On Point

How many more years would SCOW have to work to match the output of the Iowa and Minnesota Supreme Courts? What hinders SCOW’s productivity? Today’s edition of SCOWstats ponders these and other riddles of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

SCOTUS has already filled almost half of its docket for the 2016-2017 term. Click here  for a sneak peek at the civil and criminal cases it is set to decide.

R.J.M. v. M.R.H., 2016AP1307, 9/22/2016, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

M.R.H. appeals the termination of his parental rights to his son, arguing that the jury during the grounds phase should not have heard (1) that he had previously been willing to voluntarily terminate his rights or (2) that his son wanted to be adopted by his stepfather. The court of appeals calls this evidence “problematic” but holds its admission harmless.

State v. Steven N. Jackson, 2015AP2682, 9/22/16, District 4 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Steven Jackson was arrested for OWI and also charged with a refusal to submit to a blood test. On appeal of the refusal, he first argues that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him.

State v. Courtney L. Carney, 2016AP175-CR & 176, 9/21/2016, District 2 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At 3 a.m. on a Saturday morning, police pulled a car over for a broken light. The car driving in front of the targeted vehicle also stopped; this was Carney’s. The police ended up detaining him too, leading to his eventual OWI arrest; the question here is whether they had reasonable suspicion for the initial detention.

Town of Grand Chute v. Shelley L. Kowalewski, 2015AP1788, District 3, 9/20/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The stop of Kowalewski’s car was supported by probable cause that she violated § 346.34(1)(b), which requires a drive to use a turn signal “[i]n the event any other traffic may be affected by the movement” of the vehicle.

The brief answer from two recent federal court decisions is “yes,” though the devil, as they say, is in the details.

William Hinesley, III, v. Wendy Knight, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2122, 2016 WL 4758437, 9/13/16

Hinesley’s trial lawyer didn’t object to the state’s presentation of the inculpatory out-of-court statements of the two principal witnesses against him because he wanted all of the witnesses’ statements admitted to show how they had changed their stories and weren’t credible. The Seventh Circuit holds the state courts reasonably concluded trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for adopting and employing this strategy.

Review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

(1)  Whether to satisfy the conditions of probation for purposes of Wisconsin’s expungement statute, § 973.015(1m)(b), a probationer must perfectly comply with every probation condition, or whether under State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811, it is enough that the probation agent determines that the probationer has successfully completed probation?

(2)  Whether Ozuna‘s procedural due process rights were violated when the court failed to provide him with notice or a hearing before denying expungement?

Review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179 held that an individual is capable of rehabilitation, and thus a proper subject for treatment under Chapter 51, when treatment would control the symptoms of the individual’s disorder.  If, on the other hand, treatment would control only the individual’s activity or behavior, then he is not a proper subject for treatment under Chapter 51. The question is: how are courts to determine whether treatment is controlling symptoms of disorder–especially when medical experts, when describing the effects of treatment, blur the line between symptoms and behavior?