On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Docket

Decision below (N.C. supreme court)

Question Presented:

Whether, in the context of interrogating a juvenile in a school setting, “custody” for purposes of triggering Miranda warnings is determined by a purely objective test; or includes subjective considerations such as the subject’s age and status as a special education student.

Scotusblog page

The nub of the lower court holding:

 …

Docket

Decision below (S.C. supreme court)

Questions Presented (courtesy, Scotusblog):

1) Whether an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to appointed counsel at a civil contempt proceeding that results in his incarceration; and 2) whether the Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court.

Cert petition

Scotusblog page

Turner got 12 months in jail for civil contempt for willful failure to pay child support (remedial contempt,

Docket

Decision below (CTA11)

Question Presented (from cert petition):

Whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a search authorized by precedent at the time of the search that is subsequently ruled unconstitutional.

Cert petition

Scotusblog page

Fall-out from the Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 

Consolidated cases:

Camreta

Docket

Decision Below (9th Cir)

Question Presented (from SCOTUSblog):

Whether the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant, a court order, parental consent, or exigent circumstances before law enforcement and child welfare officials may conduct a temporary seizure and interview at a public school of a child whom they reasonably suspect was being sexually abused.

Docket

Decision below (KY supreme court)

Question Presented (from USSC docket post):

Police officers entered an apartment building in hot pursuit of a person who sold crack cocaine to an undercover informant. They heard a door slam, but were not certain which of two apartments the trafficker fled into. A strong odor of marijuana emanated from one of the doors, which prompted the officers to believe the trafficker had fled into that apartment.

Docket

Decision Below (New Mexico supreme court)

Question Presented:

Whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or observe the laboratory analysis described in the statements.

Cert. Petition

State’s Brief Opposing Cert

SCOTUSblog page

Follow-up to Melendez-Diaz v.

Docket

Decision below (CTA8)

Questions Presented:

There is a conflict among the United States Courts of Appeals regarding a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation and whether it can support a downward sentencing variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Whether a federal district judge can consider a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation as a permissible factor supporting a sentencing variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) after Gall v.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, USSC No. 08-1521, 6/28/10

Two years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. ___ (2008), we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, and we struck down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. The city of Chicago (City) and the village of Oak Park,

Issue: Whether, in federal habeas corpus proceedings, a state law under which a prisoner may be barred from collaterally attacking his conviction when the prisoner “substantially delayed” filing his habeas petition is “inadequate” to support a procedural bar because (1) the federal court believes that the rule is vague and (2) the state failed to prove that its courts “consistently” exercised their discretion when applying the rule in other cases.

Docket: 09-996

• Opinion below (9th Circuit,

Magwood v. Patterson, USSC No. 09-158, 6/24/10

After a defendant has been resentenced in state court pursuant to relief granted on a federal habeas petition, a second federal habeas petition challenging the new sentence will be treated as a first petition (vs. a “2nd or successive” petition), even if raising grounds that could have been raised in the original petition.

We have described the phrase “second or successive” as a “term of art.” Id.,