On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Docket

Decision below (9th Cir, unpublished)

Question Presented:

For more than 25 years, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that a legal permanent resident (LPR) who is deportable due to a criminal conviction could seek a discretionary waiver of removal under Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1182(c), provided that the conviction also would have constituted a waivable basis for exclusion.

Cullen v. Scott Lynn Pinholster, USSC No. 09-1088, 4/4/11

We first consider the scope of the record for a §2254(d)(1) inquiry. The State argues that review is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Pinholster contends that evidence presented to the federal habeas court may also be considered. We agree with the State.

…

We now hold that review under §2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.

Docket

Decision below (621 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir 2010))

Question Presented:

Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a jail to conduct a suspicionless strip search of every individual arrested for any minor offense no matter what the circumstances.

Scotusblog page

Caselaw in this Circuit has long rejected suspicionless jail strip searches for minor offenses. Mary Beth G.

Docket

Decision below (3rd Cir No. 07-2163, 5/28/10)

Question Presented (by Scotusblog):

For purposes of adjudicating a state prisoner’s petition for federal habeas relief, what is the temporal cutoff for whether a decision from this Court qualifies as “clearly established Federal law” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?

Cert petition

Here’s the pitch Greene successfully made:

This case presents a fundamental question of federal habeas procedure in the post-AEDPA world: What is the temporal cutoff for when decisions from this Court count as “clearly established Federal law”?

Docket

Decision below (11th Cir No. 07-15187, 10/26/09)

Question Presented (by Scotusblog):

Whether the Eleventh Circuit properly held that there was no “cause” to excuse any procedural default where petitioner was blameless for the default, the state’s own conduct contributed to the default, and petitioner’s attorneys of record were no longer functioning as his agents at the time of any default.

Cert petition

Scotusblog page

After Maples lost his direct appeal in (Alabama) state court,

Felkner v. Steven Frank Jackson, USSC No. 10-797, 3/31/11

On habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the court of appeals failed to give sufficient deference to the state court determination that the prosecutor had race-neutral reasons for striking 2 of 3 black prospective jurors.

The prosecutor struck one juror because she had an MSW, and the prosecutor didn’t like having social workers on the jury;

Henry W. Skinner v. Switzer, USSC No. 09-9000, 3/7/11

A convicted state prisoner may utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to seek DNA testing of crime-scene evidence.

When may a state prisoner, complaining of unconstitutional state action, pursue a civil rights claim under §1983, and when is habeas corpus the prisoner’s sole remedy? …

We summarized the relevant case law most recently in Wilkinson v.

Wall v. Kahlil Kholi, USSC No. 09-868, 3/7/11

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim” tolls the 1-year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition. 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2). The question in this case is whether a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law tolls the limitation period,

Pepper v. U.S., USSC No. 09-6822, 3/2/11

In light of the federal sentencing framework described above, we think it clear that when a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal and his case remanded for resentencing, a district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s rehabilitation since his prior sentencing and that such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range.

The thrust of the opinion is statutory,

FCC v. AT&T, USSC No. 09-1279, 3/1/11

The “personal privacy” exemption in the federal Freedom of Information Act doesn’t apply to corporations, though they are considered “persons” under the Act.

… Adjectives typically reflect the meaning of corresponding nouns, but not always. Sometimes they acquire distinct meanings of their own. The noun “crab” refers variously to a crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective “crabbed” can refer to handwriting that is “difficult to read,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 527 (2002);