On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Renico v. Lett, USSC No. 09-338, 5/3/10

The state court’s conclusion of manifest necessity for mistrial where the foreperson reported inability to reach unanimity wasn’t unreasonable, hence grant of habeas relief is vacated:

… (T)rial judges may declare a mistrial “whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity” for doing so. Id., at 580. The decision to declare a mistrial is left to the “sound discretion” of the judge,

Questions Presented:

May a party appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits if the party chose not to appeal the order before trial?

SCOTUS docket: here. Scotusblog, briefs: here.

This have anything to do with SPD-related practice? Not really, strictly speaking. But, isn’t the problem at least somewhat reminiscent of the recurrent one based in State v.

Questions Presented:

California Civil Code sections 1746-1746.5 prohibit the sale of violent video games to minors under 18 where a reasonable person would find that the violent content appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors, is patently offensive to prevailing community standards as to what is suitable for minors, and causes the game as a whole to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. The respondent industry groups challenged this prohibition on its face as violating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

Padilla v. Kentucky, USSC No. 08-651, 3/31/10

In sum, we have long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Hill , 474 U. S., at 57; see also Richardson , 397 U. S., at 770–771. The severity of deportation—“the equivalent of banishment or exile,” Delgadillo v.

Berghuis v. Smith, USSC No. 08-1402, 3/30/10

Defendants have Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury drawn from fair cross section of community. To establish prima facie violation of this “fair-cross-section,” requirement, a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as “distinctive” (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) “systematic exclusion” in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation. Various methods have been proposed to test underrepresentation,

Thaler v. Haynes, USSC No. 09–273, 2/22/10 (per curiam)

Nothing in Supreme Court caselaw clearly requires “that a demeanor-based explanation for a peremptory challenge must be rejected unless the judge personally observed and recalls the relevant aspect of the prospective juror’s demeanor.” In other words, there’s no requirement that the judge have been present during jury selection in order to evaluate a Batson claim defended by the prosecutor as based on the juror’s demeanor.

Wright v. Joseph L. Van Patten,552 US 120 (2008)
Prior history: Joseph Van Patten v. Deppisch, 434 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 2006), reinstated, 489 F. 3d 827, 2007, on remand from the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Carey v. Musladin, 549 U. S. ___ (2006); on habeas review of,