On Point blog, page 22 of 104
SCOW approves “illegal alien” status as aggravating sentencing factor
State v. Leopoldo R. Salas Gayton, 2016 WI 58, 7/6/16, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2014 WI App 120, 358 Wis. 2d 709, 856 N.W.2d 345; case activity (including briefs)
SCOW took this case to address “whether a sentencing court may rely on a defendant’s illegal immigrant status as a factor in fashioning a sentence.” See here. In a 6-0 decision, the answer, at least on the facts of this case, is that a Wisconsin court may sentence a defendant more harshly because he is an “illegal alien.” The concurrence by Justice A.W. Bradley provides guidance to lower courts and defense attorneys about how to handle immigration status at sentencing.
SCOW makes it easier for the state to satisfy the “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule
State v. Mastella L. Jackson, 2016 WI 56, 7/1/16, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals, 2015 WI App 49, 363 Wis. 2d 553, 866 N.W.2d 768; case activity (including briefs)
Despite the “flagrant” and “reprehensible” violations of Jackson’s Fifth Amendment rights by police, the supreme court holds that physical evidence seized based in part on information obtained from those violations should not be suppressed because the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. In the course of this ruling, the court alters Wisconsin’s long-established inevitable discovery standard and refuses to rule out using the doctrine in cases where the police intentionally violate a suspect’s rights.
Jeremy Perri Guest Posts: SCOW says flip phones are “computerized communication systems”
State v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, 6/28/16, reversing a published court of appeals decision, 2015 WI App 31; case activity (including briefs)
SCOW here defines the phrase “computerized communication system” by separately defining each word, and then lumping together those definitions to conclude that text messages sent with a flip phone constitute “use of a computerized communication system.” It concludes that Wis. Stat. §948.075 is understood by persons of ordinary intelligence, and is therefore not unconstitutional; and that the circuit court’s jury instructions, while not perfect, were close enough. Additionally, SCOW reminds the court of appeals that discretionary reversals under §752.35 are only for “exceptional cases.”
SCOW clarifies Nelson/Bentley test and read-in procedure; muddles rules on petitions for review again
State v. Richard J. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, 6/14/16, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Sulla entered a plea agreement requiring him to plead “no contest” to two counts and the State to dismiss and “read in” two other counts for purposes of sentencing and restitution. But after he was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment, Sulla moved for plea withdrawal arguing that he was misinformed of, and did not understand, the effect that a read-in charge could have at sentencing. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. Don’t be fooled. SCOW’s decision here affects more than plea withdrawal. It changes appellate procedure.
SCOW: Joinder of charges okay. Oh, and “or” can also mean “by”.
State v. Salinas, 2016 WI 44, 5/26/2016, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
In which our so-called law-developing court does not develop the law of joinder under § 971.12(1)—and even leaves it less clear than it used to be.
SCOW dismisses DA’s action to enjoin release of information in response to open records request
State v. Moustakis, 2016 WI 42, 5/20/2016, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2015 WI App 63, case activity (including briefs)
This decision may interest those who need to file an open records request concerning a district attorney. In this case, a newspaper asked the DOJ for records of complaints or investigations regarding the Vilas County District Attorney. The DA sought to enjoin the DOJ from releasing the records.
Mike Tobin Guest Posts: SCOW declines to extend Padilla to other serious consequences of conviction
State v. Stephen LeMere, 2016 WI 41, 05/12/2016, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, case activity (including briefs)
In State v. LeMere, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not require defense counsel to advise a client that conviction for a pending charge of sexual assault could result in future commitment proceedings under chapter 980. The case could be appropriate for certiorari review in the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the scope of the right to counsel.
SCOW does not overrule Steven H., except for the holding
St. Croix County Department of Health and Human Services v. Michael D. & Juanita A., 2016 WI 35, 05/12/2016, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity
Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607, finds itself roundly praised and deeply buried by our high court.
SCOW: No right-to-testify colloquy needed in second NGI phase
State v. James Elvin Lagrone, 2016 WI 26, 4/22/2016, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Ziegler, dissent by A.W. Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)
Lagrone wasn’t told he had the right to testify during the second, mental responsibility phase of his NGI trial. He alleged in his postconviction motion that he didn’t know he had any such right. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The supreme court now affirms that denial in an opinion that neither (1) decides whether Lagrone had a right to testify during the second phase, nor (2) explains how the denial of that right, if it exists, can be raised in postconviction proceedings.
SCOW reformulates “clearly erroneous” standard, renders competency findings unassailable
State v. Jimmie Lee Smith, 2016 WI 23, 4/7/16, reversing a published court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Roggensack, concurrence by Ziegler, dissent by Abrahamson (joined by A.W. Bradley); case activity (including briefs)
You can’t accuse the majority of mere error correction in this decision. Although the State never asked SCOW to rewrite the “clearly erroneous” standard of review and nobody briefed or orally argued the issue (see Ziegler’s concurrence and Abrahamson’s dissent), the majority seized the opportunity to make a tough standard even tougher. Unless SCOTUS steps in, it’s going to be virtually impossible to challenge circuit court competency findings as well as other circuit court decisions governed by the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.