On Point

Holguin-Hernadez v. United States, USSC 18-7739, vacating and remanding a per curiam 5th Circuit Court of Appeals opinion;  SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary).

At Holguin-Hernandez’s revocation hearing, his counsel argued for a specific sentence–either nothing or less than 12 months. The government pushed for 12-18 months. After the district court chose 12 months, H-H appealed and argued that the length of his sentence was unreasonable.

Shular v. United States, USSC 18-6662, affirming an unpublished 11th Circuit Court of Appeals opinion; SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The issue in this case was whether Shular, a felon in possession of a firearm, had been convicted of 3 or more “serious drug offenses” under state law. If so, he would receive a mandatory 15-year term of imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).

Jones v. Mississippi, USSC No.  18-1259, certiorari granted 3/9/20.

Question presented:

Whether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without parole.

On February 26th, SCOTUS dismissed Randall Mathena, Warden v. Lee Boyd Malvo, USSC No. 18-217, which raised the same issue. Jones is a replacement case for Malvo. 

If you’re waiting for a decision on whether solicitation of 1st degree reckless injury is a crime in Wisconsin and on whether solicitation of 1st degree recklessly endangering safety is a lesser included offense of 1st degree reckless injury, STOP! SCOW just dismissed the case raising these issues–State v. Kelly James Kloss–as improvidently granted. SCOW’s really DIGing it this term. This is the second time in less than a month that it has issued a Dismissed as Improvidently Granted order.

State v. Alexander M. Schultz, 2020 WI 24, affirming a published court of appeals opinion; 3/4/20; case activity (including briefs)

In a 4-3 decision, SCOW holds that the State may assert a vague charging period (i.e “late summer to early fall”) for repeated child sexual assault, but then constructively narrow the charging period after trial in order to bring a second prosecution for child sexual assault without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.

State v. T. E.-B., 2019AP309, 3/5/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

T. E.-B. appeals his juvenile adjudication for sexual assault of a four-year-old, arguing that the state failed to prove that the alleged assault happened when the petition said it did: “on or about June 21, 2017.” Everyone agrees that the possible range of dates for the assault doesn’t encompass that day, which was a few days after the child first reported an assault to family. Based on the child’s account, the assault actually would have to have occurred sometime between November 6, 2016 and mid-June of 2017.

Check out the new article to be published in the University of  Illinois Law Review by the prolific Michael Cicchini. It examines how Wisconsin judges accept pleas and then jump the agreed upon sentence (or joint recommendation), leaving the defendant without recourse.  The article contrasts Wisconsin practice’s with the majority of states, which don’t allow judges to sandbag defendants this way.  More significantly, though, the article offers Wisconsin defense lawyers a strategic approach (including a sample motion) for avoiding this problem in some circumstances and in some cases.  

Jefferson County v. M.P., 2019AP2229, 3/5/20, District 4 (One-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.P. has schizophrenia. In 2018, she was committed for six months after she made statements about shooting some relatives and burning down a house. In 2019, the county sought and received an extension of the commitment. M.P. argues that recommitment was invalid because the evidence went only to her conduct before her initial commitment, and thus didn’t show her to be currently dangerous. The court of appeals disagrees.

Kansas v. Garcia, USSC No. 17-384, 2020 WL 1016170, 3/3/20, reversing and remanding State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588 (Kan. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court has upheld Kansas’s prosecution of noncitizens who used stolen social security numbers to gain employment.

The Kansas Supreme Court held that federal law in the form of the Immigration Reform and Control Act precluded prosecution of Garcia and some other defendants for identity theft because of 8 U.S.C.

State v. Lance L. Black, 2019AP592, 3/3/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Black’s first trial ended in a hung jury. When the state said it would try him again, he made a fuss–swearing and pounding on a table. At his second trial, Black again erupted (twice), was removed from the courtroom, and refused to return. His counsel requested a competency evaluation, which the court permitted, though with apparent reluctance. After the examiner found Black incompetent, the court disagreed with her, finding him competent and continuing the trial to (guilty) verdicts.