On Point

State v. V.S., 2021AP136, District 1, 4/6/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The record shows the circuit court considered all of the § 48.426(3) factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child and properly applied them to the facts in deciding whether to terminate V.S.’s parental rights to D.D.S.

State v. Markell Hogan, 2021 WI App 24; case activity (including briefs)

A police officer who has experience investigating human trafficking cases and who has training from various prosecutorial and law enforcement conferences about the methods traffickers use may testify as an expert under §907.02 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Brown v. Davenport, No. 20-826, cert. granted 4/5/21; Scotusblog page

Question presented: May a federal habeas court grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the Brecht test is satisfied, as the Sixth Circuit held, or must the court also find that the state court’s Chapman application was unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1), as the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held?

On March 31, 2021, the court of appeals ordered the publication of the following criminal law related opinions:

State v. Avant Rondell Nimmer, 2020AP878-CR, petition for review granted 3/24/21; case activity (including links to briefs and PFR)

Issue presented (composed by On Point):

Did police responding to a ShotSpotter alert of shots fired have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Nimmer based on his proximity to the address in the alert so close to the alert and Nimmer’s response to the officer’s arrival on the scene?

Daniel Doubek v. Joshua Kaul, 2020AP704, 3/31/21, District 2, certification granted 6/16/21; decision issued, circuit court reversed, 2022 WI 31; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Are Evans v. DOJ, 2014 WI App 31, 353 Wis. 2d 289, 844 N.W.2d 403, and Leonard v. State, 2015 WI App 57, 364 Wis. 2d 491, 868 N.W.2d 186, “good law” in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014)?

Village of Greendale v. Matthew R. Derzay, 2019AP2294, District 1, 3/30/31 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The burden of proof for a petitioner under § 968.20 is preponderance of the evidence, but the circuit court applied the clear and convincing standard and demanded Derzay provide certain kinds of proof to meet that burden. This was error.

Jackson County DHS v. M.M.B., 2021AP98 & 2021AP99, District 4, 4/1/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.M.B. stipulated that there were grounds for terminating her parental rights to her two children, but argued at the disposition phase that termination wasn’t in the best interest of the children. At that hearing, the County presented the testimony of a psychologist who had assessed M.M.B.’s “psychosocial functioning, including issues related to parenting and substance abuse.” M.M.B. objected, arguing the psychologist’s evaluation was not contemporaneous to the dispositional hearing, but had been conducted two years earlier, and thus wasn’t relevant to the issue of the children’s best interests. (¶¶3-6). The circuit court didn’t err in admitting this testimony.

Winnebago County v. A.A.L., 2020AP1511, 3/24/2021, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

A.A.L. appeals her commitment under ch. 51. She claims the county didn’t give her adequate notice of which statutory forms of dangerousness it intended to prove, and that in any event it didn’t prove any of them. The court of appeals finds the notice argument forfeited (though it goes on to say it’s also unconvincing). And though it admonishes the county for presenting a bare-bones case and calls the question “close,” the court also holds the evidence of dangerousness sufficient for commitment.

Fond du Lac County v. J.L.H., 2020AP2049, 3/24/21, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)e. lays out the “fifth standard” for dangerousness; a person can be committed under it if his or her mental illness prevents him or her from understanding the advantages and disadvantages of treatment, and a lack of treatment will cause a substantial probability that the person will be harmed and become unable to function. But there’s a limitation on this standard that the other standards lack: a person can’t be dangerous under it if care is available, either in the community at large or through ch. 55, that diminishes the threat of harm so that it is not substantial.