On Point: B. Opinions

State v. Jesse J. Delebreau, 2015 WI 55, 6/16/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Prosser, concurrence by Roggensack, dissent by Abrahamson; case activity (including briefs)

Last time SCOW addressed a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel after being charged with a crime, the result was 5 separate opinions. Discerning the rule of State v. Forbush required clairvoyance. Here, SCOW holds definitively that a defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel in an interrogation before he is charged (under the 5th Amendment) is sufficient to waive his  right to counsel after he is charged (under the 6th Amendment) even though he has appeared in court with a public defender. Despite being represented by an attorney, the defendant must affirmatively invoke his right to counsel. The result is the same under Article 1 §7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.

State v. Raheem Moore, 2015 WI 54, 6/16/15, affirming a published decision of the court of appeals; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court affirms the court of appeals’ conclusion that 15-year-old Raheem Moore’s confession was voluntary, but it rejects the court of appeals’ reading of § 938.31, which requires juvenile confessions to be recorded unless the juvenile “refused to respond or cooperate” with the interrogation if it was being recorded, § 938.31(3)(b) and (c)1.

State v. Andre M. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53, 6/12/15, reversing an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals; opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that when the parties in an OWI prosecution are disputing the number of prior offenses, the circuit court can require the dispute to be resolved before it accepts the defendant’s plea; it doesn’t have to wait till sentencing to determine the number of prior offenses. And even if the court errs in denying the state the chance to prove an additional prior OWI conviction at sentencing, it violates due process to allow the circuit court to resentence the defendant on the basis of the additional conviction if the additional conviction would increase the penalty that could be imposed.

State v. General Grant Wilson, 2015 WI 48, reversing an unpublished court of appeals summary disposition; opinion by Prosser; concurrence by Ziegler; dissent by Abrahamson; case activity (including briefs)

If this portly opinion had been placed on 40-page reducing plan, it would have gained clarity and exposed its inner motive: ensuring that a 22-year old conviction sticks. In Wisconsin, even when the case against a defendant is overwhelming, he still has the right to present evidence that a 3rd party committed the crime of which he is accused per State v. Denny. To do so, he must show that the 3rd party had a motive and an opportunity to commit, and a direct connection to, the crime charged. SCOW here reaffirms Denny but “engineers” a more stringent “opportunity” test for certain cases.

State v. Dean M. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, 5/5/15, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; opinion by Chief Justice Roggensack; case activity (including briefs)

Though police moved Blatterman beyond the “vicinity” of the traffic stop and therefore exceeded the permissible scope of the stop, the detention of Blatterman was nonetheless reasonable because police had probable cause to arrest him for OWI and, in the alternative, the detention was justified under the community caretaker doctrine.

State v. Roddee W. Daniel, 2015 WI 44, 4/29/15, affirming and modifying a published court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity (including briefs)

This opinion clarifies the procedure for determining the competency of a defendant during postconviction proceedings by holding that once the issue of a defendant’s competency has been raised, the state bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is competent to proceed.

State v. Michael R. Luedtke/State v. Jessica M. Weissinger, 2015 WI 42, 4/24/15, affirming two published decisions of the court of appeals: Luedtke; Weissinger; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs): Luedtke; Weissinger

Brushing aside the argument that the Wisconsin Constitution’s due process clause provides greater protection to its citizens than the federal constituiton, the supreme court affirms the existing Wisconsin rule governing claims that the destruction of evidence by the state violates a defendant’s right to due process.

State v. Michael R. Luedtke/State v. Jessica Weissinger, 2015 WI 42, 4/24/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that § 346.63(1)(am), which prohibits operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, is a strict liability crime and does not violate due process by failing to require proof that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance.

State v. Michael R. Griep, 2015 WI 40, 4/23/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack; case activity (including briefs)

Opinion testimony by a qualified expert based on data produced by an unavailable forensic lab analyst doesn’t violate a defendant’s right to confrontation if the testifying expert formed an “independent” opinion based on a review of the unavailable analyst’s data.

State v. Joel M. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, 3/31/15, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity (including briefs)

This lengthy decision addresses three discrete issues: Whether Hurley was given sufficient notice of the child sexual assault charges he had to defend against; whether other acts evidence was properly admitted; and whether the prosecutor’s closing argument justified a new trial in the interest of justice.

This post covers the court’s conclusion that under its just-revised “totality of the circumstances” test for deciding whether charges of child sexual assault give a defendant adequate notice of the charges, Hurley was given sufficient notice by a criminal complaint charging him with repeated acts of sexual assault of M.C.N., his stepdaughter, on three or more occasions “on and between” 2000 and 2005. Our post on the other-acts issue is here, and our post on the prosecutor’s closing argument is here.