On Point

While we’re waiting for a decision in State v. Loomis to tell us whether we can have access to the inner workings of the de facto Deus ex machina of Wisconsin sentencing proceedings, we thought you’d be interested in this investigative report on the COMPAS by the investigative reporters at ProPublica.

Luna Torres v. Lynch, USSC No. 14-1096, 2016 WL 2903424 (May 19, 2016), affirming Torres v. Holder, 764 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

The definition of “aggravated felony” under federal immigration law, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), has 21 subsections covering dozens of different crimes. Many of the subsections refer to offenses “described in” particular federal statutes, all of which include the interstate commerce element necessary for federal criminal jurisdiction. A catch-all at the end of the statute says that “aggravated felony” includes “an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law….” This decision says that a state offense that lacks an interstate commerce element, but corresponds in all other ways to a listed federal offense, is an aggravated felony.

Tony Thomas v. Tarry Williams, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2610, 5/18/16

Thomas’s federal habeas petition argued the state withheld potentially exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), but didn’t raise this claim in his state postconviction proceeding so he can’t raise it in his federal habeas petition.

Pretty much the only way you’ll see the terms “SPD,” “SCOW,” and any form of the verb “win” in the same sentence is if that sentence also includes the word “fantasy.” 🙂 Believe it or not, SCOW’s bitter decision last week in St. Croix County DHHS v. Michael D. allowed the State Public Defender to […]

State v. Keith A. Wiedmeyer, 2016 WI App 46; case activity (including briefs)

In an impressive of feat of judicial activism, the court of appeals here rewrites §343.305(5)(d) and (6)(a) and defies precedent to achieve its desired outcome: the admission of statutorily invalid blood test results at OWI trials. On Point looks forward to SCOW’s take on this published court of appeals decision.

State v. Chad T. Kippley, 2015AP1671-CR, 5/19/16, District 4 (unpublished opinion); case activity (including briefs)

A warden observed Kippley’s boat travelling at a slow speed in bow-up position. Based on his training and experience, the warden suspected that the boat was equipped with a motor in excess of its maximum horsepower rating, so he stopped Kippley and obtained evidence that led to Kippley’s conviction for operating a boat while intoxicated.

Rock County v. S.J.M., 2016AP255-FT, 5/19/16, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

A circuit court involuntarily committed S.J.M. under §51.20(1)(a)1 -2 after finding him mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous.  S.J.M. challenged the “dangerous” determination and, specifically, the finding that he threatened his mother with serious physical harm, which made her reasonably fear violent behavior and serious harm from him.

Betterman v. Montana, USSC No. 14-1457 (May 19, 2016), affirming State v. Betterman, 342 P.3d 971 (Mont. 2015); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Brandon Betterman pled guilty to bail jumping, and then spent 14 months in jail before he was finally sentenced. He appealed, contending that the lengthy delay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Montana Supreme Court determined that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a speedy sentencing, and SCOTUS now agrees.

State v. Mario Martinez Redmond, 2015AP657-2015AP658-CR, 5/17/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Redmond was charged and convicted of battery, disorderly conduct, and multiple counts of witness intimidation. His appeal raised various ineffective assistance of counsel and other claims. But the most interesting issue concerns Redmond’s failed motion to suppress a cryptic text message sent from his phone.

State v. Bradley L. Kilgore, 2016 WI App 47; case activity (including briefs)

The execution of the search warrant at Kilgore’s home started with a heavily armed officers, including a SWAT team, entering and putting Kilgore down on the floor at gunpoint; but once the home was “cleared” and weapons were secured and the SWAT team left, Kilgore was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Thus, the statements he made to police while they searched his home were admissible despite the lack of a Miranda warning.