On Point

State v. Duanne D. Townsend, 2019AP787, 6/9/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Good news: the court of appeals reversed a circuit court decision denying Townsend’s §974.06 motion without a hearing. Townsend now gets a one on his claims for ineffective assistance of postconviction and trial counsel. Bad news: the court of appeals botched the issue of whether Townsend was denied his 6th Amendment right to determine his own defense under McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S Ct. 1500 (2018). As noted in our post on McCoy, SCOW needs to square that decision with Wisconsin case law.

A group of researchers wanted to find out whether, using brain-imaging technology and AI, they could examine human brain activities and distinguish between an intentional and a reckless state of mind. Given that criminal law punishes defendants more harshly for acting with intent, it’s a good thing the answered turned out to be “yes.” The paper will be published soon in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, but you can read it here.

If you handle Chapter 980 cases, you make like this new paper on sexually violent predator laws. It argues that our nation’s SVP laws are a “miserable failure” and that foreign SVP laws based on international human rights law are more effective.

Due to COVID-19 courts have been considering large scale prison releases, but usually only for people convicted of nonviolent crimes. Are fears of violent crime recidivism warranted? What does it say about our justice system when we release some inmates but leave others is prisons with large COVID outbreaks? If you’re working on a motion for release this new study published in the Notre Dame Law Review my be helpful.

More news on how courts are adapting, or attempting to adapt, to the coronavirus pandemic, and how it’s working, or not working:

Waukesha County HHS v. S.S., 2020AP592, District 2, 6/10/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in ordering default judgment for S.S.’s egregious conduct of lying to the court to get her TPR trial adjourned.

State v. Mark J. Bucki, 2020 WI App 43; case activity (including briefs)

[UPDATED POST – Scroll to the bottom for very useful commentary by Chris Zachar. Many thanks to him for sharing his knowledge.]

The headline tells you the only legal proposition you need to take from this soon-to-be-published case: under Daubert, evidence that trained dogs indicated the defendant had been at a particular location, and also that there had once been human remains in other locations, is not subject to a per se rule requiring corroboration before it can be admitted at trial. In a given case, a circuit court could conclude that particular dog-sniff evidence is not sufficiently reliable to come in (with or without corroboration). But Bucki’s argument–that dog-sniff evidence is so inherently unreliable that it necessarily requires corroboration–is rejected. We read the 50-page opinion, so you don’t have to.

Juneau County DHS v. C.C., 2020AP438, 6/4/20, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Courts don’t usually award summary judgment in TPR cases, especially not at the grounds phase where the question is whether the parent abandoned the child. The issue is generally too fact intensive. But here the circuit court found no genuine issue of fact regarding abandonment, and the court of appeals affirmed.

Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, USSC No. 18-8369, 2020 WL 3038282, 6/8/20, affirming 754 Fed. Appx. 756 (10th Cir. 2018); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) bars a prisoner from being able to file a lawsuit without first paying filing fees if the prisoner has “three strikes”—that is, has had three or more prior suits dismissed because they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The issue here is whether the dismissal had to be with prejudice, or whether a dismissal without prejudice counts, too. It does, says a unanimous Court.

State v. Mose B. Coffee, 2020 WI 53, 6/5/20, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2018AP1209; case activity (including briefs)

Under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009), police can search a vehicle after arresting a recent occupant “when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” But how do courts decide when it’s “reasonable to believe” this: is it a typical totality-of-the-circumstances analysis examining all the facts around an arrest? Or, as many courts have concluded, do the elements of the crime suspected–the “offense of arrest”–determine categorically when a search is permitted and when it isn’t? A majority of justices in this case would adopt the former view, but, as we’ve often seen lately, their votes are split between the lead and dissenting opinions. This arguably means there’s no binding holding on the question of law; the only thing we know for sure is that the search in this case is upheld.