliable before either may be admitted into evidence.
Prison Litigation Reform Act – Prison Overcrowding Oversight
Brown v. Plata, USSC No. 09-1233, 5/23/11
Remedial injunction, issued by a federal court pursuant to the PLRA, ordering California to reduce its prison population on account of deficiencies in medical care caused by overcrowding, upheld.
Lengthy, 5-4 opinion (91 pp. pdf file) on something (“conditions of confinement”) outside the boundaries of SPD representation: why should you be interested? For one thing, as On Point readership surveys have demonstrated time and again over the years,
Warrantless Entry – Exigent Circumstances Exception not Circumscribed by Whether “Police-Created”
Kentucky v. Hollis Deshaun King, USSC No. 09-1272, 5/16/11, reversing, King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649 (2010)
The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement (here, imminent destruction of evidence) isn’t circumscribed by whether the exigency was “police-created.”
It is well established that “exigent circumstances,” including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant.
Habeas – Death Penalty Phase Instructions
Bobby v. Harry Mitts, USSC No. 10-1000, 5/2/11 (per curiam)
The death penalty may not be imposed when the jury isn’t permitted to consider a verdict of guilt on a lesser included, non-capital offense supported by the evidence, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). As the Court now notes:
such a scheme intolerably enhances the irrelevant considerations into the factfinding process, diverting the jury’s attention from the central issue of whether the State has satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a capital crime.” Id.,
Judulang v. Holder, USSC No. 10-694, cert granted 4/19/11
Decision below (9th Cir, unpublished)
For more than 25 years, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that a legal permanent resident (LPR) who is deportable due to a criminal conviction could seek a discretionary waiver of removal under Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1182(c), provided that the conviction also would have constituted a waivable basis for exclusion.