On Point: 2018-19 Term

In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Piontek, 2019 WI 51, 5/21/19; case activity

The supreme court suspends Judge Michael Piontek from office for five days for “obviously unethical” and “clearly improper” misconduct in two criminal cases.

State v. Dennis L. Schwind, 2019 WI 48, affirming a court of appeals’ summary disposition in 2017AP141-CR, 5/3/19; case activity (including briefs).

Section 973.09(3)(d) gives circuit courts authority to reduce or terminate a term of probation if 6 requirements are met. Schwind did not proceed under that statute because he couldn’t satisfy the requirements. So he argued that circuit courts also have inherent authority to reduce or terminate a term of probation for cause.  State v. Dowdy, 2012 WI 12, left this question open. This 5-2 opinion shuts it: No, circuit courts don’t have that authority.

State v. John Patrick Wright, 2019 WI 45, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court holds (again) that, as part of any routine traffic stop, police may ask a driver whether he or she is carrying a weapon.

State v. Nelson Garcia, Jr., 2019 WI 40, 4/19/19; case activity (including briefs)

ASPD Pam Moorshead briefed this appeal and argued it to SCOW less than two weeks ago. The lead issue was whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches upon the finding of probable cause and setting of bail by a court commissioner. Justice Abrahamson withdrew from participation leaving only 6 justices to decide the case.

State v. Corey R. Fugere, 2019 WI 33, 3/28/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Pretend you’re a defendant trying to decide whether to enter a plea. You know that maximum term of imprisonment you face. You also know that pleading NGI is one of your options. However, the circuit court doesn’t tell you (or perhaps misinforms you) about the nature and length of the commitment that will follow from pleading NGI. How can you make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary NGI plea if you don’t know the consequences of it?

State v. Joseph B. Reinwand, 2019 WI 25, 3/19/19, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

The Confrontation Clause ordinarily bars the admission of testimonial statements of a witness if the witness does not appear at trial to testify and be cross-examined. But under the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” doctrine, a witness’s testimonial statements may be admitted if the witness does appear to testify as a the result of wrongdoing by the defendant. The supreme court accepted the court of appeals’ certification of this case to address the scope of forfeiture doctrine, but as it happens the decision doesn’t address the doctrine because it determines the statements at issue are not testimonial and therefore do not implicate the Confrontation Clause.

State v. Michael A. Keister, 2019 WI 26, 3/19/19, reversing a court of appeals order dismissing the appeal and vacating a circuit court order; case activity (including briefs)

The statute providing for grants to set up treatment courts, § 165.95, does not create a fundamental liberty interest for defendants to participate in treatment court and does not itself need to define the procedures for expulsion from treatment court.

State v. Zachary S. Friedlander, 2019 WI 22, 3/12/19, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 606 N.W.2d 536, laid down a bright-line rule for determining whether a person was in “custody” for purposes of earning sentence credit. The supreme court holds that rule is inconsistent with cases holding that an inmate who is mistakenly released from custody continues to serve his or her sentence, and so is entitled to credit for the time he or she was at liberty.

State v. A.L. , 2019 WI 20, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017 WI App 72; case activity

This appeal centers on the proper interpretation of §938.30(5)(d) and §938.13 governing juveniles found not competent during a delinquency proceeding. SCOW holds a circuit court may resume suspended juvenile delinquency proceedings to reexamine the competency of a juvenile who was initially found not competent and not likely to become competent within the statutory period. It also holds that circuit courts retain competency over juvenile delinquency proceedings even after the accompanying JIPS order has expired.

Garza v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, reversing Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017);  Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved two plea agreements that included clauses stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. After sentencing, Garza told his lawyer that he wanted to appeal, but his lawyer refused due to the plea agreement. Garza filed claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Siding with Garza, SCOTUS held that counsel performed deficiently and that “prejudiced is presumed” because the failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Garza of an appeal altogether. Opinion at 1.