On Point: B. Opinions

State v. Kearney W. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, 12/18/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

At last, a unanimous SCOW decision settles how §973.015 is really supposed to work. Upon a young person’s successful completion of a sentence or probation, the detaining or probationary authority must issue a certificate of discharge to the court. This alerts the clerk to expunge the record. No petition is necessary. And once a court grants expungement, and the young person performs as required, the court cannot reverse its decision.

Outagamie v. Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 12/16/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

Section 51.20(1)(a)2.a authorizes the involuntary commitment of a person who is “dangerous,” a test that may be met by showing recent threats of, or attempts at, suicide. This unanimous decision holds that in the right circumstances just thinking about suicide–without articulating a plan for committing it–constitutes a sufficient “threat” to satisfy the involuntary commitment statute.

Practitioners take note. This opinion holds the seeds of controversy.  SCOW’s ruling–that forcing a defendant to bare his teeth to the jury does not violate the 5th Amendment–is not so surprising.  But Chief Justice Abrahamson’s concurrence, which announces the elimination of “opinion conferences” and new restrictions on the preparation of concurring and dissenting opinions seems alarming.

State v. Myron C. Dillard, 2014 WI 123, 11/26/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2013 WI App 108; majority opinion by Chief Justice Abrahamson; case activity

Dillard accepted a plea bargain under which the state dropped a persistent repeater allegation, which carried a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of release. But Dillard was never really subject to the persistent repeater law. When he discovered this fact after he was sentenced, he moved to withdraw his plea on the ground his decision to accept the plea bargain was based on his mistaken belief—one shared by the prosecutor, his lawyer, and the court—that he was facing a mandatory life sentence if he was convicted after a trial. The supreme court holds he is entitled to plea withdrawal because his plea was not knowing and voluntary and because his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to discover the persistent repeater law never applied to Dillard.

State v. Jeremiah J. Purtell, 2014 WI 101, 8/1/14, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

In a case that expands the power of probation agents to search probationers’ computers and similar digital devices, the supreme court holds that the search of Purtell’s computer by his probation agent was reasonable because: 1) the computer was contraband, as Purtell was prohibited from possessing it by the rules of his probation; and 2) the agent had reasonable grounds to believe the computer might contain other items the probationer was prohibited from possessing—in this case, communications with underage girls or unauthorized Myspace accounts.

State v. James R. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, 8/1/14, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

The court of appeals granted Hunt a new trial; the supreme court takes that new trial away. The supreme court’s decision does not develop any new law or address a novel issue of statewide concern—and that’s no surprise, for as described here, the state’s petition for review admitted the case didn’t meet the usual standards for review. Instead, the court applies well-developed rules governing harmless error and ineffective assistance of counsel to the fact-specific claims in this case. In the course of doing so, however, the court misunderstands, ignores, or inverts some fundamental tenets of appellate review and basic rules of evidence.

State v. Donyil Leeiton Anderson, 2014 WI 93, 7/30/14, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

Without explaining its reasoning, the supreme court declares that while the consumption of prescription medication in accordance with a physician’s advice may give rise to an involuntary intoxication defense under § 939.42, it can never create a mental defect that would sustain an insanity defense under § 971.15. The court also holds that mixing prescription medication with any amount of alcohol precludes a defendant from using either defense.

State v. Carlos Cummings and State v. Adrean L. Smith, 2014 WI 88, 7/24/14, affirming per curiam court of appeals decisions in 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR, majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; concurrence/dissent by Justice Prosser (joined by Justice Bradley); dissent by Chief Justice Abrahamson; case activity for Cummings and Smith

These cases address whether two Mirandized suspects unequivocally invoked their respective rights to remain silent, or cut off questioning, during police interrogations.  Citing State v. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242 the majority held that both defendants seem to have meant something other than what they literally said.  Their attempts to cut off questioning were “equivocal” and thus their statements need not be suppressed.

State v. Bobby L. Tate, 2014 WI 89, 7/24/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack; case activity

State v. Nicolas Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, 7/24/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; lead opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

In two decisions consisting of 8 separate opinions spread out across almost 200 pages, the supreme court is unable to muster a majority on the central issue presented: Whether cell phone location tracking is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, in both cases a majority assumes without deciding that cell phone tracking is a search and then affirms the convictions, although on different grounds. If you’re looking only for the holdings, here they are: In Tate, a majority holds that the circuit court’s “order” that a cell phone service provide information about the cell phone location was reasonable because it met the requirements for a search warrant. In Subdiaz-Osorio, a majority holds that the warrantless acquisition of the cell phone location data was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. If you’re looking for more information, read on.

State v. Tramell Starks,  2013 WI 69, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, case activity; reconsideration denied 7/24/14, concurring opinion by Chief Justice Abrahamson

Taking a cue from Napolean Bonaparte, the Wisconsin Supreme Court just denied two, year-old reconsideration motions outlining many serious mistakes in the Starks majority opinion (written by Justice Gableman).  No, that statement is not just sour grapes.  The Attorney General also asked for reconsideration  along the same lines as the defense. The Chief Justice took the extraordinary step of attaching both motions to her concurrence.