On Point blog, page 1 of 3
SCOW disciplines lawyer for “offering,” and then failing to correct, witness’s false testimony
OLR v. John Kenyatta Riley, 2016 WI 70, 7/15/16; case activity (including briefs)
Leaving us with another splintered decision as the current term comes to its end, a majority of the supreme court votes to publicly reprimand an attorney for “offering” false testimony from his client and then failing to take reasonable measures to correct the testimony. The precedential value of the opinion is uncertain, and perhaps nil, as there’s no majority rationale for the decision and it involves a previous version of the relevant ethical rule; nonetheless, every lawyer who calls witnesses should be aware of it and contemplate what it might portend.
SCOW upholds use of COMPAS at sentencing
State v. Eric L. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, 6/13/06, on certification from the court of appeals, case activity (including briefs)
The developer of COMPAS says that he didn’t design it to be used in sentencing, and he won’t disclose its “trade secret” algorithm. See Pro Publica interview here. But in a 7-0 decision (with 2 concurrences) SCOW holds that if used properly, observing certain “limitations and cautions,” a circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment at sentencing does not violate due process. Slip op. ¶8.
SCOW again leaves Shiffra standing—for now
State v. Patrick J. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, 7/13/16, affirming (for all practical purposes) a published court of appeals decision, 2015 WI App 2, 359 Wis. 2d 482, 859 N.W.2d 125; case activity (including briefs)
A very divided supreme court once again declines to overrule State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), and State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, and leaves the current standard and remedy intact—or, as the mandate puts it, “the law remains as the court of appeals has articulated it.” But four separate writings totaling 135 pages make it clear Shiffra in its current form will certainly be subject to challenge again.
Splintered SCOW finds ex post facto violation in repeal of some early release statutes
State ex re. Aman Singh v. Paul Kemper, 2016 WI 67, 7/13/16, affirming in part and reversing in part a published court of appeals decision, 2014 WI App 43, 353 Wis. 2d 520, 846 N.W.2d 820; case activity (including briefs)
This habeas case involves three discrete ex post facto claims regarding multiple offenses committed and disposed of over a short time span during which there were three versions of Truth-in-Sentencing. A fractured court issues five separate opinions, resulting in holdings that find some ex post facto violations but apparently provide no relief to Singh, the petitioner.
SCOW says circuit courts never ever lack subject matter jurisdiction over OWIs or other matters
City of Eau Claire v. Melissa M. Booth Britton, 2016 WI 65, 7/12/16, reversing a circuit court order on bypass, case activity (including briefs)
OWI specialists, pay attention to this case! It abolishes subject matter jurisdiction challenges to improperly-charged 1st offense OWIs. Everyone else, pay attention too. Justice Abrahamson’s 33-page dissent offers a comprehensive analysis of how the majority opinion (written by R.G. Bradley) fundamentally misunderstands circuit court competency and subject matter jurisdiction and broadly impacts public policy as well as civil and criminal litigation.
SCOW reinvigorates Bangert; holds commutation isn’t alternative remedy to plea withdrawal
State v. Timothy L. Finley, Jr., 2016 WI 63, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2015 WI App 79, 365 Wis. 2d 275, 872 N.W.2d 344; case activity (including briefs)
Reaffirming the long-standing law governing plea withdrawal that was established in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and limiting the reach of two recent cases that muddied the Bangert procedure, the supreme court holds, 5 to 2, that Finley is entitled to withdraw his plea because the circuit court misadvised Finley of the maximum penalty during the plea colloquy and the state failed to prove Finley knew the actual maximum penalty.
Attorney disciplined based in part on failure to turn client files over to successor counsel
OLR v. Peter J. Kovac, 2016 WI 62, 7/8/16; case activity
The supreme court suspended an attorney’s license for 90 days for professional misconduct in two criminal matters, including violating SCR 20:1.16(d) by failing to promptly provide the clients’ files to postconviction counsel. (¶¶5-6, 8, 9-10, 12). Because the attorney did not file an answer or defend against the OLR complaint,
SCOW approves “illegal alien” status as aggravating sentencing factor
State v. Leopoldo R. Salas Gayton, 2016 WI 58, 7/6/16, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2014 WI App 120, 358 Wis. 2d 709, 856 N.W.2d 345; case activity (including briefs)
SCOW took this case to address “whether a sentencing court may rely on a defendant’s illegal immigrant status as a factor in fashioning a sentence.” See here. In a 6-0 decision, the answer, at least on the facts of this case, is that a Wisconsin court may sentence a defendant more harshly because he is an “illegal alien.” The concurrence by Justice A.W. Bradley provides guidance to lower courts and defense attorneys about how to handle immigration status at sentencing.
SCOW makes it easier for the state to satisfy the “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule
State v. Mastella L. Jackson, 2016 WI 56, 7/1/16, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals, 2015 WI App 49, 363 Wis. 2d 553, 866 N.W.2d 768; case activity (including briefs)
Despite the “flagrant” and “reprehensible” violations of Jackson’s Fifth Amendment rights by police, the supreme court holds that physical evidence seized based in part on information obtained from those violations should not be suppressed because the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. In the course of this ruling, the court alters Wisconsin’s long-established inevitable discovery standard and refuses to rule out using the doctrine in cases where the police intentionally violate a suspect’s rights.
Jeremy Perri Guest Posts: SCOW says flip phones are “computerized communication systems”
State v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, 6/28/16, reversing a published court of appeals decision, 2015 WI App 31; case activity (including briefs)
SCOW here defines the phrase “computerized communication system” by separately defining each word, and then lumping together those definitions to conclude that text messages sent with a flip phone constitute “use of a computerized communication system.” It concludes that Wis. Stat. §948.075 is understood by persons of ordinary intelligence, and is therefore not unconstitutional; and that the circuit court’s jury instructions, while not perfect, were close enough. Additionally, SCOW reminds the court of appeals that discretionary reversals under §752.35 are only for “exceptional cases.”