On Point

State v. B.H., 2016AP892-893, District 1, 12/28/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication)

B.H.’s twins were taken from her due to a report of violence between her and their father. The trial court found that she had failed to meet the conditions for their return and to assume parental responsibility. B.H. argues that those findings rest upon inadmissible hearsay in the form of testimony from the foster mother and from a social worker and in the form of a letter from the Bureau. B.H. asserts that trial counsel’s failure to object to this evidence amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.

City of Eau Claire v. David Eugene Phelps, 2016AP248, District 3, 12/28/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Contrary to the circuit court’s conclusion, a police officer’s observations about Phelps’s driving provided more than a “hunch” and justified the stop of his car.

T.M.H. v. A.N.W., 2016AP1981, District 4, 12/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The biological father of J.H. petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother, A.W. The circuit court granted the petition, but only after concluding it could order continued visitation between J.H. and his maternal great-grandmother, with whom J.H. had an important relationship. It turns out the circuit court did not have that authority. Because the circuit court said it “absolutely, positively” would not terminate A.W.’s rights unless it could order continued visitation by the great-grandmother, the termination order is reversed.

State v. John D. Myer, 2016AP490-CR, District 4, 12/22/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Assuming a police officer’s contact with Myer constituted a seizure, it was justified under the community caretaker doctrine.

State v. Michael L. Washington, 2017 WI App 6, petition for review granted 4/10/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 3; case activity (including briefs)

Michael Washington was set to go on trial for burglary and obstructing an officer. On the morning of the first day of trial, before voir dire, Washington began complaining about his attorney, engaged in a contentious dialogue with the judge, and then “semi was removed and semi left on his own.” Voir dire and trial went on without him; he was occasionally contacted in his jail cell and refused to come back to the courtroom. He was convicted, and on appeal argues that his statutory (as opposed to constitutional) right to presence was violated because the statutory conditions for waiving that right were not met.

State v. Judith Ann Detert-Moriarty, 2017 WI App 2; case activity (including briefs)

The Wisconsin Equal Access to Justice Act, § 814.245, doesn’t apply to a person who prevailed in a forfeiture action brought in the name of the State of Wisconsin because the clear statutory language covers only actions brought by “a state agency.”

Jefferson County DHS v. C.C., 2016AP1983, District 4, 12/21/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly granted summary judgment on the petition terminating C.C.’s parental rights despite C.C.’s claims that the circuit court violated the mandatory notice provision under § 802.08(2) and that a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of grounds for termination.

State ex rel. Vincent Martinez v. Brian Hayes, 2014AP2095, District 2, 12/21/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Martinez claimed the lawyer who represented him at his ES revocation hearing should have objected to certain hearsay evidence and to the ALJ’s failure to find good cause for the lack of appearance of certain witnesses. The court of appeals rejects the claim because even if counsel was deficient, Martinez wasn’t prejudiced.

Review of a published court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs); petition for review

Issues (from the petition):

I. Whether the circuit court properly suppressed Mr. Blackman’s warrantless blood test because he was unconstitutionally coerced into taking the test when he was read the informing the accused form which incorrectly told him that he faced a revocation and other penalties if he refused chemical testing, when he was actually only facing a possible arrest?

II. Whether the circuit court below properly suppressed Mr. Blackman’s blood test where Mr. Blackman was unconstitutionally coerced into taking the blood test, under the totality of the circumstances, when he acquiesced to the unlawful assertion by the officer that they take blood samples in cases like his—in addition to being told that he faced a revocation and other penalties if he refused?

III. Whether section 343.305(3)(ar)2 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it coerces consent to otherwise unconstitutional searches without due process of law?

Review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs); petition for review

Issues (composed by On Point):

1.  Whether a driver, who is a non-native speaker of English, consents to a blood draw where, in response to the officer’s question “will you consent” gives an unintelligible answer, then clearly asks “what kind of test?” and “don’t you need a warrant?” and where the driver does not otherwise “resist” or “fight” the blood draw?

2.  Whether a driver’s acquiescence to a blood draw is voluntary when it occurs after he asks the officer “don’t you need a warrant?” and the officer shakes his head “no.”