On Point

See The Atlantic‘s new article, “The Repurposing of the American Jail” here.

State v. Z.J., 2019AP1623-1626, District 1, 11/19/19, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

All TPRs are sad. But this one really highlights the Catch 22 that poverty can create for a parent. Z.J., mother of 4, was struggling with drug and alcohol abuse. The State sought to terminate her parental rights for these and other reasons. But the real issue is whether the circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it entered a default judgment against her at the grounds phase.

V.A. v. M.W.P., 2019AP1098, District 2, 11/20/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

V.A. petitioned to terminate the parental rights of her child’s father, M.W.P., who pled no contest to abandonment. M.V.P. argues the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering termination because it failed to dismiss the proceeding or give sufficient weight to the fact that V.A.’s husband, M.A., confronted the child’s GAL about his recommendation against termination, telling the GAL he’d “have blood on his hands.” (¶¶3, 13). No erroneous exercise of discretion here, says the court of appeals.

State v. A.L.M., 2019AP1599, 2019AP1600, & 2019AP1601, District 1, 11/19/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

After A.L.M. pled no contest to failing to assume parental responsibility, the circuit court terminated his parental rights. The evidence was sufficient to support that conclusion.

Some of you have noticed that the subject lines for On Point’s email blasts get stuck or don’t coordinate with the posts listed within the  email itself. It’s happened several times now. Sorry for the confusion. We are working to fix the problem.

State v. Matthew Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, 11/12/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017AP1416, case activity (including briefs)

We’ve posted on this case twice before, first on the published court of appeals decision and then on the supreme court’s grant of the petition for review. The question is easily posed: the statute says that a juvenile is subject to automatic adult court jurisdiction if “the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under [chs. 48 and 948] has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation” and the previous case is either pending or ended in conviction. Does “the court” in that phrase mean any juvenile court in the state (so that waiver in any county would forever precluded juvenile jurisdiction in every county), or does it mean the specific juvenile court in the county where criminal charges are contemplated (so that each county would have a chance to make the waiver decision in its own courts)?

State v. Roy S. Anderson, 2019 WI 97, 11/15/19, affirming a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Act 79 permits law enforcement to search a person on probation, parole or extended supervision based on reasonable suspicion (not probable cause) that the person, is is about to, or has committed a violation of a condition of his release. In its first decision on this law, SCOW holds 7-0 that the officer here had (a) knowledge of Anderson’s supervision status before conducting the search at issue, and (b) the reasonable suspicion needed to conduct the search.

State v. David Gutierrez, 2017AP2364-CR, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 11/13/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (based on the State’s Petition for Review):

1. Did the court of appeals violate the standard of appellate review of trial court evidentiary rulings by holding the trial court erred in deciding to exclude evidence offered by the defendant that DNA from other men was found on the clothing of the complainant in a child sexual assault prosecution?

2. Did the court of appeals improperly apply Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b), Wisconsin’s rape shield law, when it held the defendant was not offering the DNA evidence as evidence concerning the victim’s prior sexual conduct?

State v. Shawn A. Anderson, 2019AP173-CR, District 3, 11/13/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court’s sentencing remarks considered in their entirety showed the court properly exercised its discretion in ordering Anderson to be subject to lifetime supervision under § 939.615.

State v. E.F., 2019AP1559-1561, 11/12/19, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court never uttered the words “best interest of the child” at the dispositional phase of this TPR case. No matter, says the court of appeals, “magical” or “talismanic” words aren’t necessary. The trial court’s decision was “infused with articulated concern” for E.F.’s children. That’s enough. Opinion, ¶¶17-18.