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On Point is a judicial analysis blog written by members of the Wisconsin State Public Defenders. It includes cases from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Warrantless swipe of credit card does not violate 4th Amendment
The Volokh Conspiracy sums up this case beautifully: “Nebraska drug doggie alerts on vehicle. Officers find no drugs but do find a duffel bag with many credit cards, debit cards, and gift cards. Eighth Circuit (over a dissent): No Fourth Amendment violation to scan the cards’ magnetic stripes (which revealed them to be counterfeit).” Read the decision […]
SCOTUS: Uncounseled tribal-court priors can be predicate offenses
United States v. Bryant, USSC No. 15-420, 2016 WL 3221519 (June 13, 2016), reversing and remanding 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
As we explained in our prior post on the cert grant in this case, the Sixth Amendment does not apply in tribal courts. Congress has created a statutory right to counsel in such courts, including for indigent defendants, in prosecutions involving prison sentences greater than one year. But for charges involving less than a year of incarceration, only defendants who can afford a lawyer are entitled to have one. Bryant has several prior domestic violence convictions in tribal court for which he was not statutorily entitled to, and did not receive, a lawyer. The question here is whether these convictions can form the predicate for his new, federal-court conviction for “domestic assault within … Indian country” which applies only to those with at least two DV priors.
SCOTUS: Due process required recusal of justice who helped prosecute habeas petitioner
Williams v. Pennsylvania, USSC No. 15-5040, 2016 WL 3189529 (June 9, 2016), vacating and remanding Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
When he was district attorney of Philadelphia, Ronald Castille authorized a subordinate to seek a death sentence in Terrance Williams’s murder trial. Thirty years later, as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Castille refused to recuse himself from the commonwealth’s appeal of Williams’ successful habeas petition, which alleged that the DA’s office had withheld exculpatory information contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled against Williams; SCOTUS now holds that Castille’s participation in that decision deprived Williams of due process.
SCOTUS rejects “Humpty Dumpty theory of the jury”
Dietz v. Bouldin, USSC No. 15-458, 2016WL3189528 (June 9, 2016), affirming Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2015); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
In a 6-2 decision, SCOTUS holds that a federal district court has limited inherent authority to rescind a jury discharge and to recall the jury for further deliberations in order to address an error in its verdict. The court specifically limits this decision to civil cases.
Failure to object precludes Daubert analysis; expert on cell phone tracking per se admissible
State v. Robert Lavern Cameron, 2016 WI App 54; case activity (including briefs)
This decision feels like an encounter with a swarm of mosquitoes on a pleasant summer evening. But because it is recommended for publication, you can’t just swat it away. Indeed, the court of appeals’ analysis of the issues will leave you reaching for a bottle of the calamine lotion.
Duane Edward Buck v. William Stephens, USSC No. 15-8049, cert. granted 6/6/16
Question presented:
Duane Buck’s death penalty case raises a pressing issue of national importance: whether and to what extent the criminal justice system tolerates racial bias and discrimination. Specifically, did the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit impose an improper and unduly burdensome Certificate of Appealability (COA) standard that contravenes this Court’s precedent and deepens two circuit splits when it denied Mr. Buck a COA on his motion to reopen the judgment and obtain merits review of his claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for knowingly presenting an “expert” who testified that Mr. Buck was more likely to be dangerous in the future because he is Black, where future dangerousness was both a prerequisite for a death sentence and the central issue at sentencing?
SCOTUS rejects “special circumstances” exception to PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
Ross v. Blake, USSC No. 15-339, 2016 WL 3128839 (June 6, 2016), vacating and remanding Blake v. Ross, 787 F.3d 693 (4th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
The Supreme Court unanimously holds there is no unwritten “special circumstances” exception to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that a prisoner exhaust administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit.
Bobby J. Moore v. Texas, USSC No. 15-797, cert. granted 6/6/16
Question presented:
Whether it violates the Eighth Amendment and this Court’s decisions in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) to prohibit the use of current medical standards on intellectual disability, and require the use of outdated medical standards, in determining whether an individual may be executed.
IAC claims not raised in first appeal can’t be revived on remand
State v. Michael S. Dengsavang, 2015AP637-CR, 6/1/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Michael Dengsavang raises several challenges to the trial court’s denial of his Machner motion. The court of appeals rejects one claim on the merits and declines to consider the rest, holding them previously abandoned.
SCOTUS rejects data offered to show inconsistent application of bar to federal habeas review
Deborah K. Johnson v. Donna Kay Lee, 578 U.S. __ (2016)(per curiam); SCOTUS docket
Like Wisconsin, California has a rule that a defendant may not raise a claim for the first time on on state collateral review if he could have raised it on direct appeal. Wisconsin calls it the “Escalona bar.” California calls it the “Dixon bar.” The issue in this case was whether the California Supreme Court’s application of the “Dixon bar” provided an independent and adequate state ground for barring federal habeas review. SCOTUS answered “yes.”
Lee’s litigation strategy is interesting. After losing her direct appeal in California state courts, she skipped state postconviction review and filed a federal habeas petition. The federal court stayed her petition and directed her to exhaust her state-court remedies. She filed a state habeas petition, which the California Supreme Court denied in a summary order that cited Dixon.
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