On Point

State v. Jesse J. Franklin, Jr., 2013AP1447, District 1, 6/17/14 (unpublished); case activity

Milwaukee Police Officers Paul Lough and James Campbell testified against Franklin at his trial for possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of a firearm by a felon.  Franklin was convicted and lost his appeal.  A few years later he filed a § 974.06 motion arguing that he should be granted a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence–namely evidence that Officers Campbell and Lough had beaten, planted evidence on, and falsely arrested 6 individuals during the same period in which they arrested Franklin.  Franklin argued that this evidence supported his defense that someone else had placed in his van the drugs and guns that the police found there.

State ex re. Lorenzo D. Kyles v. William Pollard, 2013 WI 38, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Settling a somewhat obscure but still important point of appellate procedure, the supreme court unanimously holds that when a defendant seeks to reinstate the deadline for filing a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief under § 809.30(2)(b) based on an allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely notice, he should file a habeas petition in the court of appeals as provided under State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).

Questions presented

Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable person” would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort.

Whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.

Abramski v. United States, USSC No. 12-1493, 2014 WL 2676779 (June 16, 2014), affirming United States v. Abramski, 706 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving a split between federal circuit courts of appeal, the Supreme Court holds that the prohibition in 18 U. S. C. § 922(a)(6) against making false statements about “any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale” of a firearm applies to a “straw” purchaser—a person who buys a gun on someone else’s behalf while falsely claiming that it is for himself—even if the true buyer could have purchased the gun legally.

How about some light reading and watching for your Friday afternoon?

Do you like the “Happy” song?  You know:  “Clap along if you feel like a room without a roof!” [Chorus: “because I’m happy . . .”]  Well, apparently there’s a law firm just brimming with happy lawyers and they’ve videotaped themselves getting down to the Happy song.  You can watch them boogie here.  On Point’s pretty sure public defenders have a better sense of rhythm!

On review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed by On Point)

When, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.015, a sentencing court orders the expunction of a defendant’s record upon successful completion of his sentence, does expunction occur automatically upon the circuit court clerk’s receipt of the defendant’s certificate of discharge or must the defendant file a petition for expunction?

If the defendant must petition the circuit court for expunction, then: (a) is there a deadline by which he must file it, and (b) who is required to forward the certificate of discharge to the circuit court—the defendant or the Department of Corrections (or other detaining authority)?

If a defendant successfully completes his sentence or probation, thereby earning expunction, may the circuit court revoke the grant of expunction based upon the defendant’s post-discharge conduct?

On review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Was there sufficient evidence to establish Michael H. was “dangerous” under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. or c., based either on his “threats” of suicide or a pattern of acts or omissions showing such impaired judgment that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury?

On review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Did the inclusion in the PSI of statements Alexander made to his probation agent, and the trial court’s consideration of the statements at sentencing, violate Alexander’s right against self-incrimination?

State v. Michael R. Luedtke, 2014 WI App 79, petition for review granted 10/15/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 42 (posts here and here); case activity

Section 346.63(1)(am), which prohibits operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, does not violate due process by failing to require proof that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance. In addition, Luedtke’s due process rights were not violated when the state crime lab destroyed his blood sample before he could have it independently tested.

State v. Jacqueline Robinson, 2014 WI 35, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

From the majority opinion, this looks like an open and shut case. When sentencing Robinson, the trial judge said he misunderstood the sentence she had received in another matter. One day later, he recalled the case and increased the sentence. No double jeopardy violation here, says the majority, Robinson could not yet have had a legitimate expectation of finality in her sentence. The 28-page concurrence and 20-page dissent suggest this case isn’t so simple.