On Point

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Miller: Dudley A. Williams; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Community Caretaker

Miller caught the attention of the police by driving very slowly, early in the morning, and pulling into the parking lot of a closed business. But he soon drove off, and neither committed any traffic violations nor engaged in suspicious behavior; his ensuing stop wasn’t supportable under a community caretaker rationale:

¶16      We conclude that Harper’s conduct was not a bona fide community caretaker activity because it did not meet the standard.

court of  appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); for Jackson: Mark S. Rosen; BiC: Resp.; Reply

Double Jeopardy – Retrial Following Mistrial
Mistrial on defendant’s motion, occasioned by prosecutorial failure to disclose that witness was cooperating with police in separate investigation of Jackson, didn’t bar retrial: there was no showing that the prosecutor was aware of the undisclosed information, or that failure to disclose was intended to provoke mistrial,

court of appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); pro se; Resp. Br.

Serial Litigation Bar
Collins’ § 974.06 motion is procedurally barred by his failure to allege a “sufficient reason” for not previously raising issues as part of his prior, no-merit appeal, ¶1.

Bit more interesting than that, in the following sense: the court not only pays lip service to the idea that it “must pay close attention to whether the no merit procedures were followed,”

State v. Carl Ralph Eichorn, 2010 WI App 70; for Eichorn: Melissa Fitzsimmons, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Evidence was sufficient to support stalking conviction, though the requisite “course of conduct” occurred over short span of time:

¶9     In sum, there is more than sufficient evidence under our standard of review to support beyond a reasonable doubt Eichorn’s stalking conviction.

court of appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); for Lonski: Basil M. Loeb; BiC; Resp.

Self-Defense
Lonski’s claim of self-defense (that she was protecting herself from “unlawful” use of force by a uniformed officer) was rejected as not credible by the trial court in a bench trial, and that credibility determination wasn’t clearly erroneous.

Jury Waiver
Lonski’s jury waiver was adequately canvassed,

court of appeals decision; ror Lewis: John T. Wasielewski; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

Appellate Procedure – Standard of Review: Government Informant

¶16      Our discussion must begin, as it almost always does, with the standard of review.  In deciding whether a person is a government informant or agent for purposes of this Sixth Amendment analysis, the determination regarding the relationship or understanding between the police and the informant is a factual determination.

publication orders, 4/26/10

2008AP001763 CR 2010 WI App 47 State v. Benjamin W. Mercer

2008AP002980 CR 2010 WI App 48 State v. Karon M. Asmus

2008AP002981 CR 2010 WI App 48 State v. Karon M. Asmus

2009AP000140 CR 2010 WI App 49 State v. Clifford D. Bvocik

2009AP000371 2010 WI App 50 Keith J. Johnson v. Washburn County

2009AP000385 CR 2010 WI App 51 State v.

Questions Presented:

May a party appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits if the party chose not to appeal the order before trial?

SCOTUS docket: here. Scotusblog, briefs: here.

This have anything to do with SPD-related practice? Not really, strictly speaking. But, isn’t the problem at least somewhat reminiscent of the recurrent one based in State v.

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); pro se; Resp. Br.

Controlled Substance – Prescribed by Out-of-State Doctor
Possession of marijuana, prescribed by California doctor under laws of that state, may be prosecuted in Wisconsin: though an exception exists for possession obtained by prescription from a “practitioner,” § 961.41(3g), the practitioner must be licensed in Wisconsin, § 961.01(19)(a). ¶10.

Well, the court’s conclusion might be grammatically sound,

Questions Presented:

California Civil Code sections 1746-1746.5 prohibit the sale of violent video games to minors under 18 where a reasonable person would find that the violent content appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors, is patently offensive to prevailing community standards as to what is suitable for minors, and causes the game as a whole to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. The respondent industry groups challenged this prohibition on its face as violating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.