On Point

Brown County DH & HS v. T.H., 2022AP2168, 2022AP2169, 2022AP2170, & 2022AP2171, District 3, 6/13/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (for 2022AP2168, with links to other consolidated cases)

T.H. (“Terese”) argues the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in terminating her rights to her four children based on continuing denial of physical placement or visitation grounds, § 48.415(4), because it failed to account sufficiently for, and give appropriate weight to, her positive change and the progress she made in meeting court-ordered conditions for reunification. The court of appeals disagrees, finding the circuit court analyzed all the dispositional factors for each child, employed a rational thought process, and weighed the important factors that were supported by the record.

State v. Conrad M. Mader, 2022AP382-CR, District 2, 6/7/23 (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mader was convicted of repeated sexual assault of his stepdaughter. He argues his trial lawyer was ineffective in numerous ways. The court of appeals agrees trial counsel performed deficiently in three respects, but holds trial counsel’s mistakes weren’t prejudicial and therefore Mader isn’t entitled to a new trial.

Winnebago County v. T.G., 2022AP2078, District 2, 6/14/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

At the final hearing on a petition to commit T.G. (“Thomas”) under § 51.20, the County presented evidence he threw urine and feces at a guard on one occasion and later made a threat that he’d act in a way that would require staff to “suit up” and do a cell extraction and then “hurt” staff. (¶¶3-5). Considered together, this evidence satisfied the dangerousness standard under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.

Winnebago County DHS v. B.K.V., 2023AP310, District 2, 6/7/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

B.K.V. filed a postdisposition motion for a new trial in her termination of parental rights proceeding. The court of appeals affirms the circuit court’s denial of her motion.

State v. Michael K. Fermanich, 2023 WI 48, 6/14/23, reversing a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The key takeaway here is that five justices reaffirm and apply State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, and hold that Fermanich is entitled to 433 days sentence credit for time he spent in custody in connection with Oneida County charges that were dismissed and read-in at his Langlade County sentencing. (Opinion, ¶2). A concurrence by Justice Dallet is worth reading as a preemptive response to the dissent’s answer to the question for which the court granted review: whether State v. Tuescher should be reexamined and limited to the unique circumstances present there. A dissent by Chief Justice Ziegler and R.G. Bradley would have overruled Floyd, denied Fermanich credit under Tuescher, and required him to return to custody for an additional 433 days. (See Op., ¶19, Dallet, concurring).

Kenosha County Division of Child and Family Services v. D.R.-R., 2022AP1812, 06/01/23, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In what should not be a shocking outcome, a mother’s failure to appear at a single pre-trial hearing is not “egregious” and does not support a default judgment on grounds.

State v. Wilson P. Anderson, 2023 WI 44, 6/2/23, summarily reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; 2020AP819; case activity (including briefs)

As we’ve noted previously, the court of appeals (in the person of a single judge in District 1) decided this case shortly after the same court (by a three-judge panel of District 4) decided State v. Green, 2021 WI App 18, 396 Wis. 2d 658, 957 N.W.2d 583. Green reversed an order that a criminal defendant be involuntarily medicated to competency, relying on and fleshing out the factors established by Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). In particular, Green required the state to file, for the court’s approval, an individualized treatment plan specifying medications and doses. (Green was then taken up by the supreme court, but its decision addressed other matters, leaving the court of appeals’ reading of Sell intact.) The D1 judge in Wilson’s case didn’t follow Green (or, as the state now concedes, Sell itself) and okayed a med order prepared by a psychologist with a generic recommendation that Wilson be medicated. The supreme court granted Wilson’s petition, and the state’s litigation position changed: it conceded in SCOW that it hadn’t met its burden under Sell. In briefing and argument, the only dispute between the parties was whether the testimony of a medical doctor is always necessary to satisfy Sell‘s requirements.

State v. Danny Arthur Wright, 2021AP1252-CR, District 3, 05/16/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state charged Wright with first degree sexual assault with use of a dangerous weapon. The alleged dangerous weapon at issue was a ZAP STICK. Wright filed a motion in limine to bar the state from calling a Detective to offer expert opinion testimony under Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) and Daubert. The circuit court permitted the testimony after the state cautioned that it would not ask the detective whether the ZAP STICK used in Wright’s case was a dangerous weapon under the relevant statute. The court of appeals affirms on essentially the same basis: the detective’s testimony was permissible “expositional” testimony under State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, 392 Wis. 2d 505, 945 N.W.2d 609, and not subject to the heightened reliability standard for expert opinion testimony.

State v. Heather L. Westrich, 2022AP2001-CR, District 4, 05/25/23 (one-judge opinion, not eligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶¶42-43, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223, the court held a prospective juror to be objectively biased because she knew the victim for 20 years, her parents knew the victim for about 47 years, and she described the victim as a “close friend.” Apparently, a friend “back in the day” isn’t a close friend and doesn’t render a juror objectively biased. (Op., ¶¶14-15).

State v. R.A.M., 2023AP441, 6/6/23, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); petition for review granted 9/26/23; affirmed 6/25/24 case activity

R.A.M. was defaulted on grounds after she missed a single hearing. While the “hearing” was the fourth day of her TPR court trial, she had appeared at every prior hearing, including the first three days of trial.  As all too commonly happens, the circuit court determined that R.A.M.’s single non-appearance was “egregious and in bad faith and without justification” without ever hearing from her, and held that she had waived her right to counsel under Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3. The court of appeals notes the paucity of grounds for this decision in a footnote, but as R.A.M. doesn’t challenge the finding of egregiousness, the opinion doesn’t otherwise address it. It does address what came next: rather than waiting the two days the same statute requires to hold a dispositional hearing after a counsel waiver, the court held the hearing on the same day and terminated R.A.M.’s rights.