On Point

McWilliams v. Dunn, USSC No. 16-5295, 2017 WL 2621324 (June 19, 2017), reversing McWilliams v. Dunn, 634 Fed.Appx. 698 (11th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A win for defendants in capital cases. Ake v. Oklahoma “clearly established” that when an indigent defendant demonstrates that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant fact at trial, the State must provide him with access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate (1) examination and assist in (2) evaluation, (3) preparation, and (4) presentation of the defense. Ake did not specifically require the appointment of a defense team expert (as opposed to a neutral expert). It left that issue open, and with this decision SCOTUS leaves the issue open. It does hold, however, that simplest way for a state to satisfy Ake is to prove the defense with its own psychiatric expert.

Charlotte Jenkins v. Percy Hutton, USSC No. 16-1116, 2017 WL 2621321 (June 19, 2017) (per curiam), reversing Hutton v. Mitchell, 839 F.3d 486 (2016)( 6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Hutton filed a federal habeas petition challenging his death sentence on the grounds that the jury at the penalty phase of his trial hadn’t been sufficiently instructed to consider only the aggravating factors that had been proven during the guilt phase. But he didn’t object to the instructions at trial and didn’t raise instructional error on direct appeal, so his claim was procedurally defaulted. (Slip op. at 1-3). The Sixth Circuit reached the merits of his claim anyway, excusing the default because the jury hadn’t found the existence of aggravating factors and under Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992). The Sixth Circuit was wrong to do so, says the Supreme Court.

Virginia v. Dennis LeBlanc, USSC No. 16-1177, 2017 WL 2507375 (June 12, 2017), reversing LeBlanc v. Mathena, 841 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Although this is a per curiam decision and it’s decided under the rubric of federal habeas review, the upshot of this opinion is that states won’t have to do too much to satisfy the requirement under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010), that a state give a juvenile serving life without parole “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on a demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”

State v. Jesse T. Riemer, 2017 WI App 48; case activity (including briefs)

In what appears to be the first case of its kind, the court of appeals addresses the standard for reviewing the sentence imposed on a member of the Wisconsin National Guard after he was convicted of various offenses. Concluding it should apply the same standard as civilian criminal cases—erroneous exercise of discretion—it affirms the military judge’s sentence.

Marquette County v. Matthew J. Owens, 2016AP2176, District 4, 6/15/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Owens argues that a police officer’s driving was so careless or unlawful that it required Owens to react in a way that created reasonable suspicion to stop him. Not so, says the court of appeals.

State v. Diamond J. Arberry, 2016AP866-CR, 6/16/17, granting a petition for review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

1. When a defendant is eligible for expungement under § 973.015 but expungement is not addressed the sentencing hearing, can the defendant raise the issue in a postconviction motion? If so, is a “new factor” motion the appropriate vehicle for bringing such a claim?

2. Did the circuit court err in its exercise of discretion when it denied Arberry expungement based on reasons that could apply in any case?

State v. Daniel H. Bartelt, 2015AP2506-CR, 6/15/17, granting review of a published court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1.  After confessing to an attempted homicide or other serious crimes, would a reasonable person feel free to terminate a police interview and leave an interrogation room, such that the person in not “in custody” for Miranda purposes?

2.  After confessing, did Bartelt make a clear and unequivocal request for counsel when he asked one of the detectives, “Should I or can I speak to a lawyer or anything?” the detective replied, Sure, yes, that is your option.” And Bartelt replied, “Okay, I think I’d prefer that.”

State v. Edward J. Zimbal, 2017 WI 58, 6/14/17, reversing a per curiam court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)

Don’t get too excited about this victory. The majority, by A.W. Bradley, repeatedly notes that Zimbal’s late request for substitution of judge under §971.20(7) is deemed timely due to the “unique facts” of this case. In a concurrence, Ziegler took the unusual step of warning:

[L]itigants should be hesitant to cite this case as authority in future circumstances not identical to what occurred here. Absent these unique facts, an untimely filing would be just that.  It need not be intelligently waived. Op. ¶76.

So, SCOW has published a defense win having no precedential value. It’s better than nothing.

State v. Robert Joseph Stietz, 2017 WI 58, 6/13/17, reversing a per curiam decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

This case breaks no new legal ground, but simply reaffirms some long-standing rules governing when a trial judge should instruct a jury on self-defense: The defendant has only to meet the “low bar” of producing “some evidence” to support the defense; the evidence supporting the instruction should be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant; and that the trial judge shouldn’t weigh the credibility of the evidence because that’s the job of the jury. (¶¶12-23). Under the specific facts of this case, the trial judge erred in not giving Stietz a self-defense instruction. (¶¶24-60).

State v. Shaun M. Sanders, 2015AP2328-CR, granting review of a published court of appeals decision, 6/13/17, case activity (including briefs

Issue (copied from the petition for review):

Can a person be criminally responsible for acts he allegedly committed before the age of original juvenile court jurisdiction?