On Point: 45. WI Supreme Court

State v. Richard A. Brown, 2005 WI 29, reversing 2004 WI App 33, 269 Wis. 2d 750, 767 N.W.2d 555
For Brown: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶8. The issue presented by the parties in the instant case is whether a circuit court’s denial of a chapter 980 petition for supervised release should be classified as a determination of a question of law or as an exercise of circuit court discretion.

State ex rel. Leroy Riesch v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 11, summary order
For Riesch: Christopher J. Cherella

Issue/Holding:

¶11. Since granting the petition for review in this case, we have determined that the issue presented is moot as to Riesch. “An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying controversy.” State ex rel. Olson v. Litscher,

State v. Michael S., 2005 WI 82, reversing unpublished decision
For Michael S.: Susan Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶6 Reviewing courts generally decline to decide moot issues but may do so under certain circumstances. [3] A court may decide a moot issue when the issue is of great public importance; occurs frequently and a definitive decision is necessary to guide the circuit courts;

State v. Richard A. Brown, 2005 WI 29, reversing 2004 WI App 33, 269 Wis. 2d 750, 767 N.W.2d 555
For Brown: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Where the only witness at Brown’s supervised release hearing was an expert who supported release, and the evidence indisputably showed favorable response to treatment, the State failed to meet its burden of proof that Brown should not be released,

State v. Richard A. Brown, 2005 WI 29, reversing 2004 WI App 33, 269 Wis. 2d 750, 767 N.W.2d 555
For Brown: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶11. According to Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4), the circuit court starts in the position of having to grant a petition for supervised release. The circuit court does not have to grant the petition if the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the person is still a sexually violent person and that it is substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence if the person is not continued in institutional care.

State v. Antwan B. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, affirming 2004 WI App 111
For Manuel: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding1 [general principles]: Assuming that an out of court statement first satisfies a hearsay rule (¶23), it does not implicate the “core” concern of the confrontation clause unless the statement is considered “testimonial” under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

State v. Antwan B. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, affirming 2004 WI App 111
For Manuel: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding1 [general principles]: The two-part analysis of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) survives Crawford for use in determining Confrontation Clause admissibility of nontestimonial statements, ¶¶54-61 (unavailable declarant, and adequate indicia of reliability).

State v. Glenn H. Hale, 2005 WI 7, affirming, as modified, 2003 WI App 238
For Hale: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Under Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), prior testimony at a codefendant’s separate trial is inadmissible at Hale’s trial, given that the previously testifying witness cannot be located. ¶¶53-58.

Crawford says that testimonial hearsay violates confrontation absent prior opportunity to cross-examine.

State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, reversing 2004 WI App 9
For Terrell C.J.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: (Concurrence of Chief Justice, but one that marshals majority of votes, hence represents holding:)

¶66      The powers of the Wisconsin Supreme Court are defined in several ways and have diverse origins.  Some are explicitly set forth in Article VII,

State v. Derek Anderson, 2005 WI 54, on certification
For Anderson: Neil C. McGinn, SPD, Milwaukee Trial; Wm. J. Tyroler, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: Venue, § 971.19(1), requires trial in the county where the crime was committed; bindover proof of venue in a first-degree intentional homicide was sufficient (taking the inferences in favor of bindover) to show that defendant killed the victim in the county where the prosecution was lodged,