On Point: B. Opinions

Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, 2/4/2020, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; 2017AP2217; (case activity)

The caption is the most confusing part of this opinion:

ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I., II., III., IV.A., IV.B., and IV.C.1, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, KELLY, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Part V., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., KELLY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV.C.2., and IV.D., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KELLY, J., joined. DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined.

But it’s not as bad as it looks! And this decision makes (some) law: specifically, that an appeal of an original commitment is not moot where the commitment has the continuing effect of forbidding its subject to possess firearms.

City of Cedarburg v. Ries B. Hansen, 2020 WI 11, 2/11/19 (on bypass of the court of appeals); case activity (including briefs)

Municipal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over ordinance violations (e.g. an OWI 1st), and circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over misdemeanors and felonies (e.g. an OWI 2nd or subsequent). In this 4-3 decision, SCOW holds that a municipal court had subject matter jurisdiction over an OWI 2nd that was mischarged as an OWI 1st. 

State v. Anthony James Jendusa, 2018AP2357-CRLV, review of a decision of the court of appeals denying the state’s petition for leave to appeal; case activity

Before turning to the issues presented, we’ll start with an observation about how this case might seem to affect appellate litigation in all kinds of cases, civil and criminal.

Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Kenneth W. Gorski, 2020 WI 5, imposing a public reprimand on a court commissioner; case activity

Gorski, a part-time court commissioner, earns a public reprimand for failing to recuse himself from a case being handled by a lawyer who is a close friend and for his treatment of the pro se litigant in that case.

State v. Donavinn D. Coffee, 2020 WI 1, 1/9/20, 2017AP2292, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Where to begin?

State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson, 2017AP880-W, 2019 WI 110, affirming a court of appeals unpublished memorandum opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Two weeks ago, we posted “SCOW holds defendants abandoned by counsel to same standards as licensed lawyers,” calling State v. Pope “the most absurd decision this term (still time for worse).” Behold an even more absurd decision: even teenagers who read at 2nd grade level are held to the same standard as licensed lawyers. And, sadly, there’s still time for worse.

State v. Robert James Pope, Jr., 2019 WI 106, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

In the most absurd decision this term (still time for worse), SCOW has denied a defendant sentenced to life without parole both a direct appeal and a new trial because the court system destroyed all of his trial transcripts. The defendant “sat on his rights,” said the majority opinion, written by Justice Ziegler. When his lawyer failed to file a timely notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief, he should have immediately, without counsel, figured out how to defend his appeal rights and effectively defended them. He didn’t. No relief.

State v. Stephan I. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, 12/3/19, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2017AP1894, case activity (including briefs)

The result here is simple, and expected, given the current makeup of the court: a five-two majority to overturn State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582. Dubose held that “show up” identifications–those where the police present a witness with only one suspect–were inherently suggestive, and identifications so obtained would be inadmissible unless circumstances rendered the procedure “necessary.” So, now, Wisconsin courts will review claims that a show-up identification should be excluded under the test of State v. Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d 234, 264, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995): a defendant must carry the initial burden to show the procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and if he or she does, the state must then prove that the identification is nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances.

State v. Autumn Marie Love Lopez & State v. Amy J. Rodriguez, 2019 WI 101, 11/27/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

This appeal asked whether the State may charge multiple acts of misdemeanor retail theft under §943.50  as one felony under §971.36(3)(a).  The justices split 3-2-2. Five of them answered “yes,” but did not fully agree on a rationale for that mandate.  The justices also disagreed over the role titles play in statutory construction and over whether both appellants in a consolidated appeal must file a petition for review.

State v. Matthew Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, 11/12/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017AP1416, case activity (including briefs)

We’ve posted on this case twice before, first on the published court of appeals decision and then on the supreme court’s grant of the petition for review. The question is easily posed: the statute says that a juvenile is subject to automatic adult court jurisdiction if “the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under [chs. 48 and 948] has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation” and the previous case is either pending or ended in conviction. Does “the court” in that phrase mean any juvenile court in the state (so that waiver in any county would forever precluded juvenile jurisdiction in every county), or does it mean the specific juvenile court in the county where criminal charges are contemplated (so that each county would have a chance to make the waiver decision in its own courts)?