On Point

Today’s New York Times notes a study finding that in 2015 a record 149 people in the United States were found to have been falsely convicted of a crime. Official misconduct played a role in 65 exonerations and false confessions were seen in 27. The National Registry of Exonerations, based at the University of Michigan […]

State v. Richard J. Slayton, 2015AP1255-CR, 2/3/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity, briefs Slayton, who was arrested for OWI, challenged a search warrant authorizing his blood draw. The supporting affidavit stated that an officer had reviewed his driving record and noted previous OWI conviction that were “prior countable offenses” under Ch. 346. […]

State v. David Hager, Jr., 2015AP330, and State v. Howard Carter, 2015AP1311, District 3, 2/2/2015; case activity (Hager) (Carter) (including briefs)–final SCOW decision here 4/19/18

Issues

(1) Does [the 2013 Wis. Act 84] change in [Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)] authorize the circuit court to weigh the evidence [to determine whether to hold a discharge trial], overruling State v. Arends, 2010 WI 46, ¶¶40-43, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 784 N.W.2d 513; (2) If the court is allowed to weigh the evidence, how is such a weighing accomplished, and, specifically, what factors should the court consider when predicting whether the factfinder would likely conclude the person no longer meets the criteria for commitment; (3) If the statute allows the court to weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the competing psychological reports at this stage where the petitioner bears the burden of establishing a change in his or her condition, is the statute unconstitutional because it misallocates the burden of proof; and (4) Does the change in the statute apply retroactively to a petition for discharge filed before the revised statute’s effective date.

City of Milwaukee v. D.S., 2015AP1634, 2/2/16, District 1 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.S., a juvenile, was ordered to register as a sex offender for life. On appeal, he argued that the circuit court relied on two types of inaccurate information: (1) a report, prepared by Dr. Paul Hesse, regarding the recidivism rate for juvenile sex offenders at Lincoln Hills, and (2) misinformation about the meaning of D.S.’s JSOAP-II scores.  He lost on both counts.

Michael J. Belleau v. Edward F. Wall, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-3225, 1/29/16

The Seventh Circuit holds that Wis. Stat. § 301.48, which requires certain sex offenders to wear a GPS monitoring device, does not violate either the Fourth Amendment or the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. This decision reverses a Wisconsin federal district judge’s decision striking down the statute.

Adoptions of Wisconsin, Inc. v. J.S., 2015AP1403, District 3, 1/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court entered a default judgment terminating J.S.’s parental rights after he failed to appear at the hearing scheduled on the petition, and the court of appeals holds J.S. isn’t entitled to reopen that judgment.

State v. Melisa Valadez, 2016 WI 4, 1/28/2016, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

What looked like a case about the meaning of “likely to result in … deportation” has turned into something else entirely: in a fractured decision, the court holds that the defendant has successfully shown she is likely to be excluded from admission to the country and raises, but does not resolve, the possibility that plea withdrawal claims for failure to give the required immigration warning must be brought within the time limits of Wis. Stat. Rule 809.30 (or perhaps within the strictures of Wis. Stat. § 974.06).

State v. David W. Howes, 2014AP1870-CR, 1/28/16, District 4; certification granted 4/7/16, reversed, 2017 WI 18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

This appeal presents a single recurring issue: whether provisions in Wisconsin’s implied consent law authorizing a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious suspect violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. More specifically, the issue is whether the “implied consent,” deemed to have occurred before a defendant is a suspect, is voluntary consent for purposes of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

State v. Jeanette M. Janusiak, 2015AP160-CR, 1/28/16, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Pregnancy does not by itself make a suspect particularly vulnerable to police pressure and tactics during custodial interrogation, the court of appeals holds, so the fact that Janusiak was in an advanced state of pregnancy didn’t render her statement to police involuntary. The court also rejects Janusiak’s claims that her statement was coerced because she was threatened with the loss of her children and was promised she could go home if she made a statement.

Montgomery v. Louisiana, USSC No. 14-280, 2016 WL 280758 (January 25, 2016); reversing and remanding State v. Montgomery, 141 So.3d 264 (La. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), the Court held that sentencing laws mandating life without parole violate the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments with respect to those under age 18 at the time of their crimes; here the Court holds that Miller announced a new substantive rule that is retroactive on state collateral review.