On Point

Walworth County v. James E. Robinson, Jr., 2015AP2504-FT, 5/18/16, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including memo briefs)

The County needed to prove Robinson drove his motor vehicle on a highway while under the influence of a drug to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving, § 346.63(1)(a). It succeeded.

State v. Arturo Luiz-Lorenzo, 2015AP1540-CR, 5/18/2016, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police discovered cocaine on Luiz-Lorenzo as a result of his arrest; he challenges the grounds for the initial Terry stop.

State v. Michael W. Bryzek, 2016 WI App 48; case activity (including briefs)

Bryzek had already completed most of his alleged acts when a 2010 statute broadened the definition of theft by a bailee; the court of appeals agrees with the circuit court that the jury should have been instructed on the narrower element.

United States v. Randy Johnson, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1366, 5/17/16

Taking Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), to its logical extreme, the Seventh Circuit holds that detaining the passengers in a car parked too close to a crosswalk was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Village of Somerset v. Mark J. Hoffman, 2015AP140, District 3, 5/17/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Viewed through the interpretive prism mandated by § 66.0409(6), a local ordinance prohibiting “wander[ing] or stroll[ing] in an aimless manner” that is “not usual for law abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons” isn’t violated by a person walking around with a loaded semi-automatic rifle slung over his shoulder and a loaded handgun in a holster on his hip.

State v. K.M., 2016AP421, 5/17/2016, District 1 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects a mother’s two challenges to the termination of her parental rights.

Kernan v. Hinojosa, USSC No. 15-833, 2016 WL 2842454 (May 16, 2016) (per curiam), reversing Hinjosa v. Davey, 803 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the California courts hadn’t made a determination of Hinojosa’s claim on the merits and therefore applied de novo review rather than AEDPA’s highly deferential standard. The supreme court summarily holds the court of appeals’ conclusion was wrong, and that AEDPA does apply.

United States v. Eugene A. Sweeney, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3785, 5/9/16

The police officers’ search of the basement of the apartment building where an armed robbery suspect lived was neither a trespass nor an invasion of the apartment dwellers’ curtilage. Thus, the gun found during the search was lawfully seized and not subject to suppression.

St. Croix County Department of Health and Human Services v. Michael D. & Juanita A., 2016 WI 35, 05/12/2016, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607, finds itself roundly praised and deeply buried by our high court.

State v. Jeffrey P. Lepsch, 2015AP2813-CR, petition for review granted 5/11/16; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

Were one or more jurors at Lepsch’s trial objectively or subjectively biased because they did not provide “unequivocal assurances” that they could set aside prior beliefs (about, e.g., the guilt of the defendant and the greater credibility of police) and decide the case solely on the evidence?

Did the prior beliefs of some jurors, and the lack of sufficient inquiry into their ability to set them aside, create an appearance of bias sufficient to deny Lepsch’s due process right to an impartial jury?

Were Lepsch’s rights to be present and to a public trial violated when the prospective jurors were sworn in the jury assembly room, outside the presence of the court and counsel?

Was Lepsch denied due process or the effective assistance of counsel by the trial court’s failure to give him the 7th peremptory strike to which he was entitled and by failing to strike 5 jurors for cause, forcing him to use 5 of his 6 strikes to remove them?