On Point: 44. SCOTUS

Timbs v. Indiana, USSC No. 17-1091, February 20, 2019, reversing State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

“The question presented: Is the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause an ‘incorporated’ protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause?” The answer: Yes.

Garza v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, reversing Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017);  Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved two plea agreements that included clauses stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. After sentencing, Garza told his lawyer that he wanted to appeal, but his lawyer refused due to the plea agreement. Garza filed claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Siding with Garza, SCOTUS held that counsel performed deficiently and that “prejudiced is presumed” because the failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Garza of an appeal altogether. Opinion at 1. 

Fortunately, Wisconsin does not have the death penalty. However, On Point readers might find this SCOTUS decision Madison v. Alabama, interesting. The government cannot execute a prisoner who is insane or is so mentally ill that he can’t understand the State’s rationale for executing him. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).

Gerald Mitchell v. Wisconsin, USSC No. 18-6210, certiorari granted 1/11/19

Question presented:

Whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

Terance Martez Gamble v. United States, USSC No. 17-646, certiorari granted 6/28/18

Question presented:

Whether the Court should overrule the “separate sovereigns” exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Carpenter v. United States, USSC No. 16-402, 2018 WL 3073916, reversing United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This one is a big deal. It’s impossible to say just where the law will go from here, but it’s clear there will be a lot of cases citing this one in the coming years, both because cell-site location is already a widely-used law enforcement tool, and because the majority opinion has a lot to say about what Fourth Amendment “privacy” might mean now that we all share, often unwittingly, so much information about ourselves with the entities that enable our digital lives.

Currier v. Virginia, USSC No. 16-1348, 2018 WL 3073763, June 22, 2018, affirming State v. Currier, 779 S.E.2d 834 (Va. App. 2015), reasoning adopted by 798 S.E.2d 164 (Va. 2016); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

A defendant who agrees to have overlapping charges considered in two separate trials cannot invoke the doctrine of issue preclusion adopted in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), and argue that an acquittal in the first trial bars a second trial on the remaining charges.

Rosales-Mireles v. United States, USSC No. 16-9493, 2018 WL 3013806, 6/18/18, reversing United States v. Rosales-Mireles, 850 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2017); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

As we noted in our prior post, this case is primarily of interest to federal practitioners, dealing as it does with the federal sentencing guidelines and the doctrine of plain error, which is little-used in Wisconsin’s courts. Nevertheless, the seven-justice majority has some ringing language exhorting courts, in the interest of their own legitimacy, to cop to their own errors when those errors lead to unwarranted consequences for criminal defendants.

Tyson Timbs v. Indiana, USSC 17-1091, certiorari granted 6/18/18

Question presented:

Whether the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Gilberto Garza, Jr. v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, certiorari granted 6/18/18

Question presented:

Does the “presumption of prejudice” recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), apply where a criminal defendant instructs his trial counsel to file a notice of appeal but trial counsel decides not to do so because the defendant’s plea agreement included an appeal waiver?