On Point

Ocasio v. United States, USSC No. 14-361, (May 2, 2016), affirming United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399, (4th Cir. 2014); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

That post title is Justice Thomas’s view of the majority’s decision in this case, and he is not the lone dissenter. The Hobbs Act makes it a crime to obstruct, delay or affect commerce by extortion. It defines extortion as the obtaining of property from another with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force, violence or fear, or under color of official right. 18 U.S.C. §1951(b)(2). In a split decision with an odd alignment of justices, the majority holds that “a group of conspirators can agree to obtain property ‘from another’ in violation of the [Hobbs] Act even if they agree only to transfer property among themselves.”  (Slip op. Sotomayor, J. dissenting at 1).

That’s what we suspect anyway. In 2011, Kansas passed the Offender Registration Act, which requires persons convicted of certain felonies to register with state authorities. That prompted the question of whether applying the Act to persons convicted before it went into effect would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Last week, the Kansas Supreme Court issued a 4-3 opinion answering “yes.” A few hours later it issued another 4-3 opinion reversing itself on the very same issue.  

Michael Miller v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1869, 4/26/2016

An Indiana state court sentenced Michael Miller to a total of 120 years in prison on three counts of child molestation. On direct appeal, his lawyer raised challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of other-acts evidence, but did not contest the length of his sentence. Miller then filed a state collateral attack, alleging his original appellate counsel was ineffective for not attacking the sentence.

United States v. Lemurel E. Williams, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1194, 4/26/16

Williams is entitled to a new trial because under the totality of the circumstances, the jury’s continued deliberations after an aborted delivery of the initial verdict were impermissibly coercive.

As readers may know, the prosecutors in the so-called “John Doe” cases have filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.

Donovan M. Burris v. Judy P. Smith, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2891, 4/28/16

Burris’s claim that a supplemental instruction to the jury about how to determine “utter disregard for human life” doesn’t present a claim for federal habeas relief because it presents only a claim about an error of state law, not a claim that the instruction violated federal constitutional law.

State v. G.H., 2015AP1606, District 1, 4/28/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

G.H.’s parental rights to M.R.H. were terminated on the grounds that M.R.H. remained in need of protection or services under § 48.415(2) and that G.H. had failed to assume parental responsibility under § 48.415(6). The court of appeals rejects his claims that these statutes are unconstitutional as applied to him.

State ex rel. Antjuan Redmond v. Brian Foster, 2014AP2637, District 2, 4/27/16, certification granted 6/15/16, certification vacated and case returned to the court of appeals 9/15/16; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Whether an offender whose parole and extended supervision was revoked after a revocation hearing has an adequate remedy other than a writ of habeas corpus to pursue a claim that the attorney who represented him during the hearing rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance? Specifically, must the offender raise a claim of ineffective assistance of revocation counsel in a motion to the division of hearings and appeals (DHA) in the department of administration?

State v. Joshua Java Berry, 2016 WI App 40; case activity (including briefs)

Berry was found guilty at a bench trial of being a felon in possession of a firearm under § 941.29(2)(a) (2013-14). Before sentencing, Berry’s lawyer figured out that Berry’s prior conviction was for a misdemeanor, not a felony. The court vacated the felon-in-possession conviction and dismissed the charge with prejudice, and the state immediately recharged him under § 941.29(2)(b) (2013-14) because Berry had a prior delinquency adjudication. (¶¶2-6). Recharging him doesn’t violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

State v. Phillip Kareen Green, 2015AP1126-CR, 4/26/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Green argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree reckless homicide because it didn’t prove he acted with utter disregard for human life. He also argues for a new trial in the interest of justice on the grounds that: 1) the jury wasn’t fully instructed about the interaction between self-defense and the utter disregard element; and 2) important facts were not introduced or placed in proper context. The court of appeals rejects Green’s claims in a decision heavy on facts and light on analysis.