On Point blog, page 29 of 133
SCOW upholds consent search after traffic stop; dissent criticizes “trajectory” of 4th Amendment decisions
Mike Tobin guest posts on State v. Lewis O. Floyd, Jr., 2017 WI 78, 7/7/17, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 371 Wis. 2d 404; case activity (including briefs)
The majority opinion affirms the rulings of the lower courts that the defendant voluntarily consented to a frisk of his person following a traffic stop. The majority reached its decision without discussing the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion of criminal activity-an issue emphasized in the dissenting opinion and previously analyzed by the court of appeals.
SCOW fractures over implied consent law; 3 justices say it doesn’t authorize warrantless blood draws
State v. Navdeep S. Brar, 2017 WI 73, 7/6/17, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2015AP1261-CR; case activity (including briefs)
By obtaining a driver’s license or operating a vehicle in Wisconsin do we automatically give the government consent to draw our blood without a warrant? A nose count reveals the answer remains “maybe.”
SCOW: “Standard criteria” not required for vehicle impound
State v. Kenneth M. Asboth, Jr., 2017 WI 76, 7/6/2017, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
This case presented an issue that has divided federal and state appellate courts: does Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), permit “community caretaker”-type vehicle impoundments only when the police act accord to “standard criteria”? The majority in this case joins the “no” camp; the dissent says the majority has “buck[ed] the nationwide trend” and expanded the community caretaker doctrine into a “pretext to engage in unconstitutional searches” for evidence of crime.
SCOW finds no problem with felony and misdemeanor penalty for same OAR offense
State v. Ernesto E. Lazo Villamil, 2017 WI 74, 7/6/17, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
A few years ago the legislature set out to create a graduated penalty scheme for operating after revocation offenses, but it bungled the job and ended up creating misdemeanor and felony penalties for the offense of causing death while knowingly operating after revocation. The supreme court rebuffs Villamil’s claims that under the rule of lenity only the misdemeanor penalty can be imposed or, in the alternative, that creating two very different penalties for the same crime violates due process and equal protection. The court agrees with his request for resentencing, however, because the circuit court failed to consider the statutorily mandated sentencing factors.
Et tu, Bruton? SCOW says Confrontation Clause doesn’t bar admission of co-defendant’s inculpatory statements to fellow inmate
State v. Raymond L. Nieves, 2017 WI 69, 6/29/17, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2014AP1623-CR; case activity (including briefs)
Forget the old saws that “appellate courts decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds,” “appellate courts should not reach constitutional issues when another issue is dispositive,” and “the supreme court should not decide issues forfeited in the court of appeals.” They don’t constrain SCOW here. Indeed, the majority opinion rushes past the plain language of §971.12(3) in order to decide a major Confrontation Clause issue and to reverse a big defense win in the court of appeals.
SCOW clarifies subpoena requirements for criminal cases
State v. Keimonte Antoine Wilson, Sr., 2017 WI 63, 6/22/17, reversing a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
The supreme court holds that the provisions of § 885.03 govern service of a subpoenas in criminal cases, not the provisions of § 805.07.
SCOW: Expunction requires perfect conduct on probation, maybe?
State v. Lazaro Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, 6/22/17, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)
Lazaro Ozuna, a teenager, pled to two misdemeanors and got probation. The court also ordered that the convictions be expunged on successful completion of probation under Wis. Stat. § 973.015. Ozuna got through probation and was discharged, but he picked up an underage drinking ticket along the way–a violation of the no-drink condition of his probation but obviously not a terribly serious one. So, did he “successfully complete” his probation so as to be entitled to expunction?
SCOW slices single course of conduct into 2 acts and 3 crimes, finds no Double Jeopardy violation
State v. Heather L. Steinhardt, 2017 WI 62, 6/21/17, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)
Steinhardt led her 12 year old daughter to her bedroom so that her husband (the child’s step father) could have sex with her. In fact, Steinhardt sat on the bed while the assault occurred. The majority holds that leading the daughter to the assault and sitting on the bed during the assault are 2 different acts supporting 3 different crimes and punishments. Justice Abrahamson (joined by A.W. Bradley) calls Steinhardt’s crimes “revolting and detestable” but insists the “constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy protect us all, even Heather Steinhardt.” Dissent ¶47.
SCOW will address whether circuit court can revisit expungement if it overlooked eligibility at sentencing
State v. Diamond J. Arberry, 2016AP866-CR, 6/16/17, granting a petition for review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (composed by On Point)
1. When a defendant is eligible for expungement under § 973.015 but expungement is not addressed the sentencing hearing, can the defendant raise the issue in a postconviction motion? If so, is a “new factor” motion the appropriate vehicle for bringing such a claim?
2. Did the circuit court err in its exercise of discretion when it denied Arberry expungement based on reasons that could apply in any case?
SCOW to decide whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes after he confesses to a crime
State v. Daniel H. Bartelt, 2015AP2506-CR, 6/15/17, granting review of a published court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)
Issues:
1. After confessing to an attempted homicide or other serious crimes, would a reasonable person feel free to terminate a police interview and leave an interrogation room, such that the person in not “in custody” for Miranda purposes?
2. After confessing, did Bartelt make a clear and unequivocal request for counsel when he asked one of the detectives, “Should I or can I speak to a lawyer or anything?” the detective replied, Sure, yes, that is your option.” And Bartelt replied, “Okay, I think I’d prefer that.”