On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

State v. Charles L. Neill, IV, petition for review granted 6/11/19; 2018AP75; case activity (including briefs)

This is a review of a published court of appeals decision. Here’s the issue, as stated in our prior post:

Neill pleaded to an OWI-3rd, which has a minimum fine of $600. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)3. His plea came with two statutory enhancers: the one for having a BAC over .25 (Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(g)3.), and the one for having a child in a car (§ 346.65(2)(f)2.). The former quadruples the minimum fine, and the latter doubles it. So, what’s the minimum fine?

State v. Fitzgerald, 2018AP1296-CR, 2019 WI 69, 6/13/19; case activity

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) held that a mentally ill  defendant has a constitutional right to avoid unwanted antipsychotic medication. The State can force it on him to restore his competency for trial only by proving the 4 “Sell factors.” Fitzgerald holds that §971.14 does not conform to Sell. Going forward, the State cannot obtain involuntary med orders based solely on §971.14 because it is constitutionally infirm.  The State must satisfy Sell factors. The cases where this is possible may be “rare.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  Involuntary medication to restore competency to proceed should be the exception, not the rule.

State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Milw. County Circuit Court, 2018AP1214-W, 2019 WI 69, 6/13/19, case activity

A defendant is entitled to an automatic stay of an involuntary medication pending appeal, otherwise his liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medications is rendered a nullity. State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, __Wis. 2d __, 912 N.W.2d 14. But what triggers the automatic stay–the entry of the involuntary medication order itself or the filing of the notice of appeal? SCOW split 3-3 on this issue (Abrahamson did not participate), so the court of appeals decision stands.

State v. Kelly James Kloss, 2018AP651-CR, petition and cross petition for review of a published court of appeals decision, both granted 6/11/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

Is solicitation of first degree reckless injury a crime under Wisconsin law?

Is solicitation of first degree recklessly endangering safety a lesser included offense of first degree reckless injury, making conviction for both offenses multiplicitous in this case?

Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019WI66, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2017AP1468; 6/12/19; case activity

This 4-3 decision is alarming. Waukesha County petitioned to recommit S.L.L., a homeless person, but failed to serve her with notice of the hearing because it had no idea where she was. Since she was not served, she didn’t appear for the hearing. The circuit court entered a default recommitment and forced medication order in her absence. SCOW says that is A-Okay.

State v. Peter J. Hanson, 2019 WI 63, 6/5/19, affirming an unpublished decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

Hanson was called to testify at a John Doe proceeding looking into an unsolved homicide. He was eventually charged with the crime, and at his trial the jury heard  a portion of Hanson’s John Doe testimony. The supreme court held the admission of this evidence didn’t violate Hanson’s right to confrontation. The court also holds that Hanson’s John Doe testimony was admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings because that warning isn’t required at a John Doe proceeding.

United States v. Dennis Franklin and Shane Sahm, 2019 WI 64, 6/6/19, answering a question certified by the Seventh Circuit; case activity (including briefs)

For state practitioners, the most interesting thing about Franklin is that it happened at all. Certified questions to the Wisconsin Supreme Court are rare, and a certified question presented in a federal criminal case regarding a matter of state criminal law is unheard of.

State v. Emmanuel Earl Trammell, 2019 WI 59, May 31, 2019, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Trammell challenged Wis. JI—Criminal 140, Wisconsin’s standard instruction on the burden of proof in a criminal case, arguing it dilutes the state’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. His primary challenge was to the directives that “[w]hile it is your duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt, you are not to search for doubt. You are to search for truth.” The court rejects Trammell’s arguments, though two concurring justices ask the Criminal Jury Instruction Committee to consider whether the instruction should be modified because it lacks an explanation of the quantum of proof required.

State ex rel. Ezequiel Lopez Quintero v. Dittmann, 2019 WI 58, reversing and remanding a court of appeals memorandum opinion, case activity (including briefs)

Go Remington Center for the 5-2 win in SCOW! The court of appeals dismissed R.C.’s habeas petition ex parte because it did not allege why Lopez Quintero waited 9 years to file it in violation of State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 Wis. 2d 795, 565 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997).  This overrules Smalley and holds that a habeas petitioner need not allege timeliness in his petition.

Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, 5/21/2019, affirming an unpublished order dismissing appeal as moot; case activity

Practitioners know that it’s rare to get from final judgment to court of appeals decision on the merits in less than a year. Just the ordinary statutory time frames for appointment of counsel, transcripts, motions or notices, transmitting the record, and briefing schedules can easily eat up well over half that time. So, an extension of a ch. 51 commitment–which is statutorily limited to one year in length–will often, if not invariably, be over by the time a decision can be reached. The supreme court now decides that, in some cases at least, this makes appeals of those extensions moot.