On Point

State v. Tyler Q. Hayes,  2015AP314-CR, and State v. Tanner J. Crisp, 2015AP315-CR, 4/6/2016, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A sheriff’s deputy, noticing a car parked outside the lines in a parking lot, pulled behind the car, walked up to the driver’s door, and perhaps (the testimony is not clear) asked that the window be rolled down. However the window came to be open, the deputy smelled marijuana and you know the rest. So were the vehicle’s occupants seized when the deputy asked them to roll down the window and they complied?

State v. Henry J. Bloedorn, 2015AP953-CR, 4/6/2016, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Henry Bloedorn brought three ineffective assistance claims regarding the attorney who represented him during his plea and sentencing. That attorney’s unchallenged testimony at the Machner hearing convinced the circuit court, and now the court of appeals, that his performance gave no cause for complaint.

State v. Lazeric R. Maxey, 2015AP2137-CR, 4/6/16, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Maxey isn’t entitled to credit on time he spent in custody relating to two cases for which he’s serving consecutive sentences because he hasn’t shown the credit wasn’t given on the earlier-imposed sentence.

Question Presented:

Most states and the federal government have a rule of evidence generally prohibiting the introduction of juror testimony regarding statements made during deliberations when offered to challenge the jury’s verdict. Known colloquially as “no impeachment” rules, they are typically codified as Rule 606(b); in some states, they are a matter of common law.

The question presented is whether a “no impeachment” rule constitutionally may bar evidence of racial bias offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury?

Woods v.  Etherton, USSC No. 15-723 (April 4, 2016) (per curiam), reversing Etherton v. Rivard, 800 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2015); SCOTUSblog page (including links to petition, response and reply)

This was a federal habeas action in which the petitioner claimed, among other things, that: (1) the state trial court’s admission of an anonymous tip violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the tip; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise claims (1) and (2).  The petitioner lost because, in SCOTUS’s view, his appellate counsel and the state habeas court deserved, but were not given, the benefit of the doubt.

Lester Ray Nichols v. United States, USSC No. 15-5238, 2016 WL 1278473, (April 4, 2016), reversing United States v. Nichols, 775 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In a unanimous opinion of limited impact, the Supreme Court holds that a prior version of SORNA did not require a registered sex offender to notify his state registration authority before moving out of the country.

It’s been a quiet week for appellate decisions, so here are some links to sate your appetite for law-related reading:

Michael Carter v. Stephen Duncan, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 13-2243, 3/30/16

Carter sought habeas relief on the ground his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to investigate what two defense potential witnesses had to say and failing to present their testimony at his murder trial. The Seventh Circuit holds that although the state court “stumble[d] in some respects” in determining that the failure to present the proffered testimony wasn’t prejudicial, that determination was not unreasonable under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review.

Sila Luis v. United States, USSC No. 14-419, 2016 WL 1228690 (March 30, 2016), vacating and remanding U.S. v. Luis, 564 Fed. Appx. 493 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The question presented in this case is whether the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant’s legitimate, untainted assets—that is, assets not traceable to a criminal offense—needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court answers “yes,” though for different reasons.

Question presented:

Whether, under Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), and Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009), a vacated, unconstitutional conviction can cancel out the preclusive effect of an acquittal under the collateral estoppel prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause?