On Point

Some of you have noticed that the subject lines for On Point’s email blasts get stuck or don’t coordinate with the posts listed within the  email itself. It’s happened several times now. Sorry for the confusion. We are working to fix the problem.

State v. Matthew Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, 11/12/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017AP1416, case activity (including briefs)

We’ve posted on this case twice before, first on the published court of appeals decision and then on the supreme court’s grant of the petition for review. The question is easily posed: the statute says that a juvenile is subject to automatic adult court jurisdiction if “the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under [chs. 48 and 948] has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation” and the previous case is either pending or ended in conviction. Does “the court” in that phrase mean any juvenile court in the state (so that waiver in any county would forever precluded juvenile jurisdiction in every county), or does it mean the specific juvenile court in the county where criminal charges are contemplated (so that each county would have a chance to make the waiver decision in its own courts)?

State v. Roy S. Anderson, 2019 WI 97, 11/15/19, affirming a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Act 79 permits law enforcement to search a person on probation, parole or extended supervision based on reasonable suspicion (not probable cause) that the person, is is about to, or has committed a violation of a condition of his release. In its first decision on this law, SCOW holds 7-0 that the officer here had (a) knowledge of Anderson’s supervision status before conducting the search at issue, and (b) the reasonable suspicion needed to conduct the search.

State v. David Gutierrez, 2017AP2364-CR, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 11/13/19; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (based on the State’s Petition for Review):

1. Did the court of appeals violate the standard of appellate review of trial court evidentiary rulings by holding the trial court erred in deciding to exclude evidence offered by the defendant that DNA from other men was found on the clothing of the complainant in a child sexual assault prosecution?

2. Did the court of appeals improperly apply Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b), Wisconsin’s rape shield law, when it held the defendant was not offering the DNA evidence as evidence concerning the victim’s prior sexual conduct?

State v. Shawn A. Anderson, 2019AP173-CR, District 3, 11/13/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court’s sentencing remarks considered in their entirety showed the court properly exercised its discretion in ordering Anderson to be subject to lifetime supervision under § 939.615.

State v. E.F., 2019AP1559-1561, 11/12/19, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court never uttered the words “best interest of the child” at the dispositional phase of this TPR case. No matter, says the court of appeals, “magical” or “talismanic” words aren’t necessary. The trial court’s decision was “infused with articulated concern” for E.F.’s children. That’s enough. Opinion, ¶¶17-18.

State v. A.C.M., 2018AP2423-2424, 11/12/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A.C.M.’s trial lawyer did not call her psychiatrist to testify about her mental health or her medication compliance–evidence that was important to the issue of whether she posed a safety risk to her children. The court of appeals held that even if counsel should have called the doctor, her failure to do so didn’t prejudice A.C.M.

State v. Brian L. Halverson, 2019 WI App 66; petition for review granted 3/17/20; affirmed 1/29/21; case activity (including briefs)

Until now, Wisconsin held that a person who is interviewed by law enforcement while incarcerated is per se in custody and thus must receive a Miranda warning. State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 588 N.W. 2d 606 (1999). This published court of appeals’ decision holds that the SCOTUS effectively overturned Armstrong in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012). Going forward, courts must determine whether an inmate is in custody by analyzing the totality of the circumstances surrounding his interrogation.

State v. Jeffrey L. Ionescu, 2019 WI App 68; case activity (including briefs)

A homeowner told police that he found a burglar in his car and saw him run west across his yard. About 10 minutes later, officer and a trained tracking dog headed in that direction for about 30 minutes. The officer saw footprints, and the dog detected scent, off and on along the way. Eventually they reached the yard of burglar’s mother and entered it without a warrant. She let them enter her home where they found Ionescu. Was this pursuit cold, warm or hot?

State v. Amanuel A. Ayele, 2019AP432, 11/7/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Ayele pleaded to a battery after an attack on his father, with whom he lived. The state had charged the crime as an incident of domestic abuse carrying a surcharge under Wis. Stat. § 973.o55 but moved, as part of the plea deal, to remove this provision. The court wouldn’t go along though, and Ayele pleaded anyway. What the court did do is waive the actual imposition of the surcharge under § 973.055(4). But the judgment of conviction still notes “Domestic Abuse Assessments” in the description of the charge, and Ayele wants the notation struck.