On Point: B. Opinions

State v. Glenn T. Zamzow, 2017 WI 29, 4/6/17, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant whose guilt or innocence is at stake at trial may employ the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’ …. But the Sixth Amendment does not mandate that statements considered at a suppression hearing face the crucible of cross-examination. Nor does the Due Process Clause demand this. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not deny Zamzow his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by relying on an audio recording of a deceased officer’s statement at the suppression hearing.” (¶31).

State v. Jeffrey P. Lepsch, 2017 WI 27, 3/31/17, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)

This appeal primarily concerns whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (a) object to the seating of biased jurors, and (b) ensure that the trial court properly administered the oath to the venire panel in Lepsch’s presence.  SCOW holds that none of Lepsch’s jurors were biased, and the venire panel was properly sworn. Thus, no ineffective assistance of counsel occurred. Justice Abrahamson’s concurrence acknowledges Wisconsin law governing juror bias appears inconsistent both internally and with federal case law and strives to harmonize it for the bench and the bar.

Ten weeks ago SCOW issued Seifert v. Balink, its first decision interpreting and applying §907.02, the Daubert test for the admissibility of expert testimony. The court split 2-1-2-2 (as in Abrahamson/AW Bradley–Ziegler–Gableman/Roggensack–Kelly/RG Bradley). That generated two On Point posts here and here,  an Inside Track article here and a Wisconsin Lawyer article here.  Today SCOW split 3-3 in Smith v. Kleynerman, which raised two issues regarding the law governing LLCs and a Daubert issue. Click here to see Kleynerman’s brief.

Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, 3/7/17, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2015WI App 74, case activity (including briefs)

Justice Kelly’s maiden majority opinion opens with a 4-page discussion of a subject both parties disavowed–the Second Amendment right to bear arms. According to the briefs, this case posed only an issue of statutory interpretation–essentially, whether §66.0409, which governs the  “local regulation of weapons,” preempts a City of Madison Transit and Parking Commission rule that prohibits people from carrying weapons, including guns, on City buses.

By the end of the primer on the 2nd Amendment, you can predict the result: A 5-2 opinion reversing a unanimous court of appeals decision holding that §66.0409(2)’s plain language applies to a “political subsdivision’s” “ordinances” or “resolutions” not to a  Transit Commission “rule” banning weapons. But you might not predict that the majority opinion would dial back the conservative “strict constructionist” approach to statutory interpretation adopted in State ex rel Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County.  Henceforth, a statute’s text should be no obstacle to the interpretation you desire.

State v. Thornon F. Talley, 2017 WI 21, 3/9/17, affirming an unpublished summary court of appeals order; case activity (including briefs)

Thornon Talley, who is committed as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, filed a petition for discharge from that commitment in 2012. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The supreme court now unanimously upholds that denial, essentially because Talley did not show any meaningful change in his condition since his previous discharge trial (also in 2012).

State v. David W. Howes, 2017 WI 18, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court granted certification in this case to decide an important question: Does Wisconsin’s implied consent statute create a categorical “consent” exception to the warrant requirement as to unconscious drivers, thus allowing police to collect blood without having to get a warrant or establish exigent circumstances or some other exception? But the court doesn’t answer that question, leaving the law in a muddle. On top of that, the court reverses the circuit court’s suppression order, though without a majority agreement as to why the blood draw was legal, and with some justices invoking a theory the state didn’t argue in the circuit court.

State v. Jeffrey C. Denny, 2017 WI 17, reversing a published court of appeals decision; 2015AP202-CR, 2/28/2017; case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Moran, 2005 WI 115, 284 Wis. 2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884, the supreme court unanimously held that Wis. Stat. § 974.07, the postconviction DNA testing statute, provides two routes for a convicted defendant seeking exoneration: a defendant satisfying certain basic criteria may pay for his own testing of physical evidence; one making a stronger showing of potential significance may secure such testing at public expense. The court now closes off the first, self-paid route.

Voces de La Frontera, Inc. v. David A Clarke, Jr., 2017 WI 16, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2/24/107; case activity (including briefs)

Voces filed an open records request for immigration detainer forms (aka I-247 forms) for persons held at the Milwaukee County Jail. It wanted to confirm that Sheriff Clarke was following federal law governing the deportation of immigrants. See Journal Sentinel story. When Clarke provided only redacted forms, Voces sued for full disclosure and won at the circuit court and the court of appeals. SCOW now reverses in a decision the dissent calls a loss for the people of Wisconsin and their longstanding commitment to open government.

State v. Tabitha A. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; 2014AP2981-CR, 2/23/2017; case activity (including briefs)

On June 30, 2013, Wisconsin enacted its biennial budget bill. Among its provisions were changes to the DNA surcharge applied to criminal convictions in Wisconsin. The $250 surcharge became mandatory rather than discretionary for all felonies (rather than just a few as previously), and would now be applied on a per-count basis rather than once per case. The bill also created a new, mandatory $200-per-count surcharge for misdemeanors.

State v. Rozerick E. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, on certification from the court of appeals, 2015AP158-CR, 2/14/17; case activity (including briefs)

S.D. was found dead in circumstances strongly suggestive of a drug overdose. The police summoned the medical examiner, who eventually performed an autopsy. The examiner sent samples from S.D.’s body to a lab in another state for toxicology testing, which revealed the presence of chemicals indicating a heroin overdose. Mattox, eventually charged with delivering the fatal heroin, claims his Sixth Amendment confrontation right was violated when the state introduced the toxicology report through the medical examiner, rather than the lab analyst who performed the testing.