On Point: 44. SCOTUS

U.S. v. O’Brien, USSC No. 08-1569, 5/24/10

§ 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), which exposes a person convicted of possessing, using or carrying a machinegun during certain federal crimes to a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years is an offense element subject to proof beyond reasonable doubt at trial rather than a penalty enhancer provable by mere preponderance of the evidence at sentencing.

The border between offense element and sentence enhancer remains indistinct at crucial junctures.

U.S. v. Marcus, USSC No. 08-1341, 5/24/10

… (A)n appellate court may,in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an “error”; (2) the error is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) the error “affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means” it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings”; and (4) “the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,

U.S. v. Comstock, USSC No. 08-1224, 5/17/10

The federal scheme for detaining the equivalent of ch. 980 sexually violent persons beyond release date from federal prison, 18 U.S.C. § 1848, is a valid exercise of Congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper clause. In reaching this conclusion, the Court “assume(s), but we do not decide, that other provisions of the Constitution—such as the Due Process Clause—do not prohibit civil commitment in these circumstances.”

Graham v. Florida, USSC No. 08-7412, 5/17/10

In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. This determination; the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders; and the severity of life without parole sentences all lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration is cruel and unusual. This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.

Question Presented:

Whether a state court sentence-reduction motion consisting of a plea for leniency constitutes an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), thus tolling the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year limitations period for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition.

• Opinion below (1st Circuit)
• Petition for certiorari
• Brief in opposition
• Petitioner’s reply

Principal impetus for review seems to be (per usual) a split of authority,

Renico v. Lett, USSC No. 09-338, 5/3/10

The state court’s conclusion of manifest necessity for mistrial where the foreperson reported inability to reach unanimity wasn’t unreasonable, hence grant of habeas relief is vacated:

… (T)rial judges may declare a mistrial “whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity” for doing so. Id., at 580. The decision to declare a mistrial is left to the “sound discretion” of the judge,

Questions Presented:

May a party appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits if the party chose not to appeal the order before trial?

SCOTUS docket: here. Scotusblog, briefs: here.

This have anything to do with SPD-related practice? Not really, strictly speaking. But, isn’t the problem at least somewhat reminiscent of the recurrent one based in State v.

Questions Presented:

California Civil Code sections 1746-1746.5 prohibit the sale of violent video games to minors under 18 where a reasonable person would find that the violent content appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors, is patently offensive to prevailing community standards as to what is suitable for minors, and causes the game as a whole to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. The respondent industry groups challenged this prohibition on its face as violating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

Padilla v. Kentucky, USSC No. 08-651, 3/31/10

In sum, we have long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Hill , 474 U. S., at 57; see also Richardson , 397 U. S., at 770–771. The severity of deportation—“the equivalent of banishment or exile,” Delgadillo v.

Berghuis v. Smith, USSC No. 08-1402, 3/30/10

Defendants have Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury drawn from fair cross section of community. To establish prima facie violation of this “fair-cross-section,” requirement, a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as “distinctive” (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) “systematic exclusion” in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation. Various methods have been proposed to test underrepresentation,