On Point blog, page 36 of 40
Postconviction DNA Testing – Cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Henry W. Skinner v. Switzer, USSC No. 09-9000, 3/7/11
A convicted state prisoner may utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to seek DNA testing of crime-scene evidence.
When may a state prisoner, complaining of unconstitutional state action, pursue a civil rights claim under §1983, and when is habeas corpus the prisoner’s sole remedy? …
We summarized the relevant case law most recently in Wilkinson v.
Habeas – Tolling Provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)
Wall v. Kahlil Kholi, USSC No. 09-868, 3/7/11
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim” tolls the 1-year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition. 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2). The question in this case is whether a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law tolls the limitation period,
After Sentence Has Been Set Aside, Resentencing Court May Consider Defendant’s Postsentencing Rehabilitation
Pepper v. U.S., USSC No. 09-6822, 3/2/11
In light of the federal sentencing framework described above, we think it clear that when a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal and his case remanded for resentencing, a district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s rehabilitation since his prior sentencing and that such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range.
The thrust of the opinion is statutory,
Federal Freedom of Information Act Doesn’t Apply to Corporations
FCC v. AT&T, USSC No. 09-1279, 3/1/11
The “personal privacy” exemption in the federal Freedom of Information Act doesn’t apply to corporations, though they are considered “persons” under the Act.
… Adjectives typically reflect the meaning of corresponding nouns, but not always. Sometimes they acquire distinct meanings of their own. The noun “crab” refers variously to a crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective “crabbed” can refer to handwriting that is “difficult to read,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 527 (2002);
Confrontation – Statements Made to Police During “Ongoing Emergency” not “Testimonial” Hearsay
Michigan v. Bryant, USSC No. 09-150
At respondent Richard Bryant’s trial, the court admitted statements that the victim, Anthony Covington, made to police officers who discovered him mortally wounded in a gas station parking lot. … We hold that the circumstances of the interaction between Covington and the police objectively indicate that the “primary purpose of the interrogation” was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis,
Habeas – Procedural Default – Applicable to “Discretionary” Postconviction Deadline
Walker v. Charles W. Martin, USSC No. 09-996, 2/23/11
State court time limit for seeking postconviction relief needn’t be “fixed,” but instead may be discretionary in nature, for purposes of the habeas default rule.
In a recent decision, Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. ___ (2009), this Court clarified that a state procedural bar may count as an adequate and independent ground for denying a federal habeas petition even if the state court had discretion to reach the merits despite the default.
Billy Joe Reynolds v. U.S., USSC No. 10-6549, Cert Granted 1/24/11
Decision below (3rd Cir No. 08-4747, 5/14/10)
Question Presented (by Scotusblog):
Validity of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and its implementing regulations.
The newly granted sex offender case involves an attempt to challenge the retroactive application of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.
Howes v. Randall Lee Fields, USSC No. 10-680, Cert. Granted 1/24/11
Decision below (617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir 2010))
Question Presented (by Scotusblog):
Whether this Court’s clearly established precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 holds that a prisoner is always “in custody” for purposes of Miranda any time that prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct occurring outside the prison regardless of the surrounding circumstances.
The grant appears to raise the recurrent problem of whether Miranda warnings are always and necessarily required when someone already incarcerated is interrogated by the police on a different offense.
Habeas Review – Parole Denial – Limited to Opportunity to be Heard and Statement of Reasons
Swarthout v. Damon Cooke, USSC No. 10-333, 1/24/11
Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 of a state’s decision to deny parole is limited to whether the inmate was provided an opportunity to be heard and a statement of reasons why parole was denied. The federal court simply has no authority to scrutinize the merits of the denial.
… Because the only federal right at issue is procedural,
Habeas Review – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Deference Must Be Given State Court Determination
Harrington v. Richter, USSC No. 09-587, 1/19/11, reversing grant of habeas relief, in 578 F. 3d 944
The 9th Circuit failed to give sufficient deference to the state court’s determination that Richter received adequate representation, requiring reversal of it grant of AEDPA-2254 habeas relief. The principal thrust of the opinion relates to the standard of review, both as to AEDPA habeas generally and ineffective-assistance claims more particularly.