On Point

State v. Jimmie G. Minett, 2014 WI App 40; case activity

Issue:  Whether under State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611, suppression of evidence discovered during a strip search may be a remedy for violation of § 968.255?

Holding:  “No,” said the court of appeals.  Popenhagen simply abrogated case law that prohibited the circuit court from suppressing evidence obtained in violation of a statute when the statute does not expressly require suppression.

State v. Patrick E. Gordon, 2014 WI App 44; case activity

The circuit court’s findings—Gordon was in a high-crime area; he and his friends “recognized the police presence”; and, as a result, Gordon engaged in a “security adjustment,” which is “a conscious or unconscious movement that an individual does when they’re confronted by law enforcement when they’re typically carrying a weapon” and involves placing a hand over the place the gun is to make sure it’s still there (¶¶3-7,

Joel D. Rhodes v. Michael Meisner, No. 13-C-0161 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 12, 2014)

Judge Lynn Adelman of the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, has ordered a new trial for Joel Rhodes, concluding that in State v. Rhodes, 2011 WI App 145, 337 Wis. 2d 594, 807 N.W.2d 1, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unreasonably determined that the trial court properly exercised his discretion in denying Rhodes’s request to reinstate his right to counsel on the eve of trial.

State v. Venceremos Crump, 2013AP2163-CR, District 1, 3/18/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court articulated its reasons for the sentence imposed on Crump as required by State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, in light of the court’s comments in its order denying Crump’s postconviction motion, where it explicitly addressed the three primary sentencing factors and applied those factors to the facts of Crump’s case.

Oconto County v. Robert E. Hammersley, 2013AP1263, District 3, 3/18/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The 10-day time period to request a refusal hearing under § 343.305(10)(a) begins when the driver receives a copy of the notice of intent to revoke, not when the court receives a copy. Thus, where a notice of intent to revoke was filed in the circuit court well after the statute’s 10-day time limit had elapsed, 

State v. Delano W., 2013AP2445 & 2013AP2446, District 1, 3/14/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP2445; 2013AP2446

The trial court did not violate Delano’s due process rights and properly exercised its discretion when it prohibited Delano from visitation with his children pending the trial on a petition to terminate his parental rights to those children.

Under § 48.42(1m),

State v. Ross Timothy Litke, 2013AP1606-CR, 3/11/14, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This was a potentially interesting Daubert case.  The police stopped the car Litke was driving because a tail light was out.  The officer noticed Litke’s bloodshot eyes and asked if he had been drinking.  “Yes, a few beers,” Litke replied.  The officer thus conducted 3 field sobriety tests:  the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test (which Litke flunked),

State v. Daniel M. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39; case activity

The equal protection clause isn’t violated by § 343.307(1)(d)‘s differing treatment of Wisconsin and out-of-state” zero tolerance” OWI offenses (which penalize drivers under the legal drinking age who drive with any alcohol concentration).

Hirsch had two prior driver’s license suspensions for violation Illinois’s zero tolerance law. Under § 343.307(1)(d),

John M.S. v. Marcy J.S., 2013AP2644-FT, District 2, 3/12/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Father’s petition under § 48.13(4) was insufficient because it fails to provide reliable and credible information and contain facts alleging that (1) the child “is in need of protection or services which can be ordered by the court” and (2) the parent “is unable or needs assistance to care for or provide necessary special treatment or care” for the child,

Town of Stettin v. Hoeppner, Appeal No. 2103AP1201, 3/11/14, District 3 (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The Hoeppners found themselves on the wrong side of an action seeking judicial enforcement of certain town ordinances.  When they settled the case, they stipulated to a finding that they were in contempt and to the conditions they had to perform in order to purge the contempt.  Then they failed to purge their contempt,