On Point

See the numbers for yourself right here.  Note that the answer changes when criminal defense cases are separated from other indigent defense cases.

Riley v. California, USSC No. 13-132 (together with United States v. Wurie, USSC No. 13-212), 2014 WL 2864483 (June 25, 2014), reversing People v. Riley, No. D059840 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2013) (unpublished) (and affirming United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)); Scotusblog case page (which includes links to briefs and commentary) and symposium page (additional opinion commentary)

State v. Bryanntton A. Brown, 2013AP1332-CR, District 1, 6/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present certain evidence that the complainant in Brown’s child sexual assault prosecution may have obtained her sexual knowledge from watching TV and movies and talking to her older sister. Nor was trial counsel ineffective for not taking steps to mitigate the impact of a letter Brown purportedly wrote to Carson, a fellow jail inmate, in which Brown admitted the charges. Finally, the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.

Aaron v. Ols v. City of Milwaukee, 2013AP1882, District 1, 6/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Ols is entitled to the return of his firearm under § 968.20 because there is insufficient evidence that Ols used the firearm in the commission of a crime.

Kevin Loughrin v. United States, USSC No. 13-316, 2014 WL 2807180 (June 23, 2014), affirming United States v. Loughrin, 710 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving an issue that split the federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court holds that the section of the federal bank fraud statute that prohibits “knowingly execut[ing] a scheme … to obtain” property owned by, or under the custody of, a bank “by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,” 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), requires only that the defendant intend to obtain bank property and that this end is accomplished “by means of” a false statement. Nothing in the statute requires proof of intent to defraud or deceive a bank.

Question presented:

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), which provides a minimum sentence of ten years in prison and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for a bank robber who forces another person “to accompany him” during the robbery or while in flight, requires proof of more than a de minimis movement of the victim.

State v. Eric T. Alston, 2013AP1833-CR & 2013AP1834-CR, District 4, 4/19/16 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1833-CR; 2013AP1834-CR

Bifurcated sentences that were first modified under the now-superseded, unpublished ruling in State v. Gerondale have to be modified again because they violate the rule that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence can’t exceed 75% of the total sentence.

State v. Russell S. Krancki, 2014 WI App 80; case activity

In the first Wisconsin case to address how Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013), affects the admission of evidence of a defendant’s silence, the court of appeals reads Salinas to apply to a narrow factual scenario not present in this case. The court goes on to assume that trial counsel should have objected to testimony about Krancki’s silence, but finds his failure to object wasn’t prejudicial. The court also concludes trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for saying in his opening statement that Krancki would testify or for failing to exclude references to the .02 blood alcohol limit.

State v. Dale F. Wendt, 2014AP174, District 2, 6/18/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The information known to the deputy at the time he requested Wendt to take a blood test provided probable cause to believe Wendt had driven his vehicle while intoxicated earlier that evening, despite the deputy’s lack of information as to whether Wendt drank during the time that lapsed between his driving and his contact with the deputy.

State v. David Phillip Foley, 2013AP1722-CR/2013AP1723-CR; district 1, 6/17/14 (unpublished); case activity

Under § 943.20(1)(d), theft by fraud requires, among other things, that the defendant made a false representation to the owner of the property that the defendant stole.  This does not require direct communication between the defendant and the victim.  It is sufficient that the defendant made a statement to a third party with the intent or reasonable expectation that it would be communicated to the victim.