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On Point is a judicial analysis blog written by members of the Wisconsin State Public Defenders. It includes cases from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and the Supreme Court of the United States.
Joinder: Felon-in-Possession and Offense Involving Weapon
State v. Joshua A. Prescott, 2012 WI App 136; case activity
Felon-in-possession, § 941.29, was properly joined for trial with reckless injury by use of dangerous weapon:
¶17 Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the charges were properly joined. The felon in possession and reckless injury charges were “based on the same act or transaction.” See Wis.
OWI: HGN Test, Outside Presence of Jury – Self-Incrimination
State v. Thomas E. Schmidt, 2012 WI App 137 (recommended for publication); case activity
After performing an HGN test, which exhibited 6 out of 6 indicia of impairment, Schmidt was arrested for OWI. At the ensuing trial, he asserted diabetes as a possible cause for the HGN result. The trial court ordered, as a condition of his testifying to this effect, that he submit to an HGN test outside the presence of the jury.
OWI – Refusal – Probable Cause to Arrest
Village of Little Chute v. John D. Bunnell, 2012AP1266, District 3, 11/14/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Officer’s failure to perform FSTs pursuant to established protocols (HGN test requires 4-second pass-of-the-eye, and officer used 2-second pass), “compromises the validity of the test results,” and therefore “cannot be used to support a determination of probable cause to arrest,” ¶19. Grounds for OWI arrest nonetheless existed:
¶20 However,
State v. Andrew M. Edler, 2011AP2916-CR, District 2, 11/14/12
court of appeals certification review granted 1/15/13; case activity
Issues Certified:
- In Maryland v. Shatzer, ___U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010), the United States Supreme Court held that, even if a defendant has invoked his or her right to counsel, law enforcement may give the Miranda[2] warnings again so long as the defendant has been released from custody for at least fourteen days.
Marvin Peugh v. U.S., USSC No. 12-62, cert granted 11/9/12
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual directs a court to “use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced” unless “the court determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.” Eight courts of appeals have held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated where retroactive application of the Sentencing Guidelines creates a significant risk of a higher sentence.
Maryland v. Alonzo Jay King, Jr., USSC No. 12-207, cert granted 11/9/12
Question Presented (from cert petition):
Does the Fourth Amendment allow the States to collect and analyze DNA from people arrested and charged with serious crimes?
Lower court opinion (King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 42 A.3d 549 (2012))
Under Maryland law, DNA Collection Act, Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety §2-504,
Stalking, § 940.32(2m)(a): Overbreadth Challenge
State v. Gary M. Hemmingway, 2012 WI App 133; case activity
Stalking, § 940.32(2m)(a), which previously survived overbreadth and vagueness challenges based on rights to travel and equal protection, State v. Ruesch, 214 Wis. 2d 548, 571 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1997), now withstands a free-speech challenge: The statute isn’t a facially overbroad regulation of protected speech, in that the first amendment doesn’t immunize intentional conduct aimed at causing serious distress or fear of bodily harm.
Delinquency – Disorderly Conduct – Sufficiency of Evidence
State v. Tyler H., 2012AP914, District 3, 11/6/12, court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Evidence held sufficient to support delinquency adjudication, where juvenile called mother “a fucking whore” after she struck him during a family “squabble” in their home.
¶9 We conclude Tyler’s conduct was of the type that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance. First, we reject Tyler’s argument that his language could not provoke a disturbance because a disturbance was already occurring.
Sufficiency of Evidence–First-Degree Intentional Homicide
State v. William F. Vollbrecht, 2012AP49-CR, District 3, 11/6/12, court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction for first-degree intentional homicide. The jury was entitled to reject Vollbrecht’s testimony that the shot he fired into his ex-girlfriend’s new boyfriend was accidental.
¶12 Vollbrecht’s argument fails on two fronts. First, consistent with Poellinger, the jury was permitted to accept Clark’s revised version of events and reject Vollbrecht’s tenuous explanation of what occurred at the time of the shooting.
Carlos Trevino v. Thaler, USSC No. 10189, Cert Granted 10/29/12
Question Presented (from cert pet):
In federal habeas proceedings, undersigned counsel raised for the first time a claim under Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate the extraordinary mitigating evidence in Mr. Trevino’s life. The federal proceeding was stayed to allow exhaustion, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Mr. Trevino’s Wiggins claim under state abuse of the writ rules.
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On Point provides information (not legal advice) about important developments in the law. Please note that this information may not be up to date. Viewing this blog does not create an attorney-client relationship with the Wisconsin State Public Defender. Readers should consult an attorney for their legal needs.