On Point blog, page 36 of 40
Greene v. Fisher, USSC No. 10-637, cert granted 4/4/11
Decision below (3rd Cir No. 07-2163, 5/28/10)
Question Presented (by Scotusblog):
For purposes of adjudicating a state prisoner’s petition for federal habeas relief, what is the temporal cutoff for whether a decision from this Court qualifies as “clearly established Federal law” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?
Here’s the pitch Greene successfully made:
This case presents a fundamental question of federal habeas procedure in the post-AEDPA world: What is the temporal cutoff for when decisions from this Court count as “clearly established Federal law”?
Maples v. Thomas, USSC No. 10-63, Cert Granted 3/21/11
Decision below (11th Cir No. 07-15187, 10/26/09)
Question Presented (by Scotusblog):
Whether the Eleventh Circuit properly held that there was no “cause” to excuse any procedural default where petitioner was blameless for the default, the state’s own conduct contributed to the default, and petitioner’s attorneys of record were no longer functioning as his agents at the time of any default.
After Maples lost his direct appeal in (Alabama) state court,
Habeas Review, Batson Issue: Must Give Deference to State Court Determination
Felkner v. Steven Frank Jackson, USSC No. 10-797, 3/31/11
On habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the court of appeals failed to give sufficient deference to the state court determination that the prosecutor had race-neutral reasons for striking 2 of 3 black prospective jurors.
The prosecutor struck one juror because she had an MSW, and the prosecutor didn’t like having social workers on the jury;
Postconviction DNA Testing – Cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Henry W. Skinner v. Switzer, USSC No. 09-9000, 3/7/11
A convicted state prisoner may utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to seek DNA testing of crime-scene evidence.
When may a state prisoner, complaining of unconstitutional state action, pursue a civil rights claim under §1983, and when is habeas corpus the prisoner’s sole remedy? …
We summarized the relevant case law most recently in Wilkinson v.
Habeas – Tolling Provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)
Wall v. Kahlil Kholi, USSC No. 09-868, 3/7/11
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim” tolls the 1-year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition. 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2). The question in this case is whether a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law tolls the limitation period,
After Sentence Has Been Set Aside, Resentencing Court May Consider Defendant’s Postsentencing Rehabilitation
Pepper v. U.S., USSC No. 09-6822, 3/2/11
In light of the federal sentencing framework described above, we think it clear that when a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal and his case remanded for resentencing, a district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s rehabilitation since his prior sentencing and that such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range.
The thrust of the opinion is statutory,
Federal Freedom of Information Act Doesn’t Apply to Corporations
FCC v. AT&T, USSC No. 09-1279, 3/1/11
The “personal privacy” exemption in the federal Freedom of Information Act doesn’t apply to corporations, though they are considered “persons” under the Act.
… Adjectives typically reflect the meaning of corresponding nouns, but not always. Sometimes they acquire distinct meanings of their own. The noun “crab” refers variously to a crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective “crabbed” can refer to handwriting that is “difficult to read,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 527 (2002);
Confrontation – Statements Made to Police During “Ongoing Emergency” not “Testimonial” Hearsay
Michigan v. Bryant, USSC No. 09-150
At respondent Richard Bryant’s trial, the court admitted statements that the victim, Anthony Covington, made to police officers who discovered him mortally wounded in a gas station parking lot. … We hold that the circumstances of the interaction between Covington and the police objectively indicate that the “primary purpose of the interrogation” was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis,
Habeas – Procedural Default – Applicable to “Discretionary” Postconviction Deadline
Walker v. Charles W. Martin, USSC No. 09-996, 2/23/11
State court time limit for seeking postconviction relief needn’t be “fixed,” but instead may be discretionary in nature, for purposes of the habeas default rule.
In a recent decision, Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. ___ (2009), this Court clarified that a state procedural bar may count as an adequate and independent ground for denying a federal habeas petition even if the state court had discretion to reach the merits despite the default.
Billy Joe Reynolds v. U.S., USSC No. 10-6549, Cert Granted 1/24/11
Decision below (3rd Cir No. 08-4747, 5/14/10)
Question Presented (by Scotusblog):
Validity of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and its implementing regulations.
The newly granted sex offender case involves an attempt to challenge the retroactive application of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.