On Point

State v. Tramell Starks,  2013 WI 69, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, case activity; reconsideration denied 7/24/14, concurring opinion by Chief Justice Abrahamson

Taking a cue from Napolean Bonaparte, the Wisconsin Supreme Court just denied two, year-old reconsideration motions outlining many serious mistakes in the Starks majority opinion (written by Justice Gableman).  No, that statement is not just sour grapes.  The Attorney General also asked for reconsideration  along the same lines as the defense. The Chief Justice took the extraordinary step of attaching both motions to her concurrence.

State v. Andres Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, 7/23/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; majority opinion by Justice Prosser, dissenting opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity

Oliver Wendell Holmes said “hard cases make bad law.”  This decision proves that simple cases can too.  If you thought winning a §974.06 postconviction motion or a § 971.08(2) motion for plea withdrawal due to the trial court’s failure to give deportation warnings was tough before, wait until you read this decision.

State v. Cortez Lorenzo Toliver, 2014 WI 85, 7/23/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

When a juvenile is charged with a crime that gives the criminal court exclusive original jurisdiction, § 970.032(1) expressly requires the judge conducting the preliminary hearing to find probable cause for the specific felony that gives the court jurisdiction. In this case the supreme court addresses what happens when the trial judge doesn’t follow the statute’s clear mandate. On Point asked Eileen Hirsch, an attorney with the SPD’s Madison Appellate Office and all-around juvenile law guru, to discuss the decision. Here’s her take:

State v. Jessica A. Nellessen, 2014 WI 84, 7/23/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

Under the two-step procedure for determining whether a confidential informant’s identity should be disclosed, a court must first determine whether there is reason to believe that the informant “may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.” If so, the court must determine (usually after an in camera examination of either affidavits or the informant) whether “there is a reasonable probability that the informer can give the testimony.” § 905.10(3)(b); State v. Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d 112, 124-26, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982). In this case, the supreme court elaborates on what a defendant must show to satisfy the first step, concludes that the required showing is “a reasonable possibility, grounded in the facts and circumstances of the case, that a confidential informer may have information necessary to the defendant’s theory of defense” (¶2), and applies the test in a way that ultimately collapses the previous two-step procedure into a single step.

State v. Christopher T. Seiler, 2013AP1911-CR, District 2, 7/23/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Seiler’s compelled statement to his probation agent didn’t taint a subsequent police investigation that led to new charges because, the court of appeals holds, the police investigation was based on sources “independent” of his statements to the agent.

State v. Kenneth A. James, 2013AP2409-CR, District 2, 7/23/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

James insisted on going to trial even though the transcript from the preliminary hearing hadn’t yet been prepared, so he can’t complain now that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an adjournment so he could get the transcript.

State v. Brian A. Patterson, Appeal No. 2013AP749-CR, District 1, 7/22/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The State charged Patterson with 1st-degree intentional homicide in a shooting death, but the jury convicted him of a lesser-included offense: 1st degree reckless homicide.  In a cut-and-dried decision, the court of appeals held the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, and found no circuit court error in allowing the jury to consider 1st-degree reckless homicide, instructing the jury, or sentencing Patterson.

State v. Muhammad Sarfraz, 2014 WI 78, 7/22/14, reversing a published court of appeals opinion; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

The supreme court holds the circuit court incorrectly concluded that evidence of prior sexual activity between Sarfraz and I.N., the complainant in his sexual assault prosecution, was not relevant to a material fact in the case, but correctly concluded that the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh the prejudice to the complainant. Thus, the evidence was properly excluded.

State v. Nancy J. Pinno & State v. Travis J. Seaton, 2014 WI 74, 7/18/14, on certification from the court of appeals, and affirming the circuit court’s orders denying postconviction relief; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity: Pinno; Seaton

Deciding an issue left open by State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶34-38, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, the supreme court rejects the argument that the right to a public trial must be affirmatively and knowingly waived by the defendant. Instead, the court holds, “[a] defendant who fails to object to a judicial decision to close the courtroom forfeits the right to a public trial, so long as the defendant is aware that the judge excluded the public from the courtroom.” (¶7).

State v. Queentesta H., 2014AP761, District 1, 7/22/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court did not err in answering the first question of the special verdict forms submitted to the jury in Queentesta’s TPR trial because the jury could not have reached any other conclusion regarding those questions.