On Point

Terry Michael Honeycutt v. United States, USSC No. 16-142, 2017 WL 2407468 (June 5, 2017), reversing United States v. Honeycutt, 816 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A federal statute—21 U.S.C. § 853—mandates forfeiture of “any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of” certain drug crimes. This case concerns how § 853 operates when two or more defendants act as part of a conspiracy. Specifically, the issue is whether, under § 853, a defendant may be held jointly and severally liable for property that his co-conspirator derived from the crime but that the defendant himself did not acquire. The Court holds that such liability is inconsistent with the statute’s text and structure. (Slip op. at 1).

The 9th Circuit, en banc, just issued a blockbuster 6-5 decision in United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, Appeal No. 13-50562.  Routine shackling of defendants in the courtroom violates the 5th Amendment. It doesn’t matter whether there is a jury present or not. The trial court must make an individualized finding of dangerousness. Judge Kozinski, author of the majority opinion, wrote:

State v. David Earl Harris, Jr., 2016AP548-CR, 5/31/17, District 1 (unpublished); case activity (including briefs)

The state charged Harris with heinous conduct giving rise to false imprisonment, sexual assault, and strangulation charges. At trial, the DA introduced a copy of a TRO that pre-dated the criminal complaint but mirrored the facts that it alleged. Defense counsel didn’t mind letting the jury see the TRO because she thought it showed that the TRO allegations were false. But she didn’t notice the part of the TRO where the court commissioner found reasonable grounds to believe that Harris had committed all heinous conduct described in the TRO. Uh oh. Guess what happened?

State v. Sara Ann Ponfil, 2016AP2059-CR, 5/31/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A police officer discovered cocaine after he detained Ponfil, who, as the officer approached, got out of one of two vehicles parked next to each other outside a bar. The court of appeals concludes that, considered together, the bar’s status as a “high-crime area,” the behavior of the vehicles’ occupants, and the presence of a known gang member in the other vehicle provided reasonable suspicion to believe she was engaged in illegal conduct.

State v. Paul A. Adams, 2016AP1149, 5/31/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity Adams, an inmate, objected to the garnishment of his prison wages to pay fines and forfeitures assessed in various traffic and OWI cases. The court of appeals rejected all of his claims because Adams, the moving party, bore the […]

The Confrontation Blog predicts this issue is SCOTUS-worthy. Click here and preserve the issue in your client’s case.

If you find fractured SCOW decisions (you know, the kind where no opinion commands 4 votes) really irritating, today’s edition of SCOWstats won’t calm you down. As you’ve probably sensed they’re on the rise even though SCOW is composed of 5 conservatives and 2 liberals. Update: Today’s decision by SCOW won’t calm you down either. See AllEnergy Corporation […]

SCOW’s recent decision in State v. Jeffrey Denny, which restricted the availability of postconviction DNA testing in Wisconsin, was a real heart-breaker. Essentially, SCOW held that to get state-funded DNA testing the defendant has to prove the results would conclusively remove him from the scene of the crime. In a decision the EvidenceProf Blog calls a […]

Juan Esquivel-Quintana v. Jefferson B. Sessions, USSC No. 16-54, 2017 WL 2322840 (May 30, 2017), reversing Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A non-citizen convicted of an “aggravated felony” is subject to virtually automatic deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). One of the crimes listed as an aggravated felony is “sexual abuse of a minor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). In this case the Supreme Court holds that “in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be younger than 16.” (Slip op. at 4). Because Esquivel-Quintana was convicted under a statute prohibiting sexual intercourse with a victim under the age of 18, he was not convicted of “sexual abuse of a minor” for purposes of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.

State v. William A. Wisth, 2016AP1481-CR, 5/24/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After Wisth, acting pro se, and the State picked a jury for his criminal case, the judge instructed the jurors “not to discuss the case with anyone.” The next day before trial, Wisch appeared by the public entrance to the courthouse with a sign and a stack of flyers that, in short, said “don’t trust Judge Malloy or Ozaukee County.” He tried to hand a flyer to a woman walking by, but she shook her head. She did not see what the sign or the flyers said. Turns out she was a juror. Uh oh.