On Point

State v. Steven E. Steffek, 2015AP93-CR, District 2, 7/1/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The evidence was sufficient to convict Steffek of endangering safety by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, § 941.20(1)(a), as a party to the crime, despite the fact there was no evidence that anyone was dodging bullets in a “zone of danger.”

State v. John Eddie Farmer, Sr., 2014AP2623-CR, 6/30/15, District 1 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs

Defense lawyers encounter this problem too often. The circuit court inadequately explains the reasons for the sentence it imposed and then shores up its rationale at the postconviction stage. This decision holds that a circuit court, which failed to mention any sentencing objectives, nevertheless met Gallion’s “bare minimum requirements.” And even if it hadn’t, it wouldn’t matter because the court of appeals could search the record for reasons to affirm the sentence. Slip op. ¶14.

State v. Greenwood, 2014AP2219-CR,6 /30/15, District 3 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs

Greenwood, who was convicted of several misdemeanors, sought resentencing on the grounds that the circuit court had relied on inaccurate information at the initial sentencing. Specifically, Greenwood alleged that the court believed his sentences would be served in  jail when, in fact, § 973.03(2) required that he serve his sentences in prison. The court  of appeals rejected this claim.

Kevin Stanbridge v. Gregory Scott, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Nos. 14-1548 & 14-2114, 6/29/15

While Stanbridge’s prior sexual abuse conviction is a necessary predicate for his current confinement as a sexually violent person, once the sentence for the conviction expired he is no longer “in custody” for that conviction for purposes of bringing a collateral attack against the conviction.

DeBartolo v. United States, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3579, 6/26/15

DeBartolo pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) by growing more than 100 marijuana plants, “[b]ut unbeknownst to DeBartolo, and also it seems to his lawyer, the prosecutors, and the judge, his conviction of the drug offense made him deportable (‘removable’ is the official term) and, were he ordered removed, would prevent him from applying for cancellation of removal.” (Slip op. at 3). Trial counsel was deficient for failing to advise DeBartolo of the deportation consequences, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), but—in light of the strength of the state’s case and the very favorable plea agreement DeBartolo received—has he shown prejudice? Yes, says a three-judge panel, in an opinion worth reviewing if you are litigating a similar issue.

Questions presented:

1.  Whether the law-of-the-case doctrine requires the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case to be measured against the elements described in the jury instructions where those instructions, without objection, require the government to prove additional or more stringent elements than do the statute and indictment.

2.  Whether a statute-of-limitations defense not raised at or before trial is reviewable on appeal.

Question presented:

Whether a state offense constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), on the ground that the state offense is “described in” a specified federal statute, where the federal statute includes an interstate commerce element that the state offense lacks.

Glossip v. Gross, USSC No. 14-7955, 2015 WL 2473454 (June 29, 2015), affirming Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In a 5-to-4 vote, the Supreme Court rejects the claims of Oklahoma death-row prisoners that the use of a particular drug (midazolam) in the three-drug lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment because it creates an unacceptable risk of severe pain. In addition to deep disagreements about the applicable Eighth Amendment standard and the lower court’s fact-finding, the case is notable for the sparring between two concurring justices (Scalia and Thomas) and a dissenting justice (Breyer, joined by Ginsburg), who now believes “it highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment” and that the Court should ask for full briefing on that basic question. (Breyer dissent at 1, 2).

Attention appellate practitioners: We are pleased to present this guest post by Andrea Cornwall, Regional Attorney Manager if the SPD’s Milwaukee Appellate Office, about the imminent change in the rules governing references to victims in appellate brief.

Johnson v. United States, USSC No. 13-7120, 2015 WL 2473450 (June 26, 2015), reversing and remanding United States v. Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. 708 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A six-Justice majority of the Supreme Court holds that “the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause [of the Armed Career Criminal Act] both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges” because the case law has failed to establish a generally applicable test that prevents application of the clause from devolving into “guesswork and intuition.” (Slip op. at 5, 8). Therefore, using the residual clause to increase a defendant’s sentence denies the defendant due process of law.