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On Point is a judicial analysis blog written by members of the Wisconsin State Public Defenders. It includes cases from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Any error in admitting expert testimony in CHIPS case was harmless
State v. Eugene P., 2014AP361, 2014AP362 & 2014AP363, District 1, 9/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP361; 2014AP362; 2014AP363
Allowing a doctor to testify at a CHIPS trial that the children’s injuries were the result of abuse was harmless because there was overwhelming evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
Ch. 51 appeal is moot
Milwaukee County v. Rebecca G., 2014AP359, District 1, 9/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Rebecca’s appeal of her ch. 51 commitment is dismissed as moot because the six-month commitment order expired while the appeal was pending and the County didn’t seek an extension.
How often does the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reverse lower court rulings favoring criminal defendants?
You don’t have to guess. Answers to these and other intriguing statistical questions about the Supreme Court of Wisconsin may be found in the latest edition of SCOWstats. For the 15-year period covering 1998-2013, SCOW reversed 77% of pro-defendant lower court rulings and just 24% of pro-State rulings. Of course, the composition of the court changes over time, so it’s […]
A “motor bicycle” is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of § 346.63(1)
State v. Thomas W. Koeppen, 2014 WI App 94; case activity
A “motor bicycle” is a bicycle with a motor added, and can be either pedaled or self-propelled using the motor, § 340.01(30). Whether a person can be charged under the OWI/PAC statute based on his operation of a motor bicycle depends on whether a motor bicycle is a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). The court of appeals concludes that a plain-language reading of the relevant statutes shows a motor bicycle is a motor vehicle, “at least when the motor bicycle being operated is self-propelled, rather than pedaled.” (¶1).
Arresting officer provided accurate information regarding implied consent law
State v. Victor J. Godard, 2014AP396-CR, District 4, 8/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The arresting officer provided Godard with accurate information about the implied consent law and thus did not cause Godard to refuse to submit to the implied consent blood test or deny him his right to a second test.
Lengthy imposed and stayed sentence wasn’t unduly harsh or excessive
State v. Britton D. McKenzie, 2014AP314-CR, District 4, 8/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Consecutive jail sentences totaling 24 months were not unduly harsh and excessive.
Retrograde extrapolation of blood alcohol concentration survives Daubert challenge
State v. Todd J. Giese, 2014 WI App 92; case activity
Expert testimony regarding retrograde extrapolation of Giese’s blood alcohol concentration is admissible under new version of § 907.02(1) despite the fact some experts doubt its reliability because it was the product of reliable principles and methods and based upon sufficient facts and data.
Time for holding probable cause hearing under § 51.20(7)(a) runs from time of arrival at hosptial, not mental health unit within hospital
Ozaukee County v. Mark T.J., 2014AP479, District 2, 8/27/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The failure to hold an initial hearing within 72 hours of Mark’s arrival at the hospital where he was detained deprived the circuit court of competency to order an initial commitment order under ch. 51. But his appeal from that initial commitment order is moot because he stipulated to recommitment and vacating the initial commitment would have no practical effect.
Police had sufficient basis to request PBT
State v. Jeanmarie Carini, 2014AP526-CR, District 2, 8/27/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
There was reasonable cause to believe Carini was driving while impaired and therefore police properly asked her to submit to a preliminary breath test.
Minor may consent to recording of conversation under § 968.31’s one-party consent rule
State v. Price G. Turner, III, 2014 WI App 93; case activity
A minor does not as a matter of law lack the capacity to consent to police interception of the minor’s conversations with another person and therefore vicarious consent by a parent is not required.
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On Point provides information (not legal advice) about important developments in the law. Please note that this information may not be up to date. Viewing this blog does not create an attorney-client relationship with the Wisconsin State Public Defender. Readers should consult an attorney for their legal needs.