On Point

State of Wisconsin ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. The Honorable Gregory Peterson et al.; State of Wisconsin ex rel. Francis D. Schmitz v. the Honorable Gregory Peterson, & State of Wisconsin ex rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners v. The Honorable Gregory Peterson, et al., 2015 WI 85, issued 7/16/15; case activity: Two Unnamed Petitioners; Schmitz v. Peterson; Three Unnamed Petitioners

Unless you’ve just returned from a trip to a remote corner of the globe that’s beyond the reach of news media, you know by now that the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided the so-called “John Doe” cases. The court’s decision ordered a halt into the investigation of coordinated fundraising and spending between candidate committees and certain independent groups during the 2011-12 recall campaigns. Gargantuan by any standard, the decision goes on for almost 400 pages, with a majority opinion, two concurrences (Prosser and Ziegler), and two dissents/concurrences (Abrahamson and Crooks). It contains almost nothing of relevance to ordinary criminal law practice. However, in the interest of helping orient readers who may want to look more closely at the decision, below the break is a summary of the major issues and how the various opinions address them.

State v. Jesse L. Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, 7/15/15, afffirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

All seven justices agree Herrmann’s due process right to an impartial judge wasn’t violated in this case, as the sentencing judge’s remarks didn’t establish the judge was was objectively biased against Herrmann. Two separate concurrences consisting of four justices, however, express displeasure with (or attempt to limit, at least with respect to recusal) the objective bias test as established in previous Wisconsin and U.S. Supreme Court cases.

State v. Richard E. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, 7/14/14, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2013AP1581-CR; majority by Prosser, dissent by Abrahamson (joined by Bradley); case activity (including briefs)

You’ve seen this before. An officer makes a traffic stop based on a “misunderstanding” of the law, then conducts a search and finds incriminating evidence.  Last July, in State v. Antonio Brown, SCOW held that a seizure based on such a mistake violates the 4th Amendment. Six months later, SCOTUS reached the opposite result in Heien v. North Carolina. In this case, SCOW overturns Brown to hold that: (1) “pretextual stops . . . are not per se unreasonable under the 4th Amendment”; (2) probable cause is never required for a traffic stop; (3) the officer here “misunderstood” multiple provisions of Ch. 346, but his mistakes were “objectively reasonable”; and (4) Article I §11 of Wisconsin’s Constitution extends no further than the 4th Amendment. Slip op. ¶¶ 4, 5, 6, 50.

State v. Aaron Schaffhausen, 2014AP2370-CR, District 3, 7/14/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

It was error for the circuit court to tell jurors at the mental-responsibility phase of Schaffhausen’s NGI trial that they would decide whether a defense psychiatrist and psychologist were qualified as expert witnesses, but the error was harmless. In addition, the circuit court did not misuse its discretion in denying the jury’s request during deliberations to provide it with the expert witnesses’ reports.

State v. Dijon L. Carter, 2014AP2707-CR, District 1, 7/14/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

While a court adjudicating a juvenile delinquent for a felony is required to warn the juvenile about the prohibition on possessing a firearm under § 941.29, the warning requirement doesn’t add another element to the offenses created by § 941.29. Thus, Carter can be convicted of violating § 941.29(2)(b) even though he wasn’t warned about the ban on firearm possession when he was adjudicated delinquent for possession of THC with intent to deliver.

State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, 7/9/15, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision, 2013AP1437-CR; majority opinion by Ziegler, dissenting opinion by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)

State v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, 7/9/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2013AP2435-CR, majority opinion by Justice Ziegler, dissenting opinion by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)

In a pair of 5-2 decisions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that defense attorneys provided adequate advice about immigration consequences.  In each case, the defendant sought withdrawal of his guilty plea because he had not been properly advised regarding the mandatory adverse immigration consequences of conviction.

As described below, the cases presented different circumstances regarding the nature of the convictions and the advice given by the attorney.  Nonetheless, the following points seem clear regarding the court’s interpretation of Padilla v. Kentucky: 1) the court is narrowly interpreting the obligations of defense attorneys under Padilla; 2) the court does not believe that deportation is ever automatic or mandatory; and 3) if the information or advice provided was accurate, the court will find that the attorney’s performance was adequate, regardless of extent of legal research that the attorney conducted.

State v. Patrick Hogan, 2015 WI 76, 7/10/2015, affirming a court of appeals per curiam decision, 2013AP430-CR, majority opinion by Prosser; concurrence by Ziegler, dissent by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)

Sixteen seconds. It takes longer than that just to find your keys, get into your car, buckle up and start your engine. Keep that in mind as you read on. SCOW found that a traffic stop (due to a seatbelt violation) was unconstitutionally extended to perform field sobriety tests, but then upheld the subsequent vehicle search based on consent given 16 seconds after law enforcement told Hogan he was “free to leave.” SCOW saw no need to perform an attenuation analysis.

State v. Rogelio Guarnero, 2015 WI 72, 7/9/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority by Roggensack; dissent by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)

In a decision that is short on analysis and long on Sixth Amendment problems, the supreme court holds that Guarnero’s prior conviction for conspiring to violate the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act was a conviction for a crime “under a statute … relating to controlled substances,” and therefore qualified as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender enhancement provision of § 961.41(3g)(c), because the factual basis for the conviction involved controlled substance offenses.

State v. Maltese Lavele Williams, 2015 WI 75, 7/10/15; majority by Prosser: concurrence by Abrahamson; on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

All jury instruction errors are to be assessed for whether the error was harmless, the supreme court declares, including errors describing a theory of criminal culpability that was not presented to the jury or omitting a valid theory that was presented to the jury. The court therefore abrogates State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), which held that a jury instruction accurately setting out a legal basis for liability that does not fit evidence presented at trial should be assessed for whether the evidence was sufficient to support the basis for liability in the instruction.

State v. Kerby G. Denman, 2014AP2133, District 4, 7/9/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Denman is entitled to a hearing on his petition for discharge from his ch. 980 commitment because an expert changed her opinion about Denman’s risk to reoffend based on a new risk assessment scale that hadn’t been relied on by any of the experts at Denman’s previous discharge proceeding.