On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Docket

Decision below (617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir 2010))

Question Presented (by Scotusblog):

Whether this Court’s clearly established precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 holds that a prisoner is always “in custody” for purposes of Miranda any time that prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct occurring outside the prison regardless of the surrounding circumstances.

Cert petition

Brief in opposition

Petitioner’s reply

Scotusblog page

The grant appears to raise the recurrent problem of whether Miranda warnings are always and necessarily required when someone already incarcerated is interrogated by the police on a different offense.

Swarthout v. Damon Cooke, USSC No. 10-333, 1/24/11

Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 of a state’s decision to deny parole is limited to whether the inmate was provided an opportunity to be heard and a statement of reasons why parole was denied. The federal court simply has no authority to scrutinize the merits of the denial.

… Because the only federal right at issue is procedural,

Harrington v. Richter, USSC No. 09-587, 1/19/11, reversing grant of habeas relief, in 578 F. 3d 944

The 9th Circuit failed to give sufficient deference to the state court’s determination that Richter received adequate representation, requiring reversal of it grant of AEDPA-2254 habeas relief. The principal thrust of the opinion relates to the standard of review, both as to AEDPA habeas generally and ineffective-assistance claims more particularly.

Premo v. Moore, USSC No. 09-659, 1/19/11, vacating grant of habeas relief, in 574 F.3d 1092

Moore, who admitted brutalizing the victim and shooting him in the temple, accepted a plea bargain on advice of counsel: he pleaded guilty to felony-murder, and received the minimum allowable sentence, thus avoiding a capital-offense charge. He raised a postconviction challenge to counsel’s failure to seek suppression of his statement to the police,

Docket

Decision below (CTA4)

Scotusblog page

The case appears to involve review of federal sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Consult Scotusblog page for further details.

Decision, 6/6/11

Docket

Decision below (311 S.W.3d 350, Mo. Ct. App)

Question Presented:

Contrary to the holding in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)–which held that a defendant must allege that, but for counsel’s error, the defendant would have gone to trial–can a defendant who validly pleads guilty successfully assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by alleging instead that,

Docket

Decision below (CTA6)

Questions Presented:

Anthony Cooper faced assault with intent to murder charges. His counsel advised him to reject a plea offer based on a misunderstanding of Michigan law. Cooper rejected the offer, and he was convicted as charged. Cooper does not assert that any error occurred at the trial. On habeas review, the Sixth Circuit found that because there is a reasonable probability that Cooper would have accepted the plea offer had he been adequately advised,

Docket

Decision below (CTA 11)

Question Presented  (phrasing by On Point; check Docket or Scotusblog links for subsequent posting of official recitation)

Whether conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (murder with intent to prevent a person from communicating information about federal offense to federal law enforcement officer or judge) requires proof of an ongoing or imminent federal investigation.

Scotusblog page

No immediately apparent implications for state practice in this grant.

Dismissed as improvidently granted, 3/29/11

Docket

Decision below (New York Court of Appeals)

Question Presented (phrasing by On Point; check Docket or Scotusblog links for subsequent posting of official recitation)

Whether someone’s driving record is suppressible as the fruit of an illegal stop or arrest.

Scotusblog

A mere 6 days ago, Mr. Badger raised an alert on the core of this issue:

United States v.

Wilson v. Corcoran, USSC No. 10-91, 11/8/10, vacating and remanding habeas grant in, Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 593 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2010)

Mere violation of state law doesn’t support habeas relief, violation of federal law being required.

But it is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.